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1  AN INTRODUCTION TO PPP  CONCEPT 
by Prof. Dr. Hans-Wilhelm Alfen and Yu-Chien Amber Jan,  
Bauhaus-Universität Weimar 
and Prof. Dr. Satyanarayana N. Kaladindi and L. Boeing Singh, 
Indian Institute of Technology Madras 
 
Development of infrastructure projects with private capital through Public Pri-
vate Partnership (PPP) route has become one of the commonly adopted 
procurement strategies in developed and developing countries. All over the 
world where PPP procurement has been used in one form or another, the way 
in which it is carried out has become an important issue. This chapter covers 
the general issues of PPP implementation and presents an overview of the use 
of PPP in the delivery of public infrastructure and services across the world. 
There is no standard method of PPP implementation as each country adapts 
the process as appropriate for its own culture, economy, political climate and 
legal system. It is therefore essential that all parties likely to be involved have a 
common understanding of the principles underlying PPP structures and an 
appreciation of the key issues from the standpoints of the private as well as 
the public sectors.  
The quantum of investment in the infrastructure projects by the private sector 
entities depends on the position of the project on the continuum between 
service contract and divestiture. PPP projects with substantial private invest-
ments such as Build Operate Transfer (BOT) and its variants involve participa-
tion of stakeholders with diverse perspectives. The diverse perspectives can 
lead to different perceptions on the viability of the project by the stakehold-
ers. The first section of this chapter covers in brief the different stakeholders’ 
perspectives and the parameters commonly used to measure the viability of 
the project from their perspectives. The second section discusses about the 
types of financial instruments used in financing PPP projects. The strategies 
employed in selecting financial instruments to fund the activities in the three 
broad phases of PPP project lifecycle are also discussed in this section. This 
section also covers the relationships between the financing strategy used for 
funding the activities involved in the phases of the project implementation 
cycle and the risk profile of the project over these phases. The chapter con-
cludes with the section on the brief introduction to the risk management 
process employed in PPP projects. 
 
1.1  What  i s  PPP?  
Public-private partnerships (PPP) in infrastructure development involve private 
sector participation in any or all of the design, construction, financing and 
operation phases of a public utility infrastructure, service or both. Examples of 
infrastructure developed through PPP models abound worldwide. It has been 
used in industrialised countries, such as the UK and Germany, and in newly in-
dustrialising countries with tremendous infrastructure demands, such as China 
and India, as well as in some developing countries in particular in Latin Amer-
ica. The capital-intensive nature of basic infrastructure and competition for 
limited government budgetary resources have prompted governments to in-
vite private investors to fulfill the widening demand-supply gap for infrastruc-
ture while the governments are endeavoring to meet the social commitments 
within the fiscal constraints. 
Attention has been drawn that the level of adoption of PPPs across the world 
differs widely. Typically, in industrialised countries, PPPs are used in areas of 
public service provision including education, health services, waster man-
agement and public buildings. While in industrialising countries with enormous 
needs for basic infrastructure, PPPs are often seen in the power, water or road 
sectors in order to sustain the countries’ rapid economic growth. 
1.2  Def in i t ion  and  De l imi ta t ion  o f  PPP  
There is a great variety of definitions for PPP available worldwide. The contents 
and objectives may vary according to the country specific background and 
the specific interests of the individual author. Some academic and industrial 
practitioners still regard the definition of PPP as being very ambiguous. In 
some cases, the term public-private partnership describes a wide range of ar-
rangements whereby government responsibilities are outsourced to commer-
cial partners, and risk is shared between the public and private sectors to 
bring about desired outcomes in areas associated with public policy.  
As one example, the official definition of PPP by the “Federal Report on PPP in 
Public Real Estate, Part I: Guideline”, commissioned by the German Federal 
Department of Transportation, Construction and Real Estate (BMVBW) in 2003, 
is as follows: 
 
“The term PPP refers to a long-term, contractually regulated co-
operation between the public and private sector for the efficient fulfil-
ment of public tasks in combining the necessary resources (e.g. know-
how, operational funds, capital, personnel) of the partners and distribut-
ing existing project risks appropriately according to the risk manage-
ment competence of the project partners”. 
 
There is a long tradition of the involvement of the private sector in the devel-
opment, maintenance and funding of public facilities and services. PPPs, 
however, go beyond traditional contracting of private sector organisations. 
EAP3N studies have concluded that, typically a PPP scheme allows the pri-
vate sector to gain and retain control over a facility for a long, pre-specified 
period of time and is made responsible for its operation before it is handed 
over to the public sector at the expiry of the contracting period. And that pe-
riod should be sufficient to enable the private sector to recover construction 
and maintenance costs and achieve the required rate of return on its invest-
ment, through either user fees like tolls, water tariffs, ticketing or down pay-
ments like availability payments made by the principal. The private sector as-
sumes substantial risk that would otherwise be held by the public sector, in 
exchange for compensation and the public sector ceding substantial control 
over the delivery of infrastructure services. 
In addition, there are four main characteristics of PPP: 
 
 efficiency gains through appropriate sharing of risks and responsibilities; 
the public sector retains mainly sovereign tasks and the private bears 
those for implementation; 
 lifecycle and private investment as crucial elements of PPP’s incentive 
structures; 
 long term contractual relationship; and 
 innovation, in particular through output specification, service levels and 
payment mechanisms, as a new way of describing the services to be 
supplied. 
 
One of the major objectives of PPP is to transfer tasks and responsibility for the 
provision of infrastructure to the private sector, in order to gain efficiency, cost 
reliability and financial security. The traditional procurement of public infra-
structure and its related services has given way to the private sector assuming 
responsibility for design, construction, operation, management, maintenance 
and finance, with the public sector as the customer or, sometimes, as the di-
rect user, paying for the provision of a service. The public sector, nevertheless, 
should not lose its sovereign task such as assessing and determining infrastruc-
ture needs, monitoring and supervising of an efficient and competitive pro-
curement system, and assuring all required environmental and safety stan-
dards in the service delivery. 
The principal aim of PPP here is to involve the private sector in the provision of 
public services, shifting the role of the public sector from the owner and pro-
vider to purchaser and guardian of the interests of the public. It is driven by 
the belief that the public sector should focus on its core functions, leaving the 
private sector to perform those functions which it can often do more cost-
effectively and efficiently. One of the key political drivers behind the PPP is 
the desire to improve the nation’s infrastructure and supporting public servic-
es without placing undue strain on scarce public funds and without having to 
increase taxation.  
1.3 Advantages of  PPP:  E f f ic iency Gains  
Generally, the advantages of PPP are considered as follows: 
 
 to remove the responsibility of funding the investment from the gov-
ernment’s balance sheet; 
 to introduce competition; 
 to adopt managerial practices and experience of the private sector; 
 to restructure public sector service by embracing private sector capital 
and practices; and 
 to achieve greater efficiency than traditional methods of providing 
public services. 
 
The last one, efficiency gain, is the main source of sustainable public savings 
and, therefore the main objective of and justification for PPP. In the UK, the 
Treasury estimates that the use of PPPs has produced average savings of 17% 
to 25% over all sectors during the past 10 years. 
Most governments are drawing their decisions for PPP based on greater effi-
ciency the private promoter delivers in comparison to the traditional public 
procurement. Major drivers for efficiency gains are transfer of risk to the pri-
vate sector, long-term nature of contracts, incentive structures and payment 
upon performance, output-oriented service specification, competition be-
tween bidders, incorporate feedback and negotiation in the procurement 
process, innovation and management skills by the private sector, and admin-
istrative cost reduction. 
For example, in Germany, the basis for the decision whether to adopt a PPP 
approach or to procure the project conventionally through government re-
sources lies in the evaluation of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC). Each PPP 
project is, before being tendered, compared to traditional public sector pro-
curement by a so called “value for money test” (or efficiency comparison 
test), which comprises quantitatively a comparison of the net present value of 
all cost occurred during the intended contract period, i.e. for design, con-
struction, finance, maintenance, operation etc. for the traditional (PSC) and 
the PPP option. A simplified structure of such a calculation is demonstrated in 
Figure 1.  
Also in many other industrialised countries, efficiency gains have to be proven 
before the contract award and the governmental agency estimates the cost 
of traditional public procurement by setting up a PSC. Structuring a PSC, 
however, bears numerous sources for false estimations. Common critics are 
the lack of reliable historic data for lifecycle cost estimation, over-optimistic 
assumptions for public delivery in time and on budget, selection of appropri-
ate discount rates and mechanism applied for risk stress testing.  
PSC therefore may not be the only approach in assessing efficiency gains. The 
key decision criterion for PPP should be determined by a suitable framework 
to assess and control efficiency gain with respect to a country’s economic 
and legal conditions. In many Asian countries, no PSC is being set up for de-
termining efficiency gains. Efficiency is achieved by assuming, politically, that 
the private sector is by nature more efficient than the public sector in delivery 
services. PPP tendering is done without any PSC test and past experiences 
have shown that greater efficiency has been achieved through competition 
among bidders and introduction of the market feedback period.  
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Retained 
Risks
Periodic, 
performance 
oriented 
availability 
payments
Traditional PPP-Procurement
Procurement
efficiency 
gains
 
Figure 1 – Structure of an Efficiency Comparison or Value for Money Test 
  
1.4  E lements  Determin ing  the  “PPP  Bus iness  Mode l ”  
PPP schemes are often country specific and determined by the existing indi-
vidual legal, institutional, political, administrative and economic framework as 
well as by sector and even project specific aspects. However, we can still find 
some “toolbox” of typical PPP procedures and instruments that is quite inde-
pendent from any country, sector, and project specific framework and insofar 
more generally applicable and valid (see Figure 2).  
 
 
“Toolbox” PPP Specific Procedures
Country Specific Framework
Sector Specific Issues
Project Specific Issues
• Efficiency Comparison (PSC)
• Risk Management
• Service Delivery Management
• Partnership Management
• Contract Management
• legal
• political 
• institutional 
• Tariff Regulation
• Health and Safety Regulations
• Stakeholders 
• Site 
• Financial Instruments
• etc.
• administrative
• financial
• entrepreneurial 
• industrial 
• economical
• etc.
• Type of Services
• Technical and other 
Requirements
• Needs 
• Objectives 
• Volume 
• Type of Contract 
• Ownership
• etc.
• etc. 
 
Figure 2 – PPP Specific Procedure Toolbox  
 
In order to give an overview of PPP from an international perspective and to 
take into account its variety and complexity, the most appropriate way 
seems to be to first define categories of PPP and their classifying criteria. Such 
categories are shown in Figure 3 and basic distinction between different cat-
egories will be explained in the following sub-sectors. 
Type of Works:
- new Construction
- extension
- widening
- rehabilitation
Type of Contract Model:
- DBFO
- concession
(BOT, BOOT, BOO etc.)
- mixed SPV
- etc.
Forms of Privatisation:
- formal
- functional
- material
Type of Project:
- green field
- brown field
Mode of Sector Financing:
- budget financing 
- user financing
(toll, vignette ticketing etc.)
Sector or Sub-Sector 
of application:
- Transportation
- Supply / Disposal
- Public Real Estate
Kind of Partnership:
- vertical 
- horizontal
Basic Model:
- urban development 
- public service provision
Type of Asset:
- single building 
- bundle or network
 
Figure 3 – Elements determining the PPP-Business Model 
1.4 .1  Bas i c  Mode l :  Urban  Deve lopment  versus  Pub l i c  
Serv i ce  P rov is ion  
Generally, there are two fields where PPP can be applied: (1) in urban devel-
opment and (2) in public real estate/ infrastructure management. PPP is one 
option available for governments to tap private capital and competence in-
to developing urban areas and revitalising deteriorated urban neighbor-
hoods. However, such PPP may not address the long-term problems in all pub-
lic properties due to inevitable profit oriented approach by private 
developers. In this book, our focus is therefore on studying PPP as a manage-
ment tool in public real estate and infrastructure.  
The provision of infrastructure and public services involves various tasks, and it 
is assumed that there are efficiency gains to be achieved by appropriate 
delegation of tasks and responsibilities. In this light, PPP is a tool at government 
disposal in the pursuit of efficiency because it is, in particular, predicated on 
the assumption of the proper sharing of risks, with each risk born by the part-
ner best able to manage it. Under such circumstances, the application of PPP 
ultimately secures value for money. 
1.4 .2  Forms o f  P r i va t i sa t ion  and  P r i va t i sa t ion   
Deve lopment  Pa th  
PPPs derived from the evolution of infrastructure privatisation and the origin of 
privatisation can be traced back to the concept of optimising public admini-
stration, which is now usually referred to as the ‘new public management’ 
and means that the government adopts proven management techniques 
like reorganisation, restructuring and improved monitoring and controlling sys-
tems into its administration.  
In order to provide a clear understanding for the different PPP models, we 
should first describe the privatisation development path, along which three 
principle forms of privatisation emerge, namely formal, functional and mate-
rial privatisation (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 – PPP and Privatisation 
 
 
1. Formal Privatisation 
It means that public tasks are bundled and outsourced to a legally privatised 
enterprise which remains nevertheless 100% state-owned. Since there is no 
real private partner, it is considered only as a form of privatisation but not as a 
PPP. 
 
2. Material Privatisation 
It refers to the permanent transfer of former public tasks, including property 
rights of the infrastructure asset, through sale or stock-market flotation (IPO) to 
either a complete private entity or a mixed entity with both private and pub-
lic shareholders. The former is termed as full material privatisation and the lat-
ter as partial material privatisation or ‘horizontal PPP’. 
 
 
 
3. Functional Privatisation 
It refers to the transfer of former public tasks to a private partner for a certain 
period of time. It may concern, firstly, the conventional outsourcing of partially 
dividable services lot-wise, e.g. “design and build”, “build and maintain”, and 
“build and finance”, etc. And secondly, when the tasks are regarded as a 
fully integrated value chain and delegated to a private partner. ‘Vertical PPP’ 
is subordinate to this form of functional privatisation. It is based on a so-called 
lifecycle approach and has one common characteristic - the transfer of re-
sponsibility for design, construction, finance, operation and maintenance to 
the private sector for a longer period, usually 25 to 30 years, without transfer-
ring property right.  
Sometimes a specific kind of horizontal PPP may also exist under a functional 
privatisation, namely under the form of a “mixed” Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) or Project Company, which is, nevertheless, established for a limited pe-
riod of time defined in the PPP contract and does not involve transferring of 
property rights.  
1.4 .3  K ind  o f  Par tnersh ip  
By far we distinguish PPPs with regards to kinds of partnerships. The public-
private relationship in PPPs can either be “horizontal” or “vertical” in nature. In 
a horizontal partnership both partners are directly engaged as shareholders in 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which is to providing required infrastructure 
services. In a vertical partnership the public sector contracts with the private 
partner through a concession agreement or a PPP-contract, and the latter is 
responsible for providing required services. Figure 5 illustrates again the struc-
tures of these two partnerships. Some existing literature classifies PPPs accord-
ing to the corporation organisation which undertakes the public services. 
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Figure 5 – Horizontal and vertical Partnerships 
1.4 .4  Mode  o f  Sec tor  F inanc ing   
PPPs can further be divided according to the existing mode of sector financ-
ing into user-financed and budget-financed models. Under the former model, 
the private partner has its investment recovered through user charges that 
are directly linked to the infrastructure or services, such as tolls, vignette, li-
censing fee, water tariffs and ticketing. While under the latter model the pri-
vate partner delivers service in return of down payments made by the public 
partner that are commensurate with the service level provided or upon avail-
ability of the facility. A key government responsibility here is to decide which 
mode of financing to apply and the choice is subject to the nature of infra-
structure service as well as political and economic circumstances of that 
country. The structure of financing will also affect the level of efficiency gains 
achieved. More details will be given in Chapter Two. 
1.4 .5  PPP  Cont rac t  Mode ls  in  In te rnat iona l  P rac t i ce  
Under functional and material privatisations, there are various PPP contract 
models employed in the international practice for different sectors, as shown 
in Table 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Different PPP Contract Models 
 
 
These varying models of PPPs have become commonly known by the acro-
nyms of the tasks delegated. The following gives more details regarding what 
these models might entail: 
 
1. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement involves the transfer of re-
sponsibility for constructing, financing and operating a single facility to 
a private sector partner for a fixed period of time. At the end of that 
period, the responsibility reverts to the public party. The bundling of 
building and operations allows for “lifecycle efficiency”. The additional 
financing cost incurred by using the private sector can be offset by a 
reduction in operating costs resulting from the lifecycle approach in de-
sign, construction and operation. BOT is perhaps the most familiar mod-
els of PPP and the basic concept has been employed with some varia-
tions in many different ways, including BOOT, DBLOT and DBROT. Some 
models are more prevalent in some nations than others.  
2. Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) means that the private sector 
partner is also asked to supply resources for having the project built. His 
future revenue streams are usually based on availability payments 
made by the public sector or shadow tolls. Hence this contract model be-
longs to typical budget-financed PPPs. 
PPP [functional] PPP [material] 
(D)BOT 
(Design) Build (Finance) Operate 
Transfer 
(D)BOO 
(Design) Build (Finance)  
Operate Own 
 Concession Model BDBOO Buy Design Build Operate Own 
(D)BOOT 
(Design) Build Operate Own  
Transfer 
  
DBFO(T) 
Design Build Finance Operate 
(Transfer) 
DBROO Design Build Rent Operate Own 
 Availability Payments Model   
(D)BOOT 
(Design) Build Operate Own  
Transfer 
  
DBLOT 
Design Build Lease Operate  
Transfer 
  
DBROT 
Design Build Rent Operate  
Transfer 
  
 Contracting Model   
3. Build-Operate-Own (BOO) involves the granting of ownership rights in 
perpetuity to develop, finance, design, build, own, operate, and main-
tain an asset. The private sector owns the asset outright and retains the 
ownership and operating revenue risk, with no transfer to the public 
sector. It is hence categorised as material PPP. 
1.5  Phases  o f  a  PPP  P ro jec t   
The phases of PPP projects may vary with the different categories of PPP de-
scribed so far, but PPP generally evolves through a series of the following 
phases and the Figure 6 depicts its outline. The following description of the 
procurement process refers to a vertical rather than to a horizontal partner-
ship. 
 
Phase I: Needs assessment & option appraisal 
At this initial stage of project formation, the need for a particular infrastructure 
facility is identified, normally by the government or more often by the project 
executing organisation. The needs assessment is usually done in form of a 
cost-benefit analysis. It will then consider what means it has for financing that 
facility and whether it is affordable. Also part of that Phase 1 are first consid-
erations concerning the procurement method to be applied by undertaking 
a preliminary qualitative PPP Test. It analyses, whether the project might at all 
be suitable for being carried out on a PPP basis by investigating qualitative 
“no-go criteria” of legal, political, organisational or technical character. 
 
Phase II: Preparation & conception 
Once the project proves the primary feasibility to a PPP solution, the prepara-
tion works proceed by a detailed development of the PPP option in order to 
enable a comparison with the traditional one. At this stage, governments are 
drawing their decisions for PPP based on greater efficiency the private sector 
will deliver in comparison to the traditional public procurement. In some coun-
tries, PPP projects are compared to traditional public sector finance by a 
quantitative public sector comparator (PSC) calculation. 
 
Phase III: Tendering process & contract award 
Once the government has determined to proceed with PPP, it will decide 
what procurement procedure to follow, given the applicable laws. Common-
ly the government will employ competitive tendering. It will include detailed 
output specifications as to the infrastructure facility and the length and terms 
of the PPP contract in the invitation to tender. Accordingly, prospective spon-
sors, usually acting as consortia, will carry out their own feasibility studies and 
prepare to submit bids. The government will evaluate these bids and select a 
number of preferred bidders for negotiation, during which the terms of the 
project will be discussed and redrawn. At the end the contract is awarded to 
the bidder that best conforms with the defined awarding criteria. 
 
Phase IV: Implementation & contract management 
The implementation starts with the construction of project facilities. After pass-
ing agreed completion tests, the facilities will be accepted by the govern-
ment and can commence operation. In the case of user financed schemes, 
the SPV will use the revenues generated by the project to operate and main-
tain the facilities, to repay the finance and to pay a reasonable rate of return 
to its investors. Otherwise, in budget financed schemes, the SPV will receive 
periodical down payments e.g. based on availability of the asset. 
 
Phase V: Contract termination 
Upon the termination of the contract, the project facilities under those func-
tional PPP models will be transferred to the government, usually for nil or no-
minal consideration and up to standard and conditions predefined in the PPP 
contract. 
 
Phase IV: Implementation & contract management
Phase V: Contract termination
Phase I: Needs assessment & option appraisal
 Assessment of need, economic & financial feasibility
 Selection of potential realisation concepts
 PPP-Test
Phase II: Preparation & conception
 Development of traditional procurement option (PSC)
 Development of PPP procurement option
 Efficiency comparison (Value for Money test)
Phase III: Tendering process & contract award
 Preparation and prequalification
 Negotiation procedure
 Efficiency comparison 
 Contract award and closing the deal
 Construction/ operation
 Performance control by the government
 Transfer
 Reuse or decommission of assets  
Figure 6 – Typical Procurement Process for functional/vertical PPPs 
1.6  Enab l ing  F ramework  
1 .6 .1  Lega l  F ramework  
Enabling legislation must be in place before PPP programmes can be em-
barked on in a country. The government has to demonstrate a clear, long-
term political commitment to the use of PPP. Such commitment may manifest 
itself in a variety of practical ways. PPP inevitably involve highly complex 
commercial and financial structures. This is attributable to, firstly, the many 
stakeholders involved and, secondly, the wide range of risks associated with 
the project which has to be allocated properly. A third factor is the long-term 
nature of PPP schemes, which means the arrangements must be flexible and 
responsive to circumstances changing over time. To meet these requirements 
will necessitate the existence of a reliable and well-developed legal frame-
work. Such issues can be addressed by introducing some specific ‘PPP laws’, 
as we have seen in many Asian countries. However, in spite of whether such 
specific legislation is in place, certain legislative changes are necessary to as-
sure that PPP concept is consistent with the country’s constitution. It some-
times takes years for the national or state parliament to enact the appropri-
ate legislation.  
1.6 .2  Regu la tory  F ramework  
Usually sectors in infrastructure services, such as power, gas, water or trans-
port, are among the most heavily regulated areas of economic activity. 
Hence the investors will require an optimum balance between the regulators 
objectives that are capable of impacting on project cash flows, such as pric-
ing or service levels. In addition, governments will wish to ensure that there is 
an effective regulatory system to protect, on the one hand, the investor from 
direct political interference and, on the other, the user from negative impacts 
of monopolies. 
1.6 .3  Admin is t ra t i ve  f ramework  
A legal framework that is favourable to the private sector in the rights it con-
fers or protects is worthless if it is not underpinned by an effective system of 
public administration. PPP involves a redefinition of the role of government. 
With PPP projects, government’s role becomes that of exercising general su-
pervision throughout the project lifespan, including inspecting, monitoring and 
regulating. One of the most important functions of government here is to 
manage an appropriate procurement process, so that the project will meet 
the objectives set.  
1.7  Cont rac tua l  F ramework  
A PPP project involves a number of important contractual arrangements 
among the participants. It is a complex network of relationships involving mul-
tiple parties and their formal relationships are defined by contracts. Figure 7 il-
lustrates the principle parties and contracts in a typical PPP project structure. 
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Figure 7 – Principal parties and different kind of contracts in a typical PPP structure  
 
Instead of the public sector procuring a capital asset by paying it up-front 
and in full out of the state budget, in a typical PPP project a single, stand-
alone, special purpose business, the Project Company (or SPV), is created. 
This company is operated and financed by the private sector alone or with 
public shares, and delivers the necessary service to the public sector under 
the framework of a long-term concession in return of payment commensurate 
with the service levels provided. The Project Company raises the required fi-
nance, both debt and equity, secured against the performance of the con-
tracts for the underlying service. The funds are raised against the expectation 
of the projected cash-flows generated by the project. 
1.8  P ro jec t  Agreement  
The project agreement is the foundation upon which the project is devel-
oped. This is the principle agreement in any PPP transaction and it sets out the 
relationship between and the rights and obligations of the public and private 
sectors. It is the centre of the complex web of various financial, constructions 
and consultant contracts constituting the whole project contract package, 
i.e. it underpins the entire matrix of contracts needed to implement the 
project. Many of the key provisions of other contracts will be driven by its 
terms. At the very least, all the contracts must fit together into an integrated 
whole and be compatible with the project agreement. 
The project agreement is the core contractual document in any PPP project. 
Lying at the heart of the contractual framework, it governs the relationship 
between the awarding authority and the project company. It is also the main 
legal instrument for the government to regulate private sector’s activities and 
decisions. The role of the project agreement is to set out the core obligations of 
each of the public and private parties and to establish the allocation of risks 
between them. Whilst project agreements vary depending on the particular 
category of PPP project and between sectors, there are recurring issues and 
themes. A number of these are contractual contents with regards to financing, 
design and construction, operation and maintenance, land issues, termination, 
guarantee agreements, monitoring and variation procedure, and dispute reso-
lution.  
1.9  P ro jec t  Shareho lders  and  the i r  Perspec t i ves  
Every PPP project will involve the following main shareholders. It is difficult to 
generalise each of their objectives because of the diversity of subject-matter 
of PPP projects. However, those objectives at the highest level remain the 
same from one project to another. The principal project stakeholders and 
their contributions to the project are summarised in Table 2. 
 
1. The project executing organisation 
The project executing organisation or agency perceives the need for an infra-
structure project and determines whether the project is suitable for financing 
on a PPP basis. In addition, the government has to enact legislation specific 
for the implementation of PPP and provide for the regulatory regime within 
which the project is to function, depending on the political and economic 
circumstances of the country. In some cases, the government will provide 
support for the project in some form. This might include the provision of land, 
incentives for investment, and the granting of licenses and consents required.  
The objectives of the project executing organisation will always be to transfer 
risks to the private sector and to achieve greater efficiency. Risk transfer is at 
the heart of the PPP and if risks are transferred to the private sector correctly, 
the efficient management of those risks by the private sector can often offset 
the private sector’s higher cost of borrowing. The elements of risk transfer are 
considered in further detail in Chapter Two. 
 
2. The project company 
The project sponsors will normally form a Special Purpose Vehicle to act as the 
concessionaire. The SPV is capitalised by the sponsors through equity funding 
and the relationship between the sponsors themselves is set out in a share-
holders’ agreement. This agreement addresses issues such as the capital in-
vestment proportions and each one’s obligation, partly supported by parent 
or affiliated companies, throughout the concession period. 
The sponsors are mainly looking for a proper return on their equity. Inevitably, 
in many respects their objectives will be the converse of the government’s ob-
jectives, particularly in relation to the area of risk transfer. 
The SPV may have other private equity investors, either initially or as the 
project progresses. These private investors also have the primary goal as to 
maximise the return on the investment.  
 
3. Lending banks 
Many PPP projects are funded to a great extent by commercial debt. The 
banks usually finance the project on a ‘non-recourse’ or ‘limited recourse’ 
basis. This means they look only to the project’s assets and revenue stream for 
repayment set forth in the project agreement, but not to additional sources of 
security, such as the total assets or balance sheet of the sponsors. 
The banks will therefore conduct evaluations to identify and test sensitivities to 
ascertain whether the project financials are sufficiently robust to attract non-
recourse finance. The fact that the commercial lenders will be committing 
substantial sums on a limited or non-recourse basis provides additional assur-
ance that the financial viability of the project will have been thoroughly ana-
lysed at the outset by knowledgeable financial experts. The banks will also 
exercise certain degree of control over the progress of the works and con-
tract administration to ensure cost, schedule and completion guarantees. 
4. Development finance institutions (DFIs) 
Development finance institutions have similar objectives as lending banks in 
terms of their position in PPP projects. Difference is made in their mandate to 
promote economic and social progress of the countries or regions where they 
operate. 
 
5. Contractor, operator and other supplier 
The construction contractor and the operator of the project facilities are typi-
cally also project sponsors, or affiliates of the sponsors. They are employed by 
the SPV in accordance with fixed price turnkey contracts. Under such con-
tracts, the contractor and operator took over principal risks inherent in con-
struction, operation and maintenance from the SPV.  
 
 
Table 2 – Principle project stakeholders and their contributions 
Objectives Contributions 
Project executing organisation 
Efficiency gain 
Leveraging of government budget 
Acceleration of the project 
Better service quality 
Compliance with requirement and regulations 
Concession/ licenses 
Service fee 
 
Sponsors 
Adequate rate of return 
Strategic capability 
Equity 
Competence and experience 
Investors 
Maximising of return Private equity 
Monitoring of quality 
Financial competence  
Lending banks 
Loan repayment 
Careful financial evaluation 
Debt 
Monitoring of quality 
Financial competence 
Development finance institutions (DFIs) 
Loan repayment 
Support of development goals 
Debt 
Monitoring of quality 
Financial competence 
Construction contractor 
Sufficient margin Required construction work 
Turnkey fixed-price contract 
Facility manager and operators 
Sufficient margin Required service 
Fixed-price contract 
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1.10  PPP  P ro jec t  S takeho lders ’  Perspec t i ve  
The stakeholders to PPP projects have different perspectives for participating 
in the projects. Public entities are more conscious of the need for investment 
in infrastructure as it has spillover effects with widespread social and econom-
ic costs and benefits. However, allocation of budgetary resources in building 
the infrastructure is constrained by the need for huge investments in social 
and economic development projects. Governments are motivated to pro-
cure infrastructure projects through PPP route in view of theirs desire to reduce 
sovereign borrowings, leverage the scare budgetary resources, bring in effi-
ciency in the erstwhile inefficient public procurement system, and the consid-
eration of benefits due to sharing of the financial risks and rewards between 
public and private sectors (Grimsey and Lewis 2002). These have inspired the 
public entities to shift their role from being creator of the infrastructure with 
regard to the traditional public procurement system to facilitator in PPP mode 
of procurement. They are more concerned in creating an enabling environ-
ment to attract private investment and introduce reforms in the public pro-
curement process in order to facilitate participation of the private sector bo-
dies. 
The private partners in the public private partnership have a different pers-
pective from those of the public partners. The private sector bodies that form 
the other partner of the partnership come from different industries with diverse 
core competencies. From the financing perspective, the two key players con-
stituting the private sector can be broadly classified as investors and lending 
agencies. The major private entrepreneurs providing equity to PPP projects 
are the EPC contractors, O&M contractors, governments (providing equity in 
the form of subsidies and grants), and capital markets. Whereas, the organisa-
tions providing debt financing are, but not limited to, commercial banks, na-
tional and regional development banks, and multilateral and bilateral organi-
sations. The active investors like EPC and O&M contractors are the strategic 
partners. They are more focused on gains that can be expected from the 
construction and operation of the projects. The lenders look at the higher re-
turns that can be achieved by investing in infrastructure projects in compari-
son with other investment avenues. There is also a difference in perspectives 
of the investors and lenders. Investors are more focussed on the opportunities 
associated with the project while lenders are more concerned with the down-
side risks of the project. 
 28
Public entities and private sector bodies analyzed the viability of the project 
from their perspectives to examine the fulfillment of theirs objectives. Gov-
ernments give more focus on the economic appraisal while the private par-
ties do concentrate more on the financial appraisal of the project. 
The financial appraisal of PPP project systematically evaluates the monetary 
costs involved in the development, construction, and operation of the project 
and the projected monetary revenues from the operation of the project over 
the concession period. The financial appraisal besides giving an idea on the re-
turn that could be expected from the project also gives an estimate of the size 
of the funding gap that have to be met by the public sector contribution, influ-
ence of the relative proportion of the equity and debt components of the cap-
ital structure, and relationships between the cost of the capital and the 
risk/reward appetite of the funding agencies. Some of the measures commonly 
used to assess the financial viability of the project by the investors and lenders 
based on the project’s financial characteristics are (Walker and Smith 1995): 
 
 Return on investment 
 Return on equity 
 Net present value 
 Payback period 
 Debt service coverage ratio 
 
Economic appraisal is the systematic way of analyzing all the costs and bene-
fits of all the ways in which the project objective can be met (New South Wales 
Policy Guidelines 1999). Economic appraisal is concerned with the wider eco-
nomic costs and benefits associated with the project, beyond the monetary re-
turn to the project company. Economic viability is more or less computed in the 
similar manner as financial viability as far the method of computation is con-
cerned. In order to assess the economic viability of the project, the monetary 
costs and revenues associated with the project excluding the financing-related 
cash flows are converted into direct economic costs and benefits. The implica-
tions of the project on the host country economic environment in the form of, 
viz: the growth and employment generation in other industries, technology 
transfer, and labour force skills give an estimate of the indirect economic costs 
and benefits of the project. The net benefits of the project derived from the di-
rect and indirect economic costs and benefits are discounted to get an idea 
on the economic viability of the project. 
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1.11  PPP  P ro jec t  F inanc ing  
The success of PPP projects greatly depends on the financial structuring of the 
project. The projects have to make judicious selection of financial instruments 
to bring the financial cost of the project to an optimal level with enough in-
centives for all the parties to the projects to perform at their best. The follow-
ing sections will briefly describe the typical funding agencies, kinds of financial 
instruments used for funding PPP projects, issues considered during the formu-
lation of financing strategy, and the relationship between the structure of the 
financial package and risk profile of the project. 
 
1.11 .1  Fund ing  Sources  and  F inanc ia l  Ins t ruments  
PPP projects are characterized with high debt component in their capital 
structure. The equity component of the capital structure is normally provided 
by the project promoter, government promoting the project through PPP 
route, or infrastructure investment fund. The debt financings are normally pro-
vided by the commercial banks, capital markets, and national and regional 
development banks. In addition to these, the other agencies providing fund-
ing to PPP projects are: 
 
1. EPC contractors 
2. Equipment suppliers 
3. Entrepreneurs 
4. Export Credit Agencies 
5. Bilateral and Multilaterals organizations 
6. Institutional Investors 
7. National and Development Banks 
 
These funding agencies provide different categories of financial instruments in 
financing the PPP projects. Table 3 shows the wide range of financial instru-
ments used in financing PPP road projects. 
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Table 3 – Financial Instruments used in PPP Road Projects, Source: World Bank 1999 
 
Financing Means Private Funding Public Funding 
General funding None Common tax 
Specific funding None Earmarked tax 
Equity Common stock 
Mezzanine  
finance 
Equity type Preferred stock, stock with selling option, etc. 
Debt type Subordinated loan, subordinated bonds, convertible bonds 
Debt 
Loans 
Commercial loans 
(syndicated loans) 
Loans from government or  
international financing  
agencies, regional development  
banks 
Bonds 
Private  
placement 
Project Bonds 
Government guaranteed bonds,  
municipal bonds, public corporation 
bonds, bonds guaranteed by  
international financing agencies 
Public  
Offering 
Guarantees 
Guarantee by  
commercial bank,  
credit line,  
standby facility,  
monocline insurance 
Guarantee by government,  
govt. financing agencies,  
international agencies,  
regional agencies 
Project Income Toll revenue, income from supplemental projects 
Retained earnings Retained surplus, retention fund 
Asset securitization Bond None 
Stock increase of capital 
Stock market  
flotation 
None 
Value Capture; partial use of profit 
from development due to the 
project 
None 
Increased tax on real estate,  
benefit assessment,  
special impact fee, dedication,  
assessment district, space lease,  
tax increment financing 
 
 
1.11 .2  F inanc ing  S t ra tegy  –  Ma jor  I ssues  
The project sponsor as part of the consortium formed to prepare and submit 
the financial and technical bids appoints partners and experts from various 
disciples, including engineering, legal, and finance. Financial adviser is ap-
pointed to assist the project sponsor in the financial structuring of the project. 
Financial adviser focus on developing a financing strategy that aims at divert-
ing the risks associated with the project from the sponsors while maximizing the 
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project leverage through a judicious mix of the various sources of funds availa-
ble in the market. Besides this objective, the financing strategies adopted for 
the project should result in a financial package with low capital cost; high cre-
dibility; minimal financing risk to sponsors; and minimum burden of debt servic-
ing capacity on revenue (Tiong and Alum 1997). 
The critical issues which need to be considered while developing the financial 
strategy for the project by the financial adviser are: (1) what does the market 
wants; (2) what should be the average maturity of the securities; and (3) what 
should be gearing ratio of the project capital structure (National Treasury 2001). 
Market Requirements: The needs of the investment market can be appre-
ciated via the risk/reward appetite of the investors and the considerations 
which are used to assess the risk/reward appetite of the investors are: 
 
1. Fixed or variable interest rate: Investors whose liabilities are fixed will pre-
fer a fixed-rate investment 
2. Short-term or long-term investment: Investors with long-term liabilities pre-
fer a long-term investment 
3. Industry type: Investment in a particular industry for increasing its holding 
in the concerned industry 
4. Location: Certain locations may be more attractive to investors 
5. Economic expectations: Expectations about the growth of specific indus-
try and/or sector and the economic gain expected with this growth 
6. Demographic expectations: Investors expect the middle class to grow 
and investors may be interested to invest in market targeting the middle 
class 
7. Development of partnerships: Investors in anticipation of the partnerships 
in the near future invest in the current project 
8. Debt vs equity: Investors heavily exposed to debt would like to invest in 
equity or pseudo-equity. 
 
Securities’ Maturity: As a rule, the average life of the project’s assets should de-
termine the average maturity of the project capital structure because amorti-
zation of project debt should reflect the depreciation patterns of the assets 
and matching the project capital with the project assets will assist in reducing 
the cash flow implications of the repayment of the debt principal. 
The financial adviser also needs to consider the average maturity of the finan-
cial sources for the investors. The financial sources for commercial banks are 
saving deposits which have a maturity of about 5 years while pension and in-
surance funds are contract saving and these expired at the end of around 25 – 
30 years. Innovative financing mechanisms are employed in project financing 
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to overcome this asset-liability mismatch of the commercial banks and one of 
the mechanisms commonly employed in developing countries like India is take-
out financing scheme (Murti 2005). 
Gearing Ratio: The capital structure of the PPP project is determined by the 
gearing ratio designed for the project. Sponsors, normally, want to maximize 
the gearing ratio but doing this increase the financing cost as lender charge 
higher interest rate and increased the magnitude of interest payments. Even 
though, earnings decrease due to higher interest payments, but earning per 
share increases. 
The gearing ratio of the project is influenced by a host of factors, including 
lender’s cover requirements, lender’s views on leverage in a specific sector 
and industry, degree of certainty in future cash flows of the project, restrictions 
imposed on the degree of leverage in specific sector and industry by regulat-
ing bodies, and level of bankruptcy risk associated with the project. Besides 
these factors, PPP projects in developing economies are exposed to numerous 
institutional and transactional hurdles such as: stability of the political environ-
ment; guarantees for the loan; stability and enforceability of institutions; Instabil-
ity of local currency; credit support for the loan; availability of public informa-
tion; availability of private information; and local financial market development 
(Devapriya and Alfen 2004). 
1.11 .3  F inanc ia l  Package  and  R isk  P ro f i l e  
The procurement of projects through PPP route is a time consuming process. 
The process of development of project from identification to financial closure 
may take couple of years (Development Phase), followed by 2 to 3 years con-
structing the facilities (Construction Phase). Then, the project is put into opera-
tion during the concession period, which may span over 15 to 30 years (Opera-
tion Phase). These three phases of the project are exposed to different risks. 
During development phase, project is exposed to critical risks such as Land Ac-
quisition Risk and Delay in Financial Closure Risk. The project is exposed to 
Completion Risk and Cost Overrun Risk during the construction phase. While, 
Demand Risk and Traffic Revenue Risk are some of the critical risks during the 
operation phase. The exposure of the project to the different risks, during the 
various phases of the project, dictates the risk profile of the project. Figure 8 
highlights the change in the risk profile of the project over the three phases of 
the project. 
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Figure 8 – Typical Risk and Cash Flow Profile of the PPP Road Project along with the various 
Funding Sources, Source: Industry Canada (2005) 
 
PPP projects employ tailor-made financial package consisting of a spectrum of 
financial instruments to finance the constituting activities of the three broad 
phases of project. It is observed that the choice of the funding sources and 
hence the financial package is greatly influenced by the risk profile of the 
concerned phase of the project and risk/reward appetite of the funding 
agencies [Please refer Table 4]. The financial package used is said to be suc-
cessful if different investors are provided with financial instruments that match 
their risk/reward profile with the implication that financial structuring is used as a 
medium for risk management. 
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Table 4 – Financing Sources and Project Phases/Activities 
 
Industry Canada (2005) UNIDO (1996) 
Project Phases Financing source (s) 
Project Phases / 
Activities 
Financing Source (s) 
Identification, Eval-
uation, and Devel-
opment 
Sponsors 
 
Sovereign Infrastructure 
Development Program 
 
Development Financial  
Institutions 
 
Export Credit Agencies 
 
International Financial  
Institutions 
 
Equity Funds 
Pre-Investment 
Cost 
Sponsors’ Equity 
Bidding and Pro-
curement Related 
Costs 
Governments bear the  
collating information for bid 
documents and negotia-
tions with bidders 
 
Bidders also bear this costs 
with risk capital 
Project Develop-
ment Costs 
Sponsors’ Risk Capital 
Construction and 
Commissioning 
Investment Banks 
 
Non-banking Financial  
Institutions 
 
Commercial Banks 
Construction Costs
Equity 
 
Commercial Bank Loans 
 
Bilateral/ Multilaterals/ 
ECAs funds 
 
Institutional Investors 
Operations 
Capital Markets 
 
Institutional Investors 
 
Internal Cash Flow 
Operating Costs 
Internal Revenue 
 
Short-term Commercial 
Bank Loans 
 
1.12  R isk  Management  
Project finance has been the most prevalent mode of financing for infrastruc-
ture projects developed through PPP route such as BOT, BOO and BOOT. The 
term project finance refers to cases where the loan for the capital costs of the 
project is repaid through the cash flows generated with the operation of the 
project. The lenders advancing debt financing to the project on project 
finance basis have either no or limited recourse to the project sponsors’ assets 
and/or cash flows. Lenders are more concerned with the project capacity to 
generate sufficient revenues to service the debt obligations. On the other 
 35
hand, investors focus on whether the project can provide an adequate return 
on their investments. Risk, as per Webster’s dictionary, is defined as the possibili-
ty of loss, injury, disadvantage, or destruction. From a PPP project perspective, 
the realization of different risks over the lifecycle of the project can create dif-
ferent scenarios where project benefits and costs can differ greatly from the 
projected base conditions. Identification, assessment and management of the 
risks associated with the project that can threaten the project capability to 
provide sufficient revenues to service the debt obligations and earn return on 
equity investments have been of paramount importance in procuring infra-
structure projects through PPP route. 
 
Risk management is an ongoing process over the lifecycle of the project. The 
process of risk management can be broken down into the following activities 
(Department of Economic Affairs 2006): 
 
1. Risk Identification: It is the process of identifying all the risks relevant to the 
project. 
2. Risk Assessment: It refers to determination of the degree of likelihood of 
the risks and the possible consequence if the risk occurs. 
3. Risk Allocation: Assigning the responsibility of the consequence of the risk 
to one or more of the parties to the contract. 
4. Risk Mitigation: The process of controlling the likelihood of occurrence of 
risk and/or the extent of the consequence of the risk. 
1.12 .1  R isk  Iden t i f i ca t ion  
It is difficult to generalize the risks inherent in PPP projects as the risk profile of a 
PPP project varies with a number of factors, including the country in which the 
project is situated, the type of infrastructure sector, and the unique socio-
economic environment surrounding the project. The uniqueness in the risk pro-
file of PPP projects has led to use of risk identification techniques that are based 
on the knowledge of the experts in the related fields and experience with simi-
lar projects. Some of the other risk identification techniques in addition to expe-
rience and experts are intuition, checklists, site visits, case studies, brainstorming 
sessions, allied organizations, databases, and workshops (Akintoye, Beck et al. 
2001). 
The type of risks to which the PPP projects are typically exposed to can be 
broadly classified into two broad categories (UNIDO 1996): 
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1. General or country specific risks: These are the risks normally associated 
with the political, social, and economic environment of the host coun-
try and over which the project promoter have no control. 
2. Project specific risks: These are the risks to which the project sponsors 
have control to a certain extent. 
 
The general or country specific risks comprise of factors that can influence the 
demand of the project outputs or services and the projects’ ability to meet 
their contractual obligations. The general risks can be further divided into three 
major categories of political risks, country commercial risks, and country legal 
risks. 
 
• Political risks: These risks are associated with the nature of the political 
support towards private sector involvement in infrastructure develop-
ment, changes in the country’s taxation regime, the likelihood of natio-
nalization or expropriation of infrastructure by the host government, fail-
ure to honour the concession agreement, imposition of restrictions on 
import/export, and delay or failure in issuing the necessary permits and 
clearances for the implementation of the project. 
• Country commercial risks: The country commercial risks are concerned 
with the restrictions imposed on convertibility of the revenue from the 
project into foreign currencies, foreign exchange, fluctuation in the in-
terest rate and inflation. 
• Country legal risks: Some of the factors which are related with the coun-
try legal risks are changes in laws and regulations, framework regarding 
the enforceability of the contracts, and the delays in calculating the 
compensation. 
 
The lifecycle of PPP projects may be divided into three stages of development, 
construction, and operation and the project specific risks associated with these 
phases are: 
 
• Development phase: The risks which are more prevalent during this 
phase are the bidding risk, delay in planning risk, and approval risk. Bid-
ding risk refers to the likelihood of loss of tender to other competitor re-
sulting in the loss of the expenditures associated with the bidding. These 
expenditures relating to preparation of detailed design, comprehensive 
planning, and preparation of extensive bid documents could be very 
large in case of large PPP projects. 
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• Construction phase: The major risks related with this phase are the risks 
that actual cost of construction is more than the budgeted cost of con-
struction; time taken to complete the project is more than the projected 
time to completion; and failure to achieve completion. 
• Operating phase: The projects start generating revenues during this 
phase of the project. There are certain risks that can have a bearing on 
the project capacity to earn its projected revenue and in meeting the 
budgeted operating and maintenance expenses. Some of the risks that 
are normally associated with the operation phase are (1) technical risk; 
(2) demand risk; (3) force majeure risk; and (4) revenue risk. 
 
 
1.12 .2  R i sk  Assessment  
The techniques available for risk assessment can be classified into two broad 
categories: quantitative techniques and qualitative techniques (Tanaka, Ishida 
et al. 2005). Quantitative techniques are used to assess the risks and represent 
the likelihood and impact of the risks in terms of either time or money. Two of 
the commonly used quantitative techniques are deterministic and probabilistic 
analyses. Sensitivity analysis is the most representative approach amongst the 
deterministic analyses. Sensitivity analysis examines the variations in the values 
of the model’s dependent variable by changing the values of one or more of 
the input variables to the model. Performing the sensitivity analysis by changing 
the value of just one variable at a time helps in analyzing the influence of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable. The other type of sensitivity 
analysis is scenario analysis, which allows interpretation of the influence on the 
model output due to combinations of simultaneous changes of the input va-
riables, known as scenarios. In most cases, three types of scenarios are consi-
dered in scenario analysis: optimistic scenario, base scenario, and pessimistic 
scenario. The sensitivity analysis, even though, is simple but has shortcomings 
and some of them are: (1) the technique does not take into account the inte-
ractions between the input variables; (2) the technique assigns equal probabili-
ties of occurrence to all the scenarios; and (3) the number of scenarios can 
become quite large in case of very big projects. 
Analytical and simulation approaches are the two approaches to do quantita-
tive risk assessment using probabilistic techniques. In analytical approach, 
probability distribution function (PDF) is assign to the uncertain variable and 
PDFs of the input variables are mathematically combined to derive the proba-
bility distribution function of the model output. This approach is more practical 
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in case the risk model can be made up by combining two simple and inde-
pendent distributions. The simulation techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation 
technique do the analysis through random sampling of values for each proba-
bility distribution within the model to produce number of scenarios that are 
used to create the probability distribution of the model outcomes. 
Qualitative techniques are predominantly used to list the likely risk sources and 
their consequences. Some of the commonly used qualitative techniques are 
risk registers and probability-impact tables. Risk registers have a tabular form to 
compile all the risks relevant to the projects along with the information neces-
sary for management of the risks. In probability-impact tables, the probability 
and impact of the risks are subjectively assessed using qualitative scaling fac-
tors (e.g. very high, high, medium, low, and very low). These scaling factors are 
then converted into values/weights and the scores of the risks are computed 
by multiplying the values of probability and impact. 
 
1.12 .3  R isk  A l loca t ion  
The distinguishing feature of PPP mode of procurement from the traditional 
public procurement system is with respect to the amount of risks allocated to 
the private sector parties. The profile of the risks allocated to the private sector 
can be explained with the position of the form of PPP model, used for the 
project, on the continuum between service contracts and divestiture. At the 
one end of the spectrum is the traditional public procurement contracts where 
the government bears all the risks and responsibilities associated with the 
project. On the other end is the divestiture or privatization in which private sec-
tor assumes almost all the risks associated with the project. In between there 
are number of PPP models in which the risks are allocated in varying degrees 
between the private sector and public entity. Figure 9 shows the risk transfer 
continuum. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Risk Transfer Continuum of PPP Projects 
 
The notion of risk allocation in PPP projects is that risks should be borne by the 
party best able to assess, and manage them or the party with access to hedg-
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ing options or lowest costs of bearing the risks. Even though the criterion for risk 
allocation is very simple, however in practice risk allocation is very compli-
cated. It has been observed that in some of the PPP projects allocation of risks 
is greatly influenced by the negotiating power of the parties to the contract. 
One of the major considerations that play an important role in designing the 
risk allocation framework of the project is the concept of “Value For Money”. In 
PPP models such as BOT and BOOT, public entities award a concession to the 
private party to implement the project and provide services or outputs to the 
users. The public entities do not assume the risks associated with implementa-
tion, commissioning, operation of the project, and the longer-term risks of asset 
depreciation and technological obsolescence. If the public entity can procure 
the project through PPP route at a cost less than the cost to the public entity it-
self, then the outcome is value for money. 
PPP projects target at an optimal risk allocation strategy that enables the 
project to achieve value for money by minimizing the project costs. Allocation 
of risks to party not in the best position to manage the risks will charge premium 
for assuming the risks and this will increase the project costs and, at the same 
time, diminish the project’s value for money. 
The project agreement between the project company and the public entity 
granting the concession gives the basic framework for risk allocation between 
the government and the project sponsor. With the project agreement at the 
heart of the contractual network of the project, project sponsors also enter into 
contracts with other parties to reallocate the risks allocated to project promo-
ter by the government through the project agreement. The set of contracts 
that are relevant for risk allocation normally includes the following: 
 
1. Shareholders agreement between the project sponsors 
2. Credit agreements with the project lenders 
3. EPC contract 
4. Operation and Maintenance contract 
5. Supply contracts 
 
The public entity granting the concession allocates the risks related with design, 
construction and operation of the project to the project sponsors. The project 
sponsors, then, allocate the construction and completion risks to EPC contrac-
tor and the operating risk to the O&M operator. Governments bear the political 
risks due to delays in obtaining required approvals, permits, and licenses and 
they either compensate the project company accordingly or prolong the 
concession period. However, the risks of change/imposition of taxes, tariffs, or 
custom duties will be borne by the project company if there are no compensa-
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tion for these as no government will give an assurance that tax will not be in-
creased or imposed. The demand and revenue risks are amongst the set of risks 
where there is disagreement between the public and private parties on the 
level of sharing between them. In case, the project company assumes these 
risks then the project company normally demands guarantees for a minimum 
demand/revenue level or insists on other credit enhancement measures. 
1.12 .4  R i sk  Mi t iga t ion  
Risk mitigation refers to the practice that can reduce either the likelihood of 
occurrence of risk or the impact of the consequence in case the risk occurs. 
One of the most commonly used risk mitigation practice is to transfer the risks to 
another party who is in a better position to manage and control the risk at a 
lower premium. In PPP projects, network of contractual relationships is used to 
achieve this. Project Company transfer the risks related with the construction 
and design of the facility to the EPC contractor, the operation and mainten-
ance of the facility to the O&M contractor. The risks will be further reduced if 
the project company selects parties which are experienced and qualified. 
Insurance is another risk mitigation strategy used in PPP projects. With insurance, 
in addition to transfer of the risk, the implication of the consequence of the risk 
is also capped at the risk premium. Project sponsors can select from a wide 
range of insurance instruments to mitigate various risks such as owner’s liability, 
some of the force majeure events, business interruption, and legislative and 
government policy risks such as convertibility of currency and, to a limited ex-
tent, change of law. 
Other risk mitigation practice is to employ hedging instruments to mitigate the 
macroeconomic risks such as interest rate risk, inflation risk, and foreign ex-
change risk. The hedging instruments available in the capital market include 
forwards, futures, cash swaps, and options. 
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2 CASE  STUDY I  -  D IFFERENT R ISK  PERSPECT IVES  IN  THE  2ND 
STAGE C IPULARANG TOLLWAY PROJECT 
by Prof. Dr. Stephen Ogunlana and Martinus P. Abednego,  
Asian Institute of Technology 
2.1  In f ras t ruc ture  Deve lopment  in  Indones ia  
Just like in any other developing countries, the Government of Indonesia ac-
knowledges the importance of investing in infrastructure development such as 
roads, water supplies, energy, telecommunications and other basic infrastruc-
ture services to sustain the country’s economic growth. As a matter of fact, pri-
vate sector participation has been encouraged by the Indonesian govern-
ment by allowing the private sectors to invest in power generation activities as 
well as tollroad BOTs since the early 1990s. From 1994-1999, the total private in-
vestment in Indonesian infrastructure was more than US$20 billion, with US$7.3 
billion and US$3.6 billion investment in 1996 and 1997 respectively. In terms of 
the number of projects, the transport sector led with 20 projects with private 
participation (table 1) while sub-sectors of the energy and telecom sectors led 
with 14 projects each (table 2). 
Table 1 – Number of infrastructure projects with private participation in Indonesia by primary 
sector, 1984-2002, Source: World Bank, PPI Project Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Number of infrastructure projects with private participation in Indonesia by sub-
sector, 1984-2002, Source: World Bank, PPI Project Database 
 
Sub-sector Sector Number of Projects 
Electricity 14 
Natural Gas 2 
Potable water 8 
Seaports 7 
Telecom 14 
Toll Roads 13 
Total 58 
Primary Sector Number of Projects 
Energy 16 
Telecommunication 14 
Transportation 20 
Water and Sewerage 8 
Total 58 
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Moreover, Greenwood, Jr. (2006) informed in his report that the Asian Devel-
opment Bank had provided more than US$20 billion in cumulative develop-
ment assistance to Indonesia since 1969, with the infrastructure sector consum-
ing a significant share. What is more, the study also revealed that Indonesia 
would require an estimate of US$150 billion in the next 10 years for its infrastruc-
ture development. Therefore, private sector participation is needed more than 
ever to provide the capital investments required for infrastructure development 
so that it may instigate better economic growth. 
Before the financial crisis period, Indonesia had actually made great invest-
ments in infrastructure development which accounted for approximately 6% of 
its GDP. However, there was a significant drop in infrastructure spending right 
after the crisis. Currently Indonesia is still recovering from the crisis since its infra-
structure investment only accounts for around 2% of its GDP and that private 
investors are yet to make an active comeback, causing it to be left behind by 
neighboring countries that were once out-performed in terms of infrastructure 
development. 
Nevertheless, the Indonesian government has attempted to increase private 
sector participation (PSP) and stimulate private investment through Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP) by establishing a sound regulatory framework that fol-
lows international practices as well as amending and modifying laws and regu-
lations related to private investment in Indonesia. Such efforts display the 
awareness of the Indonesian government in recognizing the need to attract 
private investment for its infrastructure development and to provide reassur-
ance for the private sector to invest by providing them guarantee through the 
establishment of appropriate regulatory policies. 
2.2  To l l road  Deve lopment  in  Indones ia  
Road transportation has always been the dominant mode of transportation in 
Indonesia. Furthermore, strong economic growth prior to the financial crisis in 
addition to the inadequate condition of its public transportation causes an in-
creasing demand for the use of private vehicles. As a result, most of the roads, 
especially in urban areas, are easily congested, thus forcing the government to 
provide a more adequate road network to reduce traveling time, reduce pol-
lution and increase efficiency. 
Due to such demand, the government planned the construction of 688 km of 
tollroads by 1999 and 1935 km by 2020. Although several international organiza-
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tions, such as the ADB and World Bank, provided financial assistance for infra-
structure developments in Indonesia, however, the Indonesian government 
played a major role in financing tollroad projects that were developed be-
tween 1978 and 1990. Based on the World Bank report (2002), the 46 km Jago-
rawi tollroad was the first toll road built in Indonesia and Jasa Marga, which is a 
state-owned road agency, was given the responsibility of collecting and main-
taining it. In addition to that, Jasa Marga also operates the other tollroads in In-
donesia and became responsible for financing and constructing tollroads in 
the later years. Their role in tollroad developments in Indonesia is further streng-
thened by being granted a license by the government to develop, construct 
and operate tollroads together with the private sector. Through the Presidential 
Decree No.25/1987, the Indonesian government required Jasa Marga to be in-
volved in all tollroad constructions and that private entities must set up joint 
ventures with Jasa Marga if they are to be involved in those constructions. Most 
of these collaborations were either in the form of BOT or Modified Turnkey. 
 
Just before the 1997 financial crisis, the total operating tollroads had reached 
472 km, of which approximately 148 km was built and operated by private 
concessionaires. The 15.5 km Cawang-Tanjung Priok elevated highway was 
one of the first tollroads to include private participation. The project was devel-
oped by a joint venture company formed between Jasa Marga and PT. Citra 
Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP), a local private company, and they were 
granted the project in 1993 with a 30 years concession period. Moreover, the 
Jakarta Outer Ring Road project was the first international joint venture tollroad 
project in Indonesia. The consortium included Brey Contractors, Jasa Marga 
and two other private Indonesian companies. Another tollroad project which 
involves foreign investors was the 59 km Cikampek-Padalarang tollroad. Trafal-
gar House (UK) formed a consortium with Jasa Marga to finance this project 
and it took approximately 6 years of negotiation before the concession 
agreement was finally signed in 1995. Unfortunately, full financing for this 
project was not secured before the financial crisis and since Indonesia suffered 
heavily from it the government was forced to review the project along with the 
other ongoing projects. During that period, approximately 237 km of tollroad 
were still under construction and were planned to be completed by 2000.  
In order to reinstate private sector’s confidence to invest and be actively in-
volved again in infrastructure development after the financial crisis, the Indone-
sian government must be able to formulate unbiased and non-discriminative 
regulatory policies, as a form of guarantee for the private sector, which hope-
fully may sustain their long-term partnership. This can be achieved as long as 
both the government and private sector have a common understanding re-
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garding the risks that may occur in the project. Therefore, it is necessary to dis-
cover and understand the perception of risks from both parties. For this pur-
pose, the 2nd Stage Cipularang tollway project is selected as the case study. 
2.3  The  2nd S tage  C ipu la rang  To l lway  pro jec t  
The Jakarta-Bandung corridor had been recognized to have a high traffic vo-
lume for many years. Although there are several alternative routes connecting 
these two cities, they were unable to cope with the increasing traffic volume. 
One alternative route in particular, which goes through the city of Purwakarta, 
experienced an average traffic volume increase of 7-9% per year in 3 years 
leading to 2002 (PT. Jasa Marga, 2002). Such condition occurred mostly due to 
the vast development of the industrial sector just outside the East Jakarta re-
gion, such as Bekasi, Cikarang, Karawang, Tasikmalaya and Garut, as well as 
the economic development in Purwakarta, Subang, Plered and Cikalong We-
tan. 
Due to these conditions, the Indonesian government realized the urgency to 
develop a high standard primary road in order to increase transportation effi-
ciency, so that it may decrease the required traveling time. Moreover, it was 
also intended to accommodate the growing traffic volume between Jakarta 
and Bandung. 
2.3 .1  P ro jec t  Background 
As mentioned previously, the project was proposed as a solution to solve the 
traffic problems along the Puncak route and Purwakarta area, which were the 
main alternative routes between Jakarta and Bandung. Its development was 
also expected to stimulate the economic development in the West Java area 
as well as encouraging the development of Jakarta and Bandung in becom-
ing mega-cities. 
As a follow up to this national plan, the Indonesian government initially ap-
pointed PT. Citra Ganesha Marga Nusantara (CGMN) in 1994, a local private 
company, as the main investor and contractor for this 2nd Stage Cipularang 
Tollway project. A concession was then created between CGMN and Trafalgar 
House Construction, a British investor, along with PT. Jasa Marga as well as sev-
eral other small local investors. CGMN was the consortium leader and had re-
ceived licensed agreement from PT. Jasa Marga to finance, construct and 
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operate this tollway project. As for Trafalgar, it provides additional financial 
support and construction technology. 
However, due to the financial crisis in 1997, the project along with several other 
infrastructure projects was reevaluated based on the Presidential Decree 
No.39/1997. Since there was no significant progress made by the joint venture, 
the project was then suspended and resulted in the termination of the joint 
venture, including the withdrawal of CGMN as the investor. In 2000, a Presiden-
tial Decree No.64/2000 was issued by the Indonesian government to confirm 
the continuation of this project and appointing PT. Jasa Marga as the main de-
veloper. 
The 2nd Stage Cipularang Tollway has a total length of 41 km that connects 
the north side of Purwakarta (Sadang) with Cikamuning, which is located at 
the west side of Padalarang (Figure 1). It connects the Padalarang-Bypass Toll-
way with the Jakarta-Cikampek Tollway, thus making it the longest tollway 
network in Indonesia (Hasanudin, 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Map of the 2nd Stage Cipularang Tollway, Source: Abednego (2006) 
 
Initially, the project was divided into 4 work packages with an average length 
of 8.5-12 km for each package. However, since Indonesia will be hosting the 
50th Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 2005, Megawati Soekarnoputri, who 
was the Indonesian President at the time, had requested PT. Jasa Marga 
through the Ministry of Public Works to accelerate the construction time of the 
project so that it may be completed just before the conference. To comply 
with this demand, the project was then divided into 9 packages or sections as 
follows to accelerate the construction process: 
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1. North Purwakarta-South Purwakarta (Section 1) 
2. South Purwakarta (Section 2) 
3. Plered-Darangdan + Ciujung Bridge (Section 3.1) 
4. Darangdan-Cikalong Wetan (Section 3.2) 
5. Cisomang Bridge (Section 3.3) 
6. Cikalong Wetan-Cikubang (Section 4.1) 
7. Cikubang Bridge (Section 4.2) 
8. Cikubang-Cipada + Cipada Bridge (Section 4.3) 
9. Cipada-Cikamuning (Section 4.4) 
 
Nine local contractors were selected through a tendering process and nine 
project managers from PT. Jasa Marga were selected to supervise each of 
these sections, coordinated by a project director. Several consultants were also 
appointed to provide professional assistance to each of those project manag-
ers. Additionally, a group of experts from various academic institutions was also 
hired to provide PT. Jasa Marga professional advice on problems encountered 
during the design and construction stage of the project. Figure 2 illustrates the 
organizational structure during the construction phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Organizational structure of the project, Source: Abednego (2006) 
In terms of project financing, the Indonesian government, who was 
represented by PT. Jasa Marga in this project, was faced by limited capital due 
to high constraint of the construction time and limited liquidity. In order to antic-
ipate the consequences that may arise due to this situation, PT. Jasa Marga 
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developed a new financial strategy that would ensure financial security for the 
project as well as maintaining a healthy condition on the company’s cash flow. 
Thus, the Contractor’s Pre-Finance (CPF) system was developed. 
In this system, several local banks (government and private) agreed to make a 
commitment with PT. Jasa Marga to finance the project by providing loan for 
all of the nine appointed contractors. In addition to that, these banks also 
agreed to apply a fixed interest rate for the whole loan and payback period. 
They were willing to provide such demanding commitment because of the 
guarantee from PT. Jasa Marga that the project will be completed and will not 
be suspended at any time during the construction phase. In other words, the 
banks were guaranteed to get their money back no matter what happens 
with the project. The agreement was then formulated in the form of Letter of 
Comfort which is then used by the contractors to request for a loan from these 
banks. 
The difference between the CPF system with the other financial strategies, such 
as the conventional project financing or BOT, is that in the CPF system the 
project does not need to look for an investor to finance the project and they 
are not in debt to the banks who provided the loans during the construction 
phase because the contractors borrowed the money directly from the bank 
and these debts will only be acknowledged by the project owner after the 
project is completed and handed over to the owner. As long as it is still in the 
construction phase, the contractor is fully responsible for the loan debt to the 
bank. After the project is completed, the project owner has the responsibility to 
repay the loans made by the contractors to the bank within a certain period 
that has been agreed previously by the owner and the banks. On the other 
hand, conventional project financing requires the owner to ask for loan directly 
to the bank, appoint contractors to carry out the construction work and 
finance the project with the loan; while the BOT system requires the owner to 
look for an investor through a tendering process to help finance the project 
and form a concession with the investor. Figure 3 illustrates how the CPF system 
works. 
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Figure 3 – Contractor’s Pre-Finance (CPF) scheme, Source: Abednego (2006) 
 
 
 
2.3 .2  P rob lems Encountered  in  P ro jec t  
The problems that were encountered in the project can be classified into 2 
broad categories (Abednego, 2006): 
 
• Problems experienced during the construction process 
• Problems caused by the construction of the project 
 
In the first category, the problems are mostly caused by the geographic condi-
tions of the project. In addition to the hilly train at the project site, some areas 
within the project site have quite a unique soil characteristic, such as the insta-
bility of the underground soil which shifted easily during the rainy season. The 
result of this condition could vary from minor cracks on the road surface in 
some areas to an extreme ground settlements as well as land-slides. Besides 
geographic problems, the weather condition also played a significant part in 
causing delays during the construction process. 
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As the source of problem, the existence of this project causes an increase in 
the traffic volume in the Jakarta-Bandung corridor which resulted in serious traf-
fic problems, especially in the city of Bandung. This condition is worsened due 
to the inadequate road network within the city of Bandung and also by the 
fact that the vehicle growth in this city had exceeded the infrastructure growth 
(info-ri.com, 2005). 
2.4  I ssues  on  D i f fe rences  in  Perspec t i ves  be tween  the  
Government  and P r i va te  Sec tor  
In theory, the party that should accept the consequences of any particular risk 
event, which is usually the result of the activities of one or more parties, is the 
one who has control over that risk (Edwards, 1995). Moreover, primary consid-
erations that have significant influence in the allocation of risk are described as 
follows (Chapman & Ward, 1991; Flanagan & Norman, 1993 and Edwards, 
1995): 
 
• Risk should be allocated to the party with the best capability to control 
the events that might trigger its occurrence. 
• Risks must be properly identified, understood and evaluated by all parties 
involved in the project. 
• A party must have the technical/managerial capability to manage the 
risk. 
• A party must have the financial ability to sustain the consequences of 
the risk or prevent the risk from occurring. 
• A party must be willing to accept the risk. 
 
In practice, however, it is quite difficult to have a proper risk allocation ar-
rangement. The reason for this is because that each party that is involved in a 
project frequently has different perceptions/perspectives regarding project risks 
(Chapman & Ward, 1991). As a consequence, each party might wish to im-
plement different kinds of strategy to manage these project risks. Furthermore, 
these differences occur because different parties typically have different 
knowledge and perceptions about the nature of project risk sources, and that 
they tend to have different objectives which form their perception on the 
meaning of project success. 
Therefore, it is very important that all of the parties involved in the project un-
derstand and acknowledge the objectives of each party so that each of them 
 51
may have a common understanding of the project risks. If they do not have this 
mutual understanding, it may create a mismanagement of the event that may 
cause these risks to occur by assuming the event or its consequences are not 
their responsibility (Hartman & Snelgrove, 1996). Such mismanagement could 
further cause inefficiencies in a project and increase project cost (Hartman, 
1993). 
In order to understand the different perspectives between the government 
and private sector regarding project risks, discovering their perspectives re-
garding project success as well as project efficiency is very much necessary. 
For such purpose, the following sections provide an overview of the govern-
ment as well as private sector’s perspectives on the success and efficiency 
attributes of the 2nd Stage Cipularang Tollway project. 
2.4 .1  P ro jec t  Success  
An extensive literature review on project management by Baccarini (1999) 
shows that the term “project success” was not defined consistently. This finding 
also confirms with previous observations done by McCoy (1986) and Wells 
(1998) that there is no standardized definition of project success and that there 
is a lack of attention to really define success, except in general terms. However, 
it is very important to understand the concept of project success and it is re-
flected by the Project Management Institute (PMI) at its 1986 Annual Seminar & 
Symposium (Baccarini, 1999). 
 
Project success is a topic that is frequently discussed and yet rarely agreed 
upon. Theconcept of project success has remained ambiguously defined. It is a 
concept which can mean so much to so many different people because of 
varying perceptions, and leads to disagreement about whether a project is 
successful or not. 
(Liu & Walker, 1998) 
 
Moreover, Belout (1998) believes that success is synonymous with effectiveness, 
such as the degree of achievement of objectives. It is well understood that all 
projects are formed to accomplish the objectives that have been set previous-
ly and that success is measured in terms of how well these objectives have 
been met. Based on this understanding, interviews with people who were in-
volved in the 2nd Stage Cipularang Tollway project were carried out to dis-
cover both the government and private sector’s perspectives on project suc-
cess as well as project efficiency. The analysis results of these interviews are 
presented in the following sections. 
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2.4 .1 .1  Government ’s  Perspec t i ve  on   
P ro jec t  Success  
According to the government, the factors that are considered to have signifi-
cant impact in determining the success of a project are as follows: 
 
Project quality achievement and on-time project completion 
These 2 factors are considered as the basic and standard value in assessing a 
project and to determine whether the project can be considered as a success, 
in general terms. 
 
Functionality of the end-product 
Since the end product of this project is in the form of a tollroad, therefore, the 
owner consider it to be successful if the product is functioning accordingly to its 
planned purpose which is to provide service and satisfaction for its end-users. 
 
Government total support 
It is in the form of unbiased and non-discriminative policies, laws and regula-
tions. The government is also expected to provide reliable information regard-
ing the national infrastructure network development plan, so that a more ac-
curate project estimate could be produced and used for preparing a more 
proper project plan. 
 
Good coordination 
Good coordination between government agencies as well as between gov-
ernment agencies and private entities is essential in ensuring an effective and 
efficient project development process. 
 
Proper project financing strategy 
In order to reduce any financial problems that may occur during the construc-
tion process, it is necessary to plan, develop and apply the most suitable fi-
nancing strategy, such as the CPF system in the case of this particular project. 
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Trust 
A sense of trust must transpire between all of the involved parties. With respect 
of this particular project, a sense of trust was developed between the govern-
ment and financial institutions which is shown through the formulation of the 
Letter of Comfort. 
 
Good system for contractor selection 
Selecting the most capable contractor to perform the construction works must 
be done carefully, thus the requirement of a good assessment and selection 
system. The term capable does not only mean having similar experience in 
past projects and possessing sufficient financial strength, but also possess a 
sense of professionalism which was actually lacking in this particular project. 
This lack of professionalism influenced the efficiency and effectiveness of that 
particular contractor, thus affecting the project overall performance which is 
essential for achieving project success. 
 
Information dissemination and communication system 
Since it is important that all information related to the project must be distri-
buted to the right party at the right time; therefore, it is necessary for the 
project to have a suitable communication system to accomplish this objective. 
 
Compelling managerial capabilities 
In order to achieve a successful implementation of the information and com-
munication system, it also requires compelling managerial capabilities of the 
human resources involved in the project. Such managerial capabilities would 
enable key decision makers, whether that is the owner of the project, the con-
tractors or the other parties involved in the project, to make the most appropri-
ate decision at the right time. Nevertheless, such level of managerial capabili-
ties could be achieved through continuous managerial training, i.e. training 
courses and on-the-job training. 
 
Continuous project monitoring and control 
The government believes that continuous monitoring the project’s work 
progress, constant control of all the resources required for the project and 
maintaining a constructive interaction within the project would also provide 
significant contribution for achieving project success. 
 
 
 
 54
2.4 .1 .2  Pr i va te  Sec tor ’ s  Perspec t i ve  on  P ro jec t  Success  
The factors that are considered by the contractors to have significant impact in 
determining the success of a project are as follows: 
 
Profit (Financial achievement) 
Since all contractors are business oriented companies, profit gaining is consi-
dered as the most important element in determining the success of any kind of 
project. 
 
Project quality achievement and on-time completion 
Similar to the government’s perspective, the private sector also consider these 
2 factors as the basic and standard value in assessing a project and to deter-
mine whether the project can be considered as a success, in general terms. 
 
Experienced human resources 
In order to be able to provide properly trained and experienced human re-
sources for the project, contractor companies require their employees to at-
tend seminars and training to enhance their technical as well as managerial 
capabilities. However, if the company does not have the required amount of 
skilled human resources available for a project, human resources outsourcing is 
generally carried out by the contractor in order to comply with the situation, as 
what happened in this particular project. 
 
Good coordination 
Good coordination between the government and private sector is also consi-
dered to be one of the most important project success factors. In addition to 
that, although good coordination between the contractors and sub-
contractors as well as the suppliers is also necessary to increase the competi-
tion level within the project, however, lack of coordination between govern-
ment agencies, especially between the central and local government, would 
create problems for the contractors during the construction process. As an ex-
ample, although the central government had informed their project develop-
ment plan in a particular area, most of the times the local government in that 
area does not appreciate and is unable to recognize the importance of such 
information. Added by the insufficient and incomprehensive level of informa-
tion provided by the central government, such circumstance would create fur-
ther difficulties towards the construction process (i.e. land acquisition prob-
lems). 
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No political pressure 
Political pressure from the government towards the construction process will not 
provide positive influence in any way. Although some may say that this particu-
lar project was a success due to the continuing pressure from the government 
to complete it before the 50th Asia-Africa Conference so that it can be used 
for the event, however, there are trade-offs that must be accepted, such as 
the increasing project cost and the quality of the product. 
 
Community participation and support 
The community around the project site also plays an important role in determin-
ing the success of the project. The community provides the necessary elements 
for the project such as access roads, hard labor, standard daily provisions, etc. 
 
Information dissemination and communication system 
With the presence of a project director from the project owner, all of the re-
quired information was able to be distributed to the right party at the right time. 
Such condition is ensured by carrying out a routine meeting between the con-
tractors, the owner’s project managers and the project director. 
 
Equality and balance in terms of rights and responsibilities 
Such equality between the public and private sector is important because the 
expected profit from the project is very much dependent on a balanced part-
nership. Unfortunately, most of the times the government do not realize that in-
frastructure projects such as tollways are part of their own development pro-
gram and not purely business development opportunity. Moreover, since the 
government requires assistance from the private sector, especially financially, 
the relationship between the government and private sector should be more 
of a partnership instead of hierarchical which is mostly based on superiority. If 
the government focuses only on the business aspect in this kind of project, the 
private sector would also focus on the business aspect, thus ignoring the 
people/community who is actually the end-users of the product. 
 
Proper planning in infrastructure network development 
Due to the lack of coordination between government agencies as well as the 
government’s main focus on the business aspect in this kind of project, the 
government would be unable to develop proper planning for the infrastructure 
network development. As a result, it would cause further problems such as in-
appropriate budget estimation to be allocated in the national annual devel-
opment budget. 
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Government support 
Contractors expect the government to provide total support to ensure project 
success. Examples of these supports can be in the form of government policy 
that would strengthen the partnership between the government and private 
sector, government regulations that have the ability to monitor and control the 
stability of construction materials and other laws/regulations that are unbiased 
and non-discriminative which are able to facilitate the private sectors in fulfil-
ling their responsibilities. 
2.4 .2  P ro jec t  E f f i c i ency  
2 .4 .2 .1  Government ’s  Perspec t i ve  on  P ro jec t   
E f f i c i ency  
Value engineering was applied by the government in order to increase the 
project’s efficiency. It involves construction design simplification as well as the 
application of new and innovative construction technology. In addition to that, 
project’s efficiency level was also maintained by balancing the required de-
sign change with the available budget. However, the government also rea-
lized that the project’s efficiency level did not reach the expectation in some 
parts. One major reason for this is because there was no distinct difference in 
terms of obligation and responsibility between the supervisory consultants and 
construction management consultants. Thus more often than not, these two 
different consultants performed the same scope of work. Through their expe-
rience in this project, the government discovered that one way to improve 
such condition is to upgrade the specifications and requirements that are used 
for selecting the consultants, experts as well as contractors. 
Another issue that is considered by the government to cause inefficiency in this 
project is the insufficient time for project design development and planning. As 
a result, the government decided to exercise a design-and-build method in 
some parts of the project in order to be able to proceed as scheduled. How-
ever, since only a preliminary design was produced from the project’s feasibility 
study, it increases the uncertainty level within the method because its detail 
design work was based only on a preliminary design. Although basically there is 
nothing wrong with the design-and-build method, the project’s circumstances 
make it less suitable to be implemented in the project. Moreover, even though 
this approach also enabled acceleration in the construction process, however, 
it resulted in an additional cost for repair and maintenance work as a trade-off. 
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2.4 .2 .2  Pr i va te  Sec tor ’ s  Perspec t i ve  on  P ro jec t   
E f f i c i ency  
In order to increase the project’s efficiency, main contractors generally distri-
buted their work load to sub-contractors. The main reason for this is because 
most contractors in Indonesia are specialized only in a specific field while most 
of the available projects consist of different kinds of work which are sometimes 
outside the contractor’s area of expertise. Therefore, the work loads are distri-
buted or outsourced to a more specialized party/subcontractor. Nevertheless, 
a strong network must be established under the coordination of the main con-
tractor to support the construction work and to ensure these works are done ef-
ficiently. 
In addition to that, the contractors believe that the project efficiency level 
could also be increased if the government provided some sort of incentives for 
any contractors that are able to complete their work ahead of schedule or be-
low the budget while maintaining the quality. Another type of motivational in-
centive is that if the government would guarantee future projects for contrac-
tors that are able to produce high-quality performance on the previous 
project. However, these ideas are very unlikely to be implemented by the gov-
ernment, especially the Indonesian government, due to the culture of its con-
struction industry and the government regulation which requires a project with 
a construction cost above a certain level to go through a tendering process. 
The government is also considered by the private sector to have a lack of 
commitment in maintaining professional relationship with them. According to 
the contractors, the relationships atmosphere created by the government is 
not partnership, but is more towards superiority-inferiority relationship. In other 
words, it is more of a hierarchical relationship based on superiority, which would 
only complicate the bureaucracy procedure and affect the project’s efficien-
cy. Furthermore, the efficiency of this particular project could also be improved 
if the government had made a proper planning, provide more accurate infor-
mation essential for the project success and delegate more authority towards 
their representative in the project site. The latter is very much necessary so that 
these representatives may make decisions that are required to be taken im-
mediately in order to maintain the flow of the construction process. 
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2.4 .3  P ro jec t  R i sks  
Nur Wulan (2005) carried out a research to identify the risks that may occur in 
a tollway project in Indonesia and these risks were classified into the following 
categories: 
 
1. Political risks, which include discontinuation of concession, tax increase, 
inappropriate tariff implementation, inappropriate tariff increase, new 
government policy, etc. 
2. Construction risks, which include inappropriate design, land acquisition, 
project delay, project site condition, contractor’s failure, etc. 
3. Operation and Maintenance risks, which include tollway network con-
dition, operator’s incompetence, construction quality, etc. 
4. Legal and Contractual risks, which include concession time warranty, 
flawed/inconsistent contract document, etc. 
5. Income risks, which include inaccurate traffic volume estimate, inaccu-
rate tollway tariff estimate, construction of a competing alternative 
road, etc. 
6. Financial risks, which include inflation, devaluation, interest rate, 
changes in monetary policies, limited capital, etc. 
7. Force major, such as weather condition, war, natural disasters, etc. 
 
With respect to the government’s perspective, risks that are considered as 
their main concern in the 2nd Stage Cipularang Tollway project are limited 
capital and unpredicted project site condition. The former was a high con-
cern for the government due to their liquidity limitation and high constraint on 
the construction time as a result of being the host for the 50th Asia-Africa Con-
ference. However, they were able to develop and apply a new financial 
strategy, the CPF method, to ensure financial security for the project as well 
as maintaining a healthy cash-flow. As for the latter, the highly unpredicted 
geological condition within the project site had resulted in their inability to 
provide accurate information regarding the soil characteristics of the project 
area. This situation then causes further consequences in the form of improper 
design; structurally, technologically and methodologically.  
As for the private sectors that were involved in this particular project, the risks 
that they consider to be main concerns were government’s lack of support, in-
accurate information provided by the government, design changes, govern-
ment’s unpreparedness, land acquisition, late decision making, unequal com-
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petence and decrease in profit. Government’s lack of support was demon-
strated by the insufficient warranty given towards the contractors for negotiat-
ing construction loan with the financial institutions. This is due to the fact that 
the agreement between the government and financial institutions can be dif-
ferent than the agreement between the contractor and the financial institu-
tions. To be more precise, the warranty, in the form of Letter of Comfort, merely 
stated and confirmed that the mentioned contractors had been formally and 
legally appointed to construct the project. Moreover, it also guarantees that 
the government will return all of the loans made by the contractor to construct 
the project after being handed over to the government, including the interest 
rate that had been agreed previously. However, the warranty did not deter-
mine that the interest rate applied on PT. Jasa Marga, who acted on behalf of 
the government and would eventually responsible for paying back all of those 
loans, has to be the same value as the interest rate applied on the contractors 
who actually made the loan. In other words, even though the banks applied 
an 11% of interest rate towards PT. Jasa Marga for the whole loan and pay-
back period, there is a possibility that the contractors may be applied more 
than this. When such situation occurred, the government would only acknowl-
edge the 11% interest rate while the exceeded amount of interest rate must be 
endured by the contractor. 
In terms of information related to the project, some of the essential information 
provided by the government, such as the result of soil investigation, was still con-
sidered to be inadequate by the contractors. Therefore, there is a conse-
quence of inaccuracy in the project design which was developed based on 
this information. In turn, such inaccuracy in the project design would result in 
changes in the project planning and design while also influencing the quality of 
the project as well as its total construction cost. Furthermore, such condition also 
showed that the government was actually unprepared for developing this 
project. As a result, the contractors were forced to accept the consequences 
and perform extra works to obtain all the necessary information, which was not 
their responsibility in the first place, spent extra time and resources while also ful-
filling their obligations for this project within the accelerated construction time. 
With regards to land acquisition, problems occurred due to the changes that 
were made in the project planning and design stage. As mentioned previously, 
the inaccurate information regarding the result of the soil investigation study 
caused changes in the project design. However, the changes were not only in 
terms of structural changes but also the lay-out of the structure. As an example, 
the Right-of-Way in some areas of the project need to be adjusted during the 
construction phase based on the new design, yet the construction process was 
not able to be carried out immediately because the land had not been acquit-
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ted by the government. As a result, the project was not able to keep up with 
the schedule and to make up for this loss of time the contractors had no choice 
but to work over time, thus increasing the total cost of the work. 
Moreover, problems also occurred due to the late decision-making process by 
the government. The project managers, who are government representatives, 
were not given sufficient authority to make some significant yet simple deci-
sions. Due to such partial authority delegation, these project managers were 
not able to make any decision even though the situation requires direct and 
fast decision making in order to proceed with the construction process since 
they need to discuss the situation with their superior before making the decision. 
On the other hand, the contractors generally assign their representative in the 
project site with full authority to make decisions on behalf of the company. 
Therefore, there is an unbalanced ability or unequal competence between the 
owner’s project managers and the contractor’s project managers in terms of 
decision-making authority. 
As a cumulative of all these risks, the contractors were forced to accept the 
consequences such as an increase in the overall project cost. Although the 
contractors had submitted their claim on this increase to PT. Jasa Marga as the 
government’s representative, there is still a possibility that the claim would not 
be acknowledged, thus resulting in the decrease of the contractor’s profit. 
2.5  Conc lus ion  
In this project, PT. Jasa Marga had the tendency to deal with the project risks 
as soon as the threats of consequences emerge. In contrast the contractors 
tend to sort things out from the project initiation stage, but were forced to act 
on the contrary due to the unbalanced condition between the number of con-
tractors in the industry and the amount of available projects. As a result, the private 
sectors more often than not lose their bargaining power because the government 
has the tendency to select a contractor that has the ability to complete the project 
with the least construction cost even though it may jeopardize the quality. 
This condition caused contractors to accept every opportunity that comes by, even 
if it means accepting the risks that are outside their own capabilities and responsibili-
ties, thus creating an unhealthy competition between the contractors in the industry. 
Moreover, contractors are also forced to follow government’s officious way and be 
controlled by it, and disregard any chance of an equal and professional partnership. 
In other words, contractors are accepting the project risks not because they have 
the capability and willingness to control and manage the consequences, but mostly 
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because they have no other choice which shows the government’s dominance in 
the risk allocation process. 
In dealing with the consequences, solutions are generally sought whether through 
the application of new construction methods, on-site design simplifications, etc, in 
order to cope with particular problems during the construction stage. Although those 
solutions were more or less effective, it would have been better if preventive action 
had been taken. As an example, if the government had conducted a more tho-
rough and detailed feasibility study, it would have been able to provide a more use-
ful and accurate information which could have been used to develop a more de-
tailed design, more accurate estimation as well as better project planning. However, 
since the feasibility study was not performed properly, both the government and 
contractors were confronted by problems on the project site. Even though the prob-
lems were solved and the project was managed to be completed within the sche-
dule, however, actions such as on-site construction method modifications and de-
sign simplifications during the construction stage resulted in a significantly increased 
project cost. Furthermore, these actions could also affect the structure quality in the 
long-rum which would evidently affect the maintenance cost. 
These findings show that the government considers a risk had been properly allo-
cated as long as its consequences can be minimized, no matter where and how, 
and their strategy is more into problem-solving rather than preventive actions. As for 
the private sector, they do not have many options but to accept the circumstances 
that they are inferior to the government and must accept this condition due to high 
competition. 
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3 CASE  STUDY I I  -  GOVERNANCE I SSUES  IN  THE  YEN LENH BR IDGE  
BOT PROJECT 
by Prof. Dr. Stephen Ogunlana and Martinus P. Abednego,  
Asian Institute of Technology 
3.1  In f ras t ruc ture  Deve lopment  in  V ie tnam 
Investments made for infrastructure development in Vietnam was a major 
contributing factor for its impressive GDP growth in the past decade. Based 
on a World Bank report1, approximately 9-10% accounted in Vietnam’s GDP 
was from the total spending for infrastructure development and results from its 
studies also shows that there is a strong link between infrastructure investment 
and Vietnam’s economic growth. With regards to the transportation sector, 
Vietnam had experienced quite significant improvements and it is shown by 
the total length of road network which had doubled since 1990 as well as its 
substantial quality improvement. 
World Bank report had also confirmed that Vietnam will require an approx-
imate sum of 11.4% of its GDP to support its infrastructure development until 
2010, in which the transportation sector requires 4.1% of the GDP per year.2 
Moreover, the proposal for capital spending on transportation sector devel-
opment is estimated to be US$ 4.3 billion from 2006-2008.1 Most of the funds for 
previous infrastructure developments had originated from the State budget 
(11%) and 37% were from the official development assistance (ODA). Howev-
er, Vietnam could experience major difficulties in the future if it only relies on 
these sources. This is due to the fact that Vietnam had experienced a signifi-
cant economic growth, especially in the past decade, and its GDP per capi-
ta had exceeded the permissible threshold of the donor community which 
makes Vietnam no longer entitled to preferential loans from donors. Therefore, 
private sector participation is expected to play a more major role in providing 
the necessary capital for infrastructure development in Vietnam. 
So far, the public sector has frequently played the major role in financing, 
constructing and operating transportation infrastructure development and 
private investment in this sector has been very low with accounting for just 2% 
of its total capital expenditure in the last decade.3 While the implementation 
of Vietnam’s transportation construction projects is managed by the Project 
Management Units (PMUs), the construction itself is usually carried out by 
some State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) who are mostly attached to the Ministry 
of Transportation (MoT) as well as the provincial government, along with sev-
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eral private companies. Currently, there are approximately 200 SOEs under 
the MoT of Vietnam and most of them are grouped into 12 corporations, such 
as the 5 Civil Engineering Construction Corporations (CIENCOs).3 Although 
these SOEs are principally independent, they are practically under the instruc-
tion of the MoT.  
The government of Vietnam has a very strong commitment to modernize the 
country’s transport system because they believe that such development 
would support the country’s overall economic growth. This commitment is 
shown through the real expenditures that the government made for the de-
velopment of the transportation sector which experienced an increase of 21% 
annually between 1994 and 2002.3 Furthermore, the government had also in-
troduced the Law of Foreign Investment in Vietnam as a mean to expand its 
foreign economic cooperation due to their awareness of Vietnam for being a 
highly attractive investment environment for foreign investors as a result of its 
strategic location, which is in the center of a dynamic economic growth re-
gion. 
3.2  BOT Pro jec ts  in  V ie tnam 
As a form of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
scheme is considered as an attractive means by the Vietnamese government 
to develop new infrastructure projects. This is due to the fact that the Viet-
namese government has very limited budget to fund these kinds of projects 
and they are also aware that the country’s economic growth could be de-
terred if its infrastructure development falls behind. In such scheme, the part-
nership between the government and the private sector is more in the form of 
an indirect partnership, where the government agrees to delegate the rights 
to build and operate infrastructure facilities to private investors. Therefore, the 
government would have access to the private sector’s capital as well as ex-
pertise, and use them as the main resources for the infrastructure develop-
ment. 
In the case of Vietnam, the country had announced its desire for foreign pri-
vate investment since the early 1990s, especially for its power sector devel-
opment. The government’s factual determination was shown through the 
passing of the BOT law during this period.4 However, there have been quite a 
few problems in the development of infrastructure projects with private partic-
ipation in Vietnam. Most of these problems occurred due to the difficulty in 
the negotiation process with the government agencies and also due to the 
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reluctance of the majority of government officials to provide the necessary 
guarantee and appropriate assurance towards the private sector regarding 
the long-term security of the project’s revenue stream.4 In addition to that, 
private sector’s constant skepticism towards the government had also played 
a major part in some of the delays that had occurred in the development of 
infrastructure projects in Vietnam. BOT Legislation in Vietnam was passed by 
the government as the legal framework for all infrastructure projects that are 
developed under these types of procurement system. Under this legislation, 
BOT companies can secure foreign loans by using their assets that are fi-
nanced by loan as a guarantee or other forms of security as long as it is in 
accordance with Vietnamese laws and regulations. However, the company 
may not grant a mortgage of land-use rights to any foreign investors/lenders. 
Instead, it may provide guarantees (through State approval) such as the fol-
lowing: 
 
 Buildings, equipments and other assets constructed or purchased with 
the invested capital of the BOT company (invested capital includes the 
loan capital) 
 Other assets owned by the BOT company 
 The value of the land-use rights 
 The property rights of the BOT company 
 
Nevertheless, the legislation may agree on the application of a foreign law, 
provided that it is not contrary to the Vietnamese law and that it is approved 
by the Ministry of Justice. 
In the past 15 years, Vietnam has had more than 100 infrastructure projects 
developed under the BOT scheme. However, some of these projects could 
not be completed on time and some had experienced budget overrun. 
These problems occurred mostly because there is a lack of knowledge in 
terms of project procurement system/procedure and the risks that have the 
possibility to occur in the project were not assessed properly during the 
project development stage. Moreover, disputes between the project stake-
holders often occurred due to their misunderstanding and different percep-
tions on construction, financial and legal issues of projects that were devel-
oped under a BOT scheme.5 If negotiations and reconciliations fails, disputes 
may be resolved either by a Vietnamese arbitration organization, an arbitra-
tion established by agreement of the stakeholders or an arbitration estab-
lished and operating in a third and neutral country. 
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As an encouragement for private sectors that are involved in any BOT com-
pany, the government of Vietnam provides various advantageous tax 
schemes and other incentives such as5: 
 
 BOT companies are entitled to a payment of business income tax (BIT) 
at the rate of 10% for the whole concession period, after the exemption 
and reduction that are referred in the following articles 
 BOT companies are exempted from payment of BIT for the first 4 years 
(8 years if the project is in an area where investment is encouraged by 
the government) from the company’s first profit-making year, followed 
by a 50% reduction in BIT for the next four years 
 BOT companies are entitled for an import duty exemption on equip-
ment, machinery and specialized vehicles (including spare parts and 
accessories) that are utilized for creating assets of the project, as well as 
fuel, raw materials and other kind of supplies used for the BOT project 
 Protected industrial property rights, technical know-how, technological 
process and technical services required to implement a BOT project are 
exempted from payment of taxes relating to the technology transfer 
3.3  Yen  Lenh  Br idge  BOT Pro jec t  
This 2.23 km bridge is located in the northern part of Vietnam and it spanned 
across the Hong (Red) River. It was constructed as an alternative route that 
connects the Hung Yen province, which is regarded as an essential economic 
region in the North Vietnam, with Ha Nam province. Previously, traffics had to 
use a ferry to get across this river or make an approximately 40 km detour 
near Hanoi which usually caused quite severe traffic jams. However, this 
bridge has been able to reduce the traffic from the other alternative route as 
well as reduce the required traveling time between the two provinces. In ad-
dition to that, the social-economic development in the two provinces as well 
as the entire river delta will also have the opportunity to improve, thus en-
hancing the entire country’s social-economic development. 
3.3 .1  P ro jec t  Background 
As mentioned previously, the project was carried out in order to link two prov-
inces in the northern region of Vietnam and to create more favorable condi-
tions for socio-economic development in the region since it is estimated to at-
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tract around 10% of the north-south traffic.6 The construction work itself took 
approximately 23 months, which was 10 months ahead of schedule. Although 
the project was developed under a BOT scheme, more than half of the 
project cost was funded by the State and the local governments of the two 
provinces (+ US$11 million), while Thang Long Construction Corporation and 
the Civil Engineering Construction Corporation No.4 (CIENCO No.4) cover the 
remaining cost. The concession company was granted a 17 years of conces-
sion period for their investment in the project. 
The East Sea Project Management Unit (ESPMU)7 was appointed by the Minis-
try of Transportation (MoT) to act on behalf of the ministry in the concession 
company, with the Vietnam Road Administration acting as an independent 
reviewer for the concession company to ensure the quality of the construc-
tion design and implementation. The Transportation Engineering Design Cor-
poration was then appointed by the concessionaire and ESPMU as the con-
sultant company to design and supervise the project. The concession 
company was also supported by the central government through agree-
ments with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Investment and Plan-
ning, while the Vietnam Development and Investment Bank provided invest-
ment fund and financial guarantee towards the concessionaire to help 
ensure the project’s financial stability, especially during its construction stage, 
and the Vietnam Insurance Company agreed on providing insurance pre-
mium to guarantee the construction of the project. In addition to that, the 
Yen Lenh BOT Company was established by the concessionaire in 2003 to op-
erate the project for as long as the agreed concession period. Figure 1 illu-
strates the structure of the stakeholders in the Yen Lenh BOT bridge project. 
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Figure 1 – Structure of stakeholders in the Yen Lenh BOT Bridge Project,   
 Source: East Sea Project Management 2002 
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3.3 .2  BOT Pro jec t  R i sk  Ident i f i ca t ion  
As part of a main research that has an objective to assess the relationship be-
tween proper risk allocation and project success, Ninh5 carried out this case 
study research on the Yen Lenh Bridge BOT project to assess the stakeholders’ 
perspective on risks and opportunities in the project. Questionnaire surveys 
were carried out as part of the data collection process with a purpose to dis-
cover the types of risks that are considered by the project’s stakeholders to 
may influence or have an impact on the efforts to achieve a successful 
project. In addition to that, the stakeholders were also requested to deter-
mine the level of impact that these risks may have on the project so that the 
risks can be ranked based on their level of impact from the perspective of 
each of the stakeholders. 
The target of this questionnaire survey includes government officials, financers 
(i.e. investors, bankers, etc.), insurers, consultants, contractors and subcon-
tractors. Forty questionnaires were distributed and 35 questionnaires were re-
turned, making the return rate to be approximately 87.5%. The respondents 
consist mostly of managers since they are considered to have more compre-
hensive knowledge on various topics such as management, technology, 
finance, organization, etc., thus making them as a reliable source of informa-
tion. Moreover, about 54.3% of these respondents have at least 10 years of 
experience, therefore considered to have substantial knowledge that are re-
levant to this kind of project. 
As a result of the survey, top ten risks that are considered to have the ability to 
influence BOT infrastructure projects in Vietnam are as follows: 
 
1. Land acquisition delay 
2. Delay in approval from government agencies 
3. Risk of transportation network in region influencing the BOT project 
4. Cost overrun 
5. Unrealistic forecast on future economic development and demand of 
the society 
6. Increasing inflation rate 
7. Incorrect analysis of ownership duration 
8. Interest rate fluctuation 
9. General corruption and untrustworthiness of public official 
10. Actual traffic revenues are lower than estimated 
 
Each of these risks is discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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3.3 .2 .1  Land Acqu is i t i on  De lay  
Land acquisition risk has always been considered as one of the risk that could 
have a significant impact on the overall success of an infrastructure project. 
On-time land acquisition is very important since a slight delay in the acquisi-
tion of only a small area of the land that is a section of a project could affect 
the entire schedule and viability of the project. In order to minimize this risk, 
the Vietnamese government had improved the existing land law so that it will 
enable the government to immediately acquire the required land for high-
way development. However, the amended law is still ineffective since land is 
still considered as a state subject and due to the time-consuming process of 
the acquisition process itself. Depending on the size of the project and the 
amount of political support given by the government towards the project, the 
land acquisition process normally will take one to three years. Figure 2 illu-
strates the current land acquisition process in Vietnam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Land acquisition process in Vietnam, Source: Ninh (2006) 
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projects, including this project, had to cope with the following issues in the 
past few years: 
 
 The proposed compensation land price by the government is always 
lower than its actual market price, but the land owner must accept this 
condition and have no bargaining /negotiation power. Therefore, it is 
impossible for the land owners to purchase a new land with the same 
value at that price. 
 There are differences in terms of land compensation price between 
provinces because each province has different legal documents or lo-
cal law/regulations. Therefore, if a project is located in more than one 
province, there is a possibility that the compensation price for the land 
used by the project could be different. This condition could result in law 
suits made by those land owners who received less land compensation 
amount. 
 In the case where the land owners are farmers, they usually turn out to 
be unemployed after they receive their compensation since their com-
pensation amount is insufficient to purchase similar type of land and the 
government does not possess this type of land to compensate them 
with. 
 Some areas were declared being mistakenly compensated by the 
government officials who were involved in the acquisition process, 
which result in a reduction of land compensation price, thus presenting 
an opportunity for corruptions.8   
 Coordination between government agencies is very week. Each gov-
ernment agency/department has their own development plan and 
most of their projects were initiated and constructed with very little or 
even without synchronization with other departments, therefore result-
ing in a competitive environment between government agencies in-
stead of a supportive environment. 
3.3 .2 .2  Delay  in  Approva l  f rom Government  Agenc ies  
For most of the time, the Vietnamese government does not grant an approval 
on project-related issues on-time and sometimes they even cancel those that 
had been approved previously. Such condition makes the approval process 
a very time-consuming practice and could result in a delay on the overall 
project development process. Moreover, the lengthy approval process is 
mostly due to several causes such as the unprofessional and incompetence 
of the government officials, poor implementation of the law and regulations 
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by the government, complex and bureaucratic approval procedures, and 
decentralization with unclear responsibility provision which creates unneces-
sary requirements from many divisions and levels for just one simple problem in 
a project. 
Looking at this situation, it is clear that most of the problems originated from 
the government, both in terms of the officials as well as an entity/organization. 
This is due to the fact that the recruitment process of government officials is 
not transparent, and is mostly based on the arrangements made by the ruling 
government. Therefore, most of these officials do not have the proper under-
standing regarding their post because their qualifications are mostly irrelevant 
and sometimes even under-qualified for their job positions. 
Moreover, many current laws and regulations have become obsolete be-
cause they were not able to control the current actual demands and that 
some of these laws and regulations can only be applied in general cases and 
impossible if not difficult to be applied to specific cases due to their poor con-
tent. Also, some of these laws and regulations are updated to quickly and 
went through a series of amendments, thus making them difficult to be ap-
plied practically. This condition had also contributed in the approval process 
performed by the government. 
3.3 .2 .3  Risk  o f  Transpor ta t ion  Network  in  Reg ion   
In f luenc ing  the  BOT Pro jec t  
Since the revenue gained by the concessionaire significantly depends on the 
amount of tollway users, therefore it is very important to discover and under-
stand the possible causes of volatility in toll revenues. In Vietnam, quite a 
number of small and isolated stretches of tolled highways, by-passes and 
bridges, which were developed under BOT scheme, were not functioning to 
its capacity because there are still some remaining bottlenecks in the unde-
veloped area of the highway. In addition to that, the revenue of these tolled 
infrastructures are also threatened by the availability of alternative roads, the 
construction of competing routes as well as the poor and deteriorating condi-
tion of the connecting roads. 
This Yen Lenh Bridge is a clear example of how conditions such as mentioned 
above influenced its revenue. One of the reasons for the development of this 
project was to increase the economic growth in the Hai Nung and Ha Nam 
province because it was expected to attract a large number of trucks and 
containers going to the central region of Vietnam from Hai Phong Port, which 
in turn would attract investment projects along the road. Moreover, vehicles 
going through Ha Noi, which has been overloaded, were also expected to be 
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reduced significantly through the development of this project as an alterna-
tive route. Unfortunately that is not the case. Not only that it is still unable to 
reduce traffic jam in the Ha Noi region, it is also unable to generate its esti-
mated revenue. Since the central provinces have their own sea-ports, they 
have no demands for transporting goods from Hai Phong Port, thus resulting in 
a wrong estimation on the number of vehicles passing through this bridge. In 
addition to that, the road connecting to the bridge has not been upgraded 
nor expanded and therefore reducing the possible number of vehicles pass-
ing through. As a result, the project has not been able to attract its predicted 
revenue as expected in its feasibility study as well as functioning to its full ca-
pacity and serving its intended purpose. 
3.3 .2 .4  Cost  Over run  
Cost overrun can be caused by various things such as the inability to strictly 
implement the findings from the feasibility study using the right procedure and 
the inability to identify all the factors that have negative impact towards the 
project, thus making it difficult to be kept under control. Factors that are con-
sidered to have the capability to create a disadvantage towards the project 
are inappropriate design, lack of resources, disputes, site conditions, man-
agement errors, human resources incompetence, changes in the scope of 
work, unpredictable weather conditions, unsuitable technology implementa-
tion, political and economic instability, etc. 
Most of infrastructure projects that are developed in Vietnam also go through 
the same experience, including this project. Although the quality of the de-
sign work conducted by Vietnamese contractors have shown improvement in 
recent years, errors on technical design as well as technology implementation 
still exists though not as much. As a result, the amount of additional cost to 
carry out repair and additional work is still significant. Since the procedure for 
applying, approving and authorizing repair and additional work is still compli-
cated due to the ineffectiveness of the government agencies, it will cause 
further delay on the overall project completion and result in an even larger 
additional cost. 
Poor management of the concessionaire was also one of the main causes of 
cost overrun in this project. The concessionaire of this project was forced to 
find a solution to subsidize the project’s contractors since these contractors 
had to bear additional cost due to inflation which caused an increase in the 
price of construction materials, as agreed by both the concessionaire and 
contractors. However, this situation occurred in the first place because most 
of these contractors are the branch company of the investors. Therefore, the 
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government was given no choice but to provide these additional costs and 
extend the duration of concession time in order to cover this cost overrun. 
3.3 .2 .5  Unrea l i s t i c  Forecas t  on  Fu ture  Economic   
Deve lopment  &  Demand o f  the  Soc ie ty  
It is very important to know whether the public (toll users and community) 
have the proper knowledge, understanding as well as acceptance towards 
the commercialization concept of toll. Through this information, the developer 
of the proposed tolled infrastructure projects would have a clearer view re-
garding the actual demand for the project which greatly depends on its 
clear economic value. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese government, just like 
any other host government, tends to have an optimistic forecast than the pri-
vate investors, thus generating a bias attitude on the actual demand of the 
society while also creating an unrealistic forecast on the ability of the project 
to instigate future economic development. 
This condition is worsened by the fact that there has not been any adequate 
research that studies the elasticity of demand due to the introduction of tolls 
in the Vietnam road projects. Consequently, very few road projects in Viet-
nam that were developed under a BOT scheme have been able to realize 
their projected traffic demand. It was discovered through this case study that 
total traffic demand loss usually varies between 20-30%. The survey carried out 
in this case study also revealed that the demand risk has a very high severity 
impact on Vietnam BOT projects. Factors that cause this risk to occur in this 
project are the development or renovation of alternative toll-free road and 
over estimation on the socio-economic development of the surrounding re-
gion, with economic recession considered as the major cause. In addition to 
that, forecasting errors in the traffic projection also played a role in generat-
ing an incorrect demand analysis for this project. 
3.3 .2 .6  I nc reas ing  In f l a t ion  Ra te  
An increase in the inflation rate would result in a significant amount of reduc-
tion on the value of money obtained. In other words, an increasing inflation 
rate could reduce the profit that should have been acquired by project in-
vestors, or even worse, result in a total loss. Therefore, it is highly essential to 
have an accurate forecast on the inflation rate so that all the involved stake-
holders would not experience any unnecessary loss. 
However, this project had to experience it. A 5% inflation rate was determined 
for this project based on the inflation rate data from 1995-1999, where the 
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annual average inflation rate was approximately 5.06%, and it was used since 
the feasibility study was carried out from 1999-2000. Unfortunately, the inflation 
rate increased rapidly in 2004 and 2005 into 9.5% and 8.3% respectively. As a 
result, the prices of main construction materials also increased, thus affecting 
the contractors which in turn causing an increase in the overall construction 
cost by approximately 30% from the initial budget. 
3.3 .2 .7  I ncor rec t  Ana lys i s  o f  Ownersh ip  Dura t ion  
The determination of the appropriate length of a concession period must 
consider the interest of both the concerned government and investors. In 
other words, one party must not be given more privilege at the expense of 
the other. Although longer concession period will provide private sectors to 
gain more benefits, however, this condition may induce loss on the govern-
ment. On the other hand, most investors will most likely increase the service 
fees, if not reject the agreement, should the concession period is too short. As 
a result of this situation, the public (end-users) will most of the times suffer the 
consequences by paying a high price for using such facility. 
In Vietnam, the approved technique for calculating the concession period is 
through the financial method which has been applied in most projects of this 
kind. A discount rate (r) is used in this method to take into account the effects 
of inflation, such as an increase in the operation and maintenance cost. Par-
ticularly for this bridge project, the discount rate was determined at 6% per 
year which means that the investors of this project will not be able to fully re-
cover their capital investment should the inflation rate increase over 6%. In 
reality, the inflation rate experienced an increase during the construction 
stage of this project as mentioned in the previous section. Hence, the future 
financial condition of this facility appeared to be doubtful since the conces-
sion period was incorrectly determined. 
3.3 .2 .8  I n te res t  Ra te  F luc tuat ion  
Instability in the interest rate would cause an undesirable financial condition 
of all the stakeholders in the project in terms of their expected revenue, as 
well as influencing the country’s overall economic value. For most of the 
times, private sectors are directly and negatively affected by an increase in 
the interest rate since they usually have an agreement with banks or other fi-
nancial institutions to acquire loan during the project implementation. Such 
increase would then reduce the private sector’s potential profit. Moreover, 
private sectors would also have to pay additional interest if they are unable to 
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make the loan payments on time. Unfortunately, the government of Vietnam 
tends to make late payments towards the contractor. As a result, the private 
sector, especially the contractors, must accept the consequences of this in-
terest rate risk even though they were not the source of the problems that are 
affected by this risk. 
3.3 .2 .9  Genera l  Cor rupt ion  and  Unt rus twor th iness  o f  
Pub l i c  Of f i c i a l  
Corruption is always a threat in infrastructure projects, especially if it is in de-
veloping countries such as Vietnam. This was confirmed by the UNDP8 report 
stating that corruption by government agencies are common in Vietnam and 
that it has spread far and deep into many government departments. As an 
example, two government agencies in Vietnam that are related to infrastruc-
ture projects development are ranked 5th and 7th in terms of most corrupted 
department, and they are the Department of Construction and the Land 
Administration Agency, respectively. According to Klitgaard9, corruption can 
be represented into a formula where Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – 
Accountability, therefore it requires a transparent administration and honest 
officials in order to minimize if not prevent corruption in these kind of projects. 
Although corruption could generally cause quite significant loss, however, it is 
considered to have less severe impact in the Vietnam construction industry 
compared to the other developing countries in the region. The reason for this 
could be because the majority of businessmen and entrepreneurs in Vietnam 
have become accustomed to corruption, thus making it as a common and 
acceptable practice. 
3.3 .2 .10  Actua l  T ra f f i c  Revenues  Lower  than   
Es t imated  
The main source of revenue for tolled infrastructure facility operators is the 
amount of vehicles using the facility. The more traffic passes through the facili-
ty, the more revenue it will be able to obtain. Therefore it is very important to 
have an accurate estimate of the potential traffic that would use the facility 
so that an estimated revenue can be calculated which is one of the impor-
tant factors that is used to determine the price of the toll-fees as well as the 
length of concession period. 
However, most of the times both the government and private sectors in Viet-
nam failed to produce an accurate estimation and therefore resulting in a 
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revenue shortfall due to insufficient traffic. Six major reasons have been dis-
covered as the cause of traffic revenue shortfall in Vietnam tolled infrastruc-
tures, they are: 
 
1. The existing transportation network in the region creates competing en-
vironment instead of complementing. 
2. Unrealistic and inaccurate forecast on future socio-economic devel-
opment and demand. 
3. Development of competing infrastructure by other agencies. 
4. Unwillingness and resistance by facility users to pay the determined toll 
fees. 
5. Availability of regular infrastructures which provide similar service and 
free of charge. 
6. Insufficient road condition that are linked to the infrastructure. 
 
Since there was quite a significant difference between the estimated and ac-
tual traffic flow, the concessionaire of this project suffered the consequences 
in terms of loss in its cash flow for a total of approximately 3,657 million VND, 
which is equal to 19.46% revenue in 2005. This revenue shortfall further affects 
the debt servicing of the concession company and also resulting in a lack of 
fund for the operation and maintenance work of the facility. 
3.3 .3  R isk  Percept ions  in  the  P ro jec t  
As previously discussed, infrastructure projects that were developed under a 
BOT scheme involve a variety of stakeholders, i.e. government agencies, pri-
vate companies, financial institutions, insurance companies, users, communi-
ty, etc. Each of these stakeholders has different objectives which therefore in-
fluence their perceptions on the risks related to these kinds of projects. In 
other words, different stakeholders may have different definitions of risks and 
these risks may also give different meanings for each stakeholder. Some risk 
can be considered to have positive impact for a stakeholder while it can also 
give a negative impact for the other stakeholder in the same time. Moreover, 
some risks can even have different meaning to the same stakeholder at dif-
ferent times or in different circumstances. As a consequence, each stake-
holder might wish to implement different kinds of strategy to manage these 
risks that may occur in the project. Therefore, it is very important that all 
project stakeholders acknowledged and understand the differences of each 
other’s objectives so that they may have a common and identical under-
standing of these risks. If the project stakeholders do not have the mutual un-
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derstanding of these project risks, mismanagement of risk will most probably 
occur in the project.10   
Questionnaire surveys were conducted to know the stakeholders’ perception 
of risks that occurred in this case study. The survey result indicates that approx-
imately 80% of the respondents considered risks only as a threat while around 
14% considered them as both opportunity and threat. This result reveals that 
the majority of respondents has adverse mind-set towards project risks and 
considers them as obstructions rather than challenges that could be over-
come. Moreover, the result also shows that 54.3% of the respondents had ex-
perienced conflicts with other project stakeholders in terms of risk perception 
which were mostly caused by the lack of understanding between the stake-
holders. This lack of understanding generally took place because each of the 
stakeholders has different objectives, interests, approach as well as values. In 
other words, the communication between the stakeholders is very poor thus 
resulting into misunderstandings.  
The stakeholders in this case study were categorized into three groups, de-
pending on their characteristics, roles and purposes in the project. The first 
group is the Government group, which consists of government agencies, de-
partments and their officials. The second group is the investors group, with in-
vestors, lenders and insurers included in it, while the third group is the contrac-
tor group that includes contractors, sub-contractors and operators. With 
respect to the government’s point of view, the risk that is considered to have 
the most threat in this project is the investor’s focus on the benefits of con-
struction rather than the profit. Although this is considered to be quite ex-
traordinary, this is what actually happened in Vietnam. Since the majority of 
infrastructure investors in Vietnam are somehow related to a state-owned 
company or is a joint-venture company which the government has the major 
control, the government officials in-charge for this project tend to conduct as 
many new projects as possible within their tenure in the department so that 
they could gain high rewards/benefits. By doing this, they are actually not 
considering nor attempting to manage the company, which has been given 
the license and authority to conduct the construction of the infrastructure 
project, to sustain in the long-term. To support their purpose, they performed 
feasibility study and presented a very optimistic data as an effort to acquire 
the approval from the relevant authorities.  
Other risks that are also considered in the top-five risks in infrastructure projects by 
the government is the poor financial resources of investors and contractors (2nd), 
which is the main reason for poor construction quality, construction delay and 
project cost overrun, unrealistic forecast on future economic development and 
demand (3rd) and poor construction quality (4th), which influence the traffic flow 
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while also increasing maintenance cost and reducing the expected construc-
tion life time, and it is mostly due to inappropriate technical application, bad 
material, construction management inefficiency and corruption. Moreover, in-
appropriate facility maintenance (5th) which is causing the quality of the infra-
structure to be decreasing rapidly is due to the investors desire to reduce the 
maintenance cost as much as possible with the lowest acceptable level of qual-
ity. Although the government tried their best to control the construction quality 
through law, criteria and investigations, nevertheless their effort is still insufficient 
to improve the quality as expected. 
In terms of the investors’ point of view, the lack of an appropriate toll adjustment 
mechanism is considered as the most threatening risk since it is beyond the abili-
ty of the private sector to control. In Vietnam, the mechanism for toll fee adjust-
ment is under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. Concessionaire can only 
offer toll-infrastructure in a constraint scale and they have to wait for approvals 
by many Government agencies whenever they wish for toll adjustments. Fur-
thermore, transportation network in region influencing the BOT project (2nd) is 
considered by the investor to be the reason for traffic revenue shortfall and un-
certain transportation demand, which result in a lower revenue flow than ex-
pected. As for the risk of incorrect analysis of ownership duration (3rd), it very 
much depends on many unpredicted variables in the long-term as well as ma-
thematical and financial method, as discussed in the previous section, however, 
it is a major key for investors either to succeed or fail throughout the project. The 
risk of delay in approval from government agencies (4th) and land acquisition 
delay (5th) are more related to political risk rather than financial risk, yet they di-
rectly affect the investors’ economy. For most of the times the Vietnamese gov-
ernment, both central and local, do not approve project related issues on time, 
even though they realize that time is very crucial in any project, especially BOT 
projects. These issues were also experienced in this case study, thus reducing the 
investors’ confidence to participate in future infrastructure development. 
Unlike the first and second group that have to face the project risks in a long-
term period, the third group that consists of contractors and subcontractors is 
confronted with risks only during the construction stage of the project, which 
generally proceed for 2-3 years. As for the operators who are also classified into 
the third group, they are usually being involved beyond the construction stage. 
From their point view, the delay in approval from government agencies and 
general corruption and untrustworthiness of public officials are ranked as the 1st 
and 2nd most threatening risk in this case study, respectively. As mentioned pre-
viously, approval from the Vietnamese government requires a thorough proce-
dure just like any other government agencies, but with unnecessary bureaucra-
cy and complexity. In order to achieve the required progress, every 
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infrastructure project requires a strong support from the government. Unfortu-
nately for contractors that are involved in infrastructure development in Vietnam 
and particularly in this project, they are often asked to go through difficult and 
un-transparent procedures. This is due to the unprofessional and incompetence 
of the staff of local government regulatory agencies, unclear decentralization of 
responsibility within the agency and relatively poor law implementation along 
with common corruption practices and high untrustworthiness of these govern-
ment officials. The unconvincing support by the government is also shown 
through the uncertainty in the critical raw material price (3rd). As the owner of 
the project and the one who has the authority to make strategic decisions, the 
government should have provided more cooperation and be a bit more en-
couraging by assembling supportive regulations. Without such support, the con-
tractors are faced with the condition where these material prices go through a 
significant and unmanageable increase and they are forced to find a solution 
for themselves in order to at least minimize the loss. Delay in financial closure (4th) 
is also the kind of risk that is considered as a threat by this group, and it is one of 
the consequences of delay in the approval from government agencies. Moreo-
ver, in many situations the contractors are forced to wait for the land acquisition 
process to be completed by the government while being instructed to start the 
project construction at the same time, thus making the land acquisition delay risk 
to be ranked 5th by this group. This condition creates a financial burden towards 
the contractors which include labor cost, cost of non-working machine, bank in-
terest and not to mention a waste of time. Table 1 compares the different per-
ceptions on the top-five important risks between these three different groups of 
stakeholders in this Yen Lenh Bridge BOT project. 
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Table 1 – The perceptions of top-five important risks in the Yen Lenh Bridge BOT project, 
Source: Ninh (2006) 
Government Investors Contractors
1
Investor's focus on the benefits 
of construction rather than the 
profit
The lack of an appropriate toll 
fee adjustment mechanism
Delay in approval from 
government agencies
2 Poor financial resources of investors and contractors
Transportation network in 
region influencing the BOT 
project
General corruption and 
untrustworthiness of public 
officials
3
Unrealistic forecast on future 
economic development and 
demand
Incorrect analysis of ownership 
duration
Uncertainty in critical raw 
material prices
4 Poor construction quality Delay in approval from government agencies Delay in financial closure
5 Inappropriate facility management Land acquisition delay Land acquisition delay
Risk Factors based on the perception of
Rank
 
 
3.4  Governance  I ssues  in  P ro jec t  
Governance can be defined in many ways. In general, governance is de-
fined as the process of decision making. The decisions made can be either 
implemented or not implemented, and different organizations may approach 
governance issues differently. As a project developed under a BOT scheme, 
the Yen Lenh Bridge has short-term as well as long-term purposes. In other 
words, it has management concerns because it has to deal with tactical is-
sues that relates to day-to-day operations while also having governance 
concerns because it deals with monitoring and overseeing strategic direction 
as well as strategic decision-making.11 Therefore, this kind of project requires a 
strategic approach in addition to the common management approach to 
ensure long-term success. Nevertheless, it is important to discover what kind of 
governance problems is the project experiencing and what are the sources 
of these problems in order to determine the most strategic resolution. For that 
reason, governance issues that occurred in this project is discussed in more 
detail in this section. 
Governance can be used in various contexts such as corporate governance, 
international governance, IT governance, including project governance. A 
good project governance (GPG) concept was developed by Abednego12 to 
help evaluate the performance of projects that are developed under a PPP 
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procurement system. Based on this concept, key components of good 
project governance were determined, namely Fairness, Transparency, Ac-
countability, Sustainability and Effectiveness/Efficiency.13 These components 
are further broken down into sub-components and each sub-component is 
also broken down into key analytical issues as shown in table 2, which will be 
used to identify the governance issues in this project. 
 
Table 2 – Detailed breakdown of GPG key components, Source: Abednego & Ogunlana 
(2006)13 
Contract document
Project administration
User & community participation
Quality assurance
Management capability
Project design & planning 
document
Government 
regulations/laws/policy
Project procurement
Financial Management
Fairness
Information Management
Information management system
Information classification
Means of communication
Existing policies related that influence construction 
projects with private sector participation
Existing government regulations related to private sector 
participation
Existing legal system and laws related to private sector 
participation
Transparency
Identification of expert(s) responsible for project design 
and planning
Project design and planning development process
Administration process for design/planning/schedule 
Contract document development process
Private sector selection process
Proposal evaluation method
Evaluation/assessment criteria
Project procurement strategy/method
Financial status
Project financing/investment strategy
Incentive/compensation program
Payment mechanism/procedures
Accountability
Public participation process
Project demand analysis
Economic and social impact analysis
Construction supervision
Sub-contractor selection process
Value engineering application
Project management training system
Project management training system
Company’s experience level
Stakeholder management
Operational and maintenance 
management
Organization structure
Sustainability
Infrastructure development plan
Stakeholder management approach
Coordination procedure and implementation
Conflict resolution approach
Infrastructure operation strategy
Infrastructure maintenance program
Organization’s decision-making approach
Organization’s hierarchy system
Effectiveness 
and Efficiency
Project monitoring and control 
system
Progress report system
Project review process
Documentation process  
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3.4 .1  Fa i rness  
In terms of project design and planning development process, the responsibil-
ity actually lies with the Vietnamese government. Even though the feasibility 
study in this project was carried out by the concession company, however, it 
was under the control of the government through its Ministry of Transport. The 
government officials who were also given the authority within the concession 
company to make strategic decisions did not make an effort to manage the 
company and help it to sustain in the long-term; instead they tend to gain as 
much benefit as they can for themselves during their office term. In order to 
do this, the result of the feasibility study they carried out would mostly pro-
duce optimistic data to maximize the chances of being approved by their 
superiors in the relevant government agencies. As a result, the project design 
and planning work was actually based on biased information, thus making it 
unreliable. Unfortunately, the contractors and the concession company have 
to accept the consequences of these unprofessional and incompetent be-
haviors of the government officials. 
Likewise, the Vietnamese government also failed to provide the necessary 
support in the form of regulations, legal systems and policies. Claims and dis-
putes are common incidents during infrastructure project development, in-
cluding this particular project. Most of these claims and disputes were the re-
sults of the government’s duality and inconsistency. By this, it means that the 
same set of regulation and policies are defined and interpreted differently by 
the government so that it may serve their purpose rather than letting it func-
tion for its intended purpose, hence the duality form. And since the legal sys-
tem in the country was also set up and structured by the government, it is giv-
ing more advantage towards the government. Despite the fact that the law 
should exercise equality among all parties, however, the government gener-
ally exploits and make use of the system that they had set up to their advan-
tage, thus the inconsistency. Therefore, it truly shows that fairness was not 
achieved in this project. 
3.4 .2  Transparency  
Another kind of problem that occurred in this project was that there is a lack 
of understanding between the stakeholders in terms of risk perception. Since 
each of the stakeholders has different goals, objectives and concerns, these 
things influence their form of perception on which risks are considered to 
have the highest potential threat. As a result, each of them approached 
these risks with different strategies based on their needs and abilities, and in 
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many occasions it creates conflicts among the stakeholders. Therefore, the in-
formation regarding these differences should have been disseminated prop-
erly between the stakeholders through better communication in the first 
place in order to prevent future conflicts. A comprehensible information 
management practice and constant communication is then very much re-
quired to avoid any unnecessary conflicts between the stakeholders. 
In addition to information management concern, this project also expe-
rienced some problems in terms of financial management. As previously men-
tioned, this kind of project in Vietnam is mostly initiated and proposed by 
government officials. Unfortunately, these officials tend to exploit their authori-
ty for their own benefits. As a result, the project development plan and in-
vestment strategy was flawed since it is based on biased information. The risks 
that were neglected before began to create problems and subsequently 
both the concessionaire and the government have to share this burden. Due 
to this situation, the consortium then had no choice but to request the gov-
ernment and make them agree to convert this previously BOT scheme project 
into Build-Transfer (BT) type project. As an effort to help the investors that has 
an important role in providing the necessary resources, the Vietnamese gov-
ernment through the Ministry of Finance suggested the Prime Minister of Viet-
nam to approve this proposal for converting the Yen Lenh Bridge project from 
BOT to BT scheme. Therefore, it is clear that there was no proper planning in 
terms of project financing for this project which then resulted in an ambiguous 
investment strategy, poor construction quality, construction delay and cost 
overruns. These conditions also prove that there is a lack of transparency with-
in the project. 
3.4 .3  Accountab i l i t y  
The accountability of this project is also considered to be substandard. This 
condition is confirmed by the findings in the previous section where the unrea-
listic forecast of future economic development and demand, which is consi-
dered as one of the most potential risk, really occurred during the project life-
time. Since the forecast is based on overly optimistic data, the revenue for this 
tolled bridge which is primarily dependent on the amount of vehicles using 
the facility and the socio-economic impact of this facility on the region had 
also become over-estimated. In reality, the facility was not able to attract the 
expected revenue due to insufficient traffic. Such insufficiency is mainly 
caused by the existence of a competing transportation network around the 
region which is ironically developed by other government agencies, and also 
due to the inadequate road condition that links to the facility. To make mat-
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ters worse, the expected economic development did not really materialize in 
the area around the facility which was previously predicted to gain an in-
creased land value due to its supposedly strategic location and high de-
mand. In other words, the government is considered to be significantly ac-
countable for the facility’s inability to neither generate the necessary returns 
nor produce the required impact around the region. 
3.4 .4  Sus ta inab i l i t y  
Coordination between government agencies as well as between govern-
ment agencies and private parties was also a problem in this project. This lack 
of coordination is confirmed by the competing circumstances especially 
among the government agencies in relation to infrastructure development, 
rather than constructing a supportive environment through an accommodat-
ing and collaborative partnership. As a result, the nationwide infrastructure 
development plan is not synchronized and an achievement by one party 
could bring failure for the other. What is more distressing is that even though 
the government as well as the other parties acknowledged this situation, 
there has only been very little effort given to solve these kind of problems 
through stakeholder management approach. Consequently, conflicts are in-
evitable. However, since the existing and practiced conflict resolution ap-
proach in Vietnam is still insufficient and unable to impose equal treatment, it 
affects the project sustainability in the long-term while also discouraging fu-
ture private participation which in turn would jeopardize future infrastructure 
development. 
Moreover, the sustainability of this project is also imperiled by high mainten-
ance cost which is due to the inefficient and ineffective construction process 
as well as corruption resulting in a poor construction quality. This condition is 
then worsened by the inappropriate application of the maintenance pro-
gram and the reduction of maintenance cost by the investors to the lowest 
possible condition, thus rapidly decreasing the infrastructure quality. Conse-
quently, the project will suffer in the long run while still causing continuous 
problems for all its stakeholders. 
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3.4 .5  E f fec t i veness  and  E f f i c i ency  
In terms of effectiveness and efficiency, this project actually needs to improve 
its administration practice, especially concerning its documentation process. 
According to the questionnaire surveys conducted in this project, one of the 
most important factors that restrict the risk identification process is the lack of 
historical information regarding risk sources. Due to this situation, it is difficult 
for the government and future private investors to predict the potential risks 
that may occur in future infrastructure projects thus preventing them from 
making an accurate estimation as well as proper planning. Without having 
the required information regarding the risks and their consequences, it will al-
so hinder the stakeholders to approach projects with the most appropriate risk 
management strategy. Hence, it is important to have proper project docu-
mentation in order to achieve an effective and efficient project. 
3.5  Conc lus ion  
Infrastructure development in Vietnam is believed to have a significant contribu-
tion towards the country’s increasing economic growth. However, the situation 
would put Vietnam to be ineligible for preferential loans from donors, especially 
since its GDP per capita had exceeded the permissible threshold of the donor 
community. As a resolution, the private sector is encouraged to be more in-
volved by providing the necessary resources, especially capital investments, for 
infrastructure development in Vietnam. In order to have more private sector par-
ticipation, it is very important to have full government support and clear under-
standing among the stakeholders regarding their differences on risk perceptions, 
such as the potential risks, possible sources of these risks as well as their preferred 
risk management strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to discover the risk percep-
tions of each of the project’s stakeholders. 
The stakeholders of this project are categorized into three major groups, namely 
government which consists of government agencies and their officials, investor 
which consists of investors, lenders and insurers; and contractor that includes 
contractors, subcontractors and operators. Each of these groups ranked the 
top-five important risks differently, based on their goals, objectives, values and 
concerns. The differences in goals, objectives, values and concerns influenced 
them in forming the perception on which risks are considered to have the high-
est potential threat. Accordingly, each of the stakeholders approached these 
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risks with different strategies based on their needs and abilities, and in many oc-
casions it creates conflicts among themselves.  
Moreover, the Yen Lenh Bridge has short-term as well as long-term purposes. In 
other words, it requires a strategic approach in addition to the common man-
agement approach to ensure long-term success. Therefore, discovering what 
kind of governance problems is the project experiencing including the sources 
of these problems is essential to help determine the most strategic solution. 
Good project governance (GPG) concept was developed to help evaluate the 
performance of projects that are developed under a PPP procurement system. 
Five key components of good project governance, namely Fairness, Transpa-
rency, Accountability, Sustainability and Effectiveness/Efficiency were deter-
mined based on the concept. They are further broken down into sub-
components and each sub-component is also broken down into key analytical 
issues 2, which is used to identify the governance issues in this project. 
This project has significant governance issues. In terms of fairness, the results of 
the project’s feasibility study was overly optimistic since the government who 
was also assigned into the investors consortium was concerned only for its own 
benefit rather than putting an effort to generate profit for the concessionaire. 
Both contractors and investors are then forced to accept the consequences as 
a result of improper project design and planning since it was based on biased in-
formation. Moreover, the government also did not provide enough support 
through the existing regulations, policy and applied legal system. On the subject 
of transparency, it was discovered that there was a lack of understanding be-
tween the project stakeholders due to the ineffective information management 
practice and improper communication among themselves. In addition to that, 
there was also no proper planning in terms of project financing for this project 
which resulted in an ambiguous investment strategy, poor construction quality, 
construction delay and cost overruns. Therefore, the project is considered to 
have failed in carrying out proper financial management. As for accountability 
measures, it is also considered to be substandard. The revenue obtained by the 
facility was not as expected and the socio-economic development did not oc-
cur as anticipated due to unrealistic forecast of future economic development 
and demand. This condition could actually be prevented if a more thorough 
feasibility study was conducted and a more extensive project demand as well 
as socio-economic impact analysis was carried out. In addition to that, lack of 
coordination between the project stakeholders had lead to an inappropriate 
nationwide infrastructure development and also a large number of unnecessary 
conflicts. However, due to the currently insufficient conflict resolution approach 
in Vietnam, it affects the project sustainability in the long-term since it will discou-
rage potential private investors to participate in future infrastructure develop-
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ment. The administration practice, especially concerning project documenta-
tion process also requires improvement so that information on all of the risks that 
occurred in the project, including their sources and consequences can be 
compiled and used for future reference. By having this kind of information, the 
development of future projects with similar characteristics can be carried out 
more effectively and efficiently. 
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4 CASE  STUDY I I I  -  “WARNOWQUERUNG ROSTOCK”  EXPER IENCES  
FROM THE  F IRST  GERMAN PPP  ROAD PROJECT UNDER THE  F-
MODEL  
by Prof. Dr. Hans-Wilhelm Alfen and Andrea Frank-Jungbecker, 
Bauhaus-Universität Weimar 
4.1  P ro jec t  Background 
The tunnel Warnowquerung in the city of Rostock is the first PPP road project 
realized under the German F-Model. The establishment of the act of 1994 on 
Federal Private Road Financing (Fernstraßenbauprivatfinanzierungsgesetz, 
FStrPrivFinG) represented the legal basis for the project and represented the 
precondition for participation of user financing of road infrastructure [1]. To 
realise the project without substantial participation of the German Federal 
Government the road was rededicated so that the city of Rostock became 
the project executing and concessioning authority. 
Primarily plans for a tunnel under the river of Warnow trace back to the 1960s 
when they became part of the urban development plan for Rostock [3]. In 
the year 1992 the tunnel was included into the Federal Transport Network Plan 
but assigned to projects of further demand and therefore of lower priority. 
Shortly after the act of 1994 for private sector participation had passed the 
citizen council of Rostock decided to realise the project as concession under 
the Public Private Partnership scheme [2]. A tender procedure was launched 
internationally. It comprised the concession for right of design, financing, con-
struction, operation, maintenance and levy of toll. The French contractor 
Bouygues Public Traveaux was selected as preferred bidder and accepted 
the bid. At that time Bouygues already disposed of respective experiences in 
France and Europe as well as internationally. 
As technical solutions to cross the river Warnow different types of bridge and 
tunnel constructions had been analyzed. Both tunnel and bridges seemed to 
be feasible from a functional and economic point of view. Still, due to geo-
graphical reasons that influenced the slope of the ramps to the construction 
a tunnel was preferred. Moreover, a bridge would have required the con-
struction of high embankments and close rows of columns. Due to urban 
planning reasons this solutions seemed less acceptable [3]. 
Construction started in December 2001 and operation in September 2003. 
Looking back to a few years only of experience in private solutions in the road 
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sector in 2006 it becomes obvious that Germany is a latecomer in comparison 
to other European countries and more then ever on international level. 
4.1 .1  P ro jec t  Ob jec t i ves  
For years Rostock’s cross-town link faces unbearable traffic conditions with 
continuous congestion. This situation burdens the citizens, the local economic 
development and environment of the whole region. A ring road in the north 
and south of Rostock was meant to release and improve the situation. To 
close the bypass the construction of the tunnel seemed to be crucial [2]. 
The construction of the tunnel has a great importance for the local economy 
with regard to a forward-looking and effective road infrastructure. Infrastruc-
ture conditions directly influence economic success and attractiveness of the 
respective location and it means that Warnowquerung strongly contributes to 
generate economic value for the city and the region [2]. The importance be-
comes even more obvious as this tunnel was the first project to be designed, 
build, financed and operated by a private party and it also represents the first 
German project to be refunded by user finance. In accordance to the con-
tract between the city of Rostock and the project company the duration of 
the concession was stipulated for 30 years. 
Vital for the decision for a private solution was the fact that the project had 
only be assigned to the Federal Transport Masterplan as subordinated de-
mand. The rededication of the road crossing the river to the responsibility of 
the city of Rostock represented an essential step for the city to be able to 
solve the traffic problem on its own behalf and to decide for a the realisation 
as Public Private Partnership. 
Advantages for the city are [4]: 
 
 Relief of the urban road network as transit traffic can choose the alter-
native ring road. 
 Traffic targeting the centre of Rostock can be distributed via the ap-
propriate exits on the ring road without passing through the centre.  
 
The new road system of the ring road including the tunnel circling the city 
centre on both sides of the river creates advantages of location by shorten 
the travelling time and distances. This strengthens the local economy as the 
seaport of Rostock and industry that has settled in the interior take advantage 
as well as tourism in Rostock and surroundings. 
4.1 .2  P ro jec t  Scope  and  S i te  
 91
In the area of Rostock the river Warnow has the shape of the letter U. The his-
torical city centre is located in the south. Due to these geographical circum-
stances the existing roads followed the urban structure leading the traffic 
through the middle of the centre and the surrounding areas. Also, since the 
city is located very centrally with respect to flows of traffic up to 60.000 vehi-
cles – urban and national traffic- using the route through the centre every day 
[4]. This volume of traffic leads to continuous congestions and minimized the 
attractiveness and possibility of development of the city enormously.  
4.2  Lega l  F ramework  
4 .2 .1  Federa l  P r i va te  Road  F inanc ing  Ac t  o f  1994 
(FS t rP r i vF inG)  and  F-Mode l  
Only after the Act of 1994 had passed for the first time in Germany’s road sec-
tor the legislator was able to transfer all rights and liabilities of road infrastruc-
ture projects to private parties [5]. In accordance with § 2 FStrPrivFinG the act 
represents the legal basis for a sovereign collection of toll from the users of 
traffic infrastructure and thus enables the refunding of private commitments.  
The model applied under this law is called the F-Model. The F-model is the 
longest existing PPP model in Germany’s road sector. The legal fundamentals 
are fixed in the Federal Private Road Financing Act. In projects under the F-
model the operator is obliged to establish or develop road infrastructure and 
to maintain and operate it for a period of 20 - 30 years and to hand it over af-
ter expiration of this duration to the public in a beforehand defined condition. 
The operator receives in response the right to raise a toll for refunding of its in-
vestment and follow-up expenditures [1]. These toll revenues flow directly from 
the users to the operators corresponding to a concession. Projects under the 
F-model are from legal view arranged also as building concession. The opera-
tor has to bring up capital for the investment. The Federal Government finan-
cially supports the projects usually with up to 20% of the construction costs [6]. 
The area of application is currently restricted for reasons of the European Law. 
Accordingly, the application of the F-Model has been limited in 1994 to 
bridges, tunnels and mountain passes assigned to the classification of multi-
lane federal highways with separated lanes. The restriction of the application 
to those types of infrastructure projects was necessary since -based on the EU 
guideline- distances-related fees (toll) in combination with time-related fees 
(vignette) can be charged in exemptions only, e.g. on bridges, tunnels and 
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mountain passes. In Germany the so called Euro-Vignette, a time-related fee 
for heavy vehicles over 12 tons- was applied on highways until September 
2003. 
In general for the execution of projects according to the F-model the agree-
ment and the co-operation between both the Federal Government and the 
Federal State are necessary. The respective Federal State is responsible as far 
as administration of orders for the implementation of the project is con-
cerned. Whereas, the Federal Government holds instruction rights due to the 
administration of orders and has first to approve and then to disburse a public 
grant. The competency to stipulate the amount of toll was assigned to the 
Federal Government in agreement with the Federal State at first. When in 
2005 the PPP Acceleration Act, a new act for simplification of German Public 
Private Partnerships, had passed this clause was revised. Now the respective 
Federal State is basically responsible for the amount of toll levied [6]. Still, the 
Ministry of Transport retains control over the decisions by the Federal States.  
The planning process for the realisation of a project under the F-Model com-
mences by preparing a feasibility study. In this study project expenses, ex-
pected numbers of traffic and related incomes as well as deviation effects 
that go along with raising toll are assessed. Essential results of the feasibility 
study are estimations of the project’s basic feasibility to be realized under the 
F-Model as well as amount of toll to be levied and in relation to it the amount 
of grant.  
Awarding of concession under the F-Model is possible at two different stages 
of the design process. In a so called “conventional design” the concession is 
awarded after the approval procedure by the public authority so that the 
private partner cannot take essential influence on the technical design of the 
project any more. In the so called “idea competition” the concessionaire can 
suggest alternative solutions for the technical design. Nevertheless, he then is 
partly responsible for the public inquiry and approval process which in most 
cases may constitute a serious risk for the concession company. Output ori-
ented service specifications are recommendable to leave space for optimi-
sation and innovation. 
During the last years and since act of 1994 a variety of potential projects has 
been discusses starting with 32 suggestions. Still, on the bases of technical and 
economical considerations the figure diminished to 17 until 1997 [5]. A revised 
project list published in 2004 contains seven projects only. 
The toll charged under the F-Model is supposed to refund the private capital 
investment and represents a fee that from a juridical point of view falls in the 
public fees regulation (Gebührenordnung). To calculate the amount of toll for 
a certain period the following costs are basically to be taken into considera-
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tion: On the one hand the depreciation of the activated building cost, on the 
other hand the costs for operation and maintenance. For both types of costs 
a fixed price arrangement can be concluded in the concession contract ac-
cording to §3 Paragraph 5 FStrPrivFinG. The third types of costs are financing 
costs for debts and return on equity. [7] 
The amount of toll to be raised can be calculated by dividing the expected 
and chargeable costs by the expected traffic amount. It is often criticised 
that according to the fee regulation all road users have to be equally 
treated. In that way demand oriented tolling is not possible. Prize differentia-
tions are possible only in relation to time and frequency of utilisation as well as 
types of vehicle [7]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Structure of German F-Model [5]  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of the F-Modell have been described as [8]: 
 
Advantages 
 Early realisation of construction of Federal Highways 
 Financial relief of the federal budget depending on the amount of state grant 
 Complete user finance 
 
 
Disadvantages 
 Costly toll collection through expensive technology solutions 
 Pre-financing of project company leads to high financing costs  
 Traffic risks and revenue hard to assess  
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Up to now two projects have been realised under the F-Model: One of which is the 
tunnel under crossing the Warnow called “Warnowquerung” in the city of Rostock 
which is analyzed in this study. Operation started in 2003. The so called “Herrentun-
nel” in the city of Luebeck is the other project and under traverses the river Trave. In 
both projects local authorities, the city of Rostock and Luebeck, have tendered and 
awarded the concession [6]. 
4.3  Cont rac tua l  and  F inanc ia l  F ramework  
4 .3 .1  S takeho lders  and  P ro jec t  S t ruc ture  
In 1994 the city council of Rostock decided to realize a BOT project based on 
the German concession model. After the pre-qualification phase a limited in-
vitation to tender had been carried out. The future concessionaire was in-
volved in the project from the beginning throughout the ideas competition 
[2]. Therefore a continuing optimization process could be achieved. The 
French contractor Bouygues became preferred bidder and in July 1996 the 
concession agreement was signed.  
The the special purpose company “Warnowquerung Rostock GmbH & Co. 
KG“ was established by the French contractor Bouygues Construction. The 
scope of supply and services includes the construction, operation and financ-
ing for a concession period of 30 years. After the expiration of the contract 
the tunnel will be transferred to the public sector.  
Bouygues Travaux Public became general contractor of the special purpose 
company and was responsible for the approval planning, the final design, the 
construction and turnkey delivery of the tunnel project. As concessioning au-
thority the city of Rostock offered the state grant and was responsible for the 
construction inspection.  
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Figure 2 – Project structure of tunnel Warnowquerung, following [5] 
4.3 .2  Sources  o f  F inance  
After the procurement phase and the preferred bidder selection, the project 
process stagnated until the request for the official approval in June 1999. The 
approval was achieved in October 1999 and the financial close took place in 
December 1999.  
The shareholders Bouygues Travaux Publics (F), Macquarie Infrastructure (AUS) 
in cooperation with a financing consortium of NordLB, KfW banking group 
and European Investment Bank (EIB) under the auspice of the Deutsche Bank 
and HSH Nordbank as creditor provided the financing of the total investment 
of about 220 Mio € (about 290m US $). In addition, the European Union (EU) 
offered an eight percent subsidy within the framework of the Trans-European-
Network (TEN) to ensure respectively improvement of the financial viability [3]. 
4.3 .3  R i sk  A l loca t ion  
For the success of every PPP project it is crucial that risks are identified and al-
located to the appropriate stakeholder who is best able to manage the risk. 
This is the basic rule to achieve best possible efficiency [9]. With view on the 
risk allocation among the project partners new grounds were broken as yet 
there have been no experiences with BOT models in Germany’s road sector. 
As the tender took place by means of an idea competition the project com-
pany had to bear high risks of approval since unforeseeable obligations could 
have turned up in combination with cost increase. 
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In addition to the right to charge toll the project company insisted on a guar-
antee by the concessioning authority. In case of discontinuance in tolling 
based on legal reasons or force majeure an extension of the concession con-
tract could be taken into consideration. The maximum toll amount was stipu-
lated for the first three years on the basis of a traffic forecast provided with 
the tendering documents.  
The risk for traffic volume and therefore for a short-fall was transferred to the 
project company. This allocation should be considered critically as the legal 
framework, the act of 1994, intends a shared allocation between the public 
and the private party. In case that force majeure should occur the city of 
Rostock will take a share of the costs of up to 50% respectively of a maximum 
of 10 Mio. €. Possible remaining costs are to be borne by the SPC. Neverthe-
less, it has to be clarified beforehand if a reasonable solution for the conces-
sionaire, such as higher toll rates or extension of the concession, is possible [5]. 
 
4.3 .4  Tra f f i c  Forecas t  
Traffic analyses of different institutions in the forefront of project realisation as-
sumed daily traffic volume of about 40,000 vehicles that would pass the tun-
nel under the assumption that passage would be free of charge. The fore-
casts predicted a reduced number of 25,000 to 30,000 vehicles. Expectations 
were still high in April 2003 a few months before completion. However, the 
amount of traffic assumed was reduced a second time to approximately 
22,000 users per day [4]. 
The analyses conducted by the project company in the years 1992, 1996, 
1999 formed the basis for the traffic forecasts used in the project. The city of 
Rostock did not order other analysis but relied of the ones available. Almost 
disillusioning the first traffic censuses a few months after opening turned out to 
be that on average hardly half of the volume predicted by the project com-
pany had been achieved. The project company had counted on 12,000 us-
ers per day for the first year and 20,000 to 25,000 vehicles for the second year. 
These figures would be necessary to achieve the rate of return expected by 
the sponsors [10]. At least the traffic volume increased and in peak hours up 
to 13,000 users passed through the tunnel. A positive trend was visible but it 
remained doubtfully at what average it could be stabilised in the long run. 
The figure illustrates the monthly average of traffic volume from opening until 
July 2005.  
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Figure 3 – Traffic analysis of Warnowquerung [11] 
4.4  Cur ren t  Deve lopments  
Since commencement of the operation phase the tunnel Warnowquerung 
incurs a loss in two-digit millions due to an enormous gap between planned 
and existing traffic volume. In an expert opinion the menacing over-
indebtedness was analysed on the basis of 30 years of concession. It came to 
the conclusion that by an extension of the concession of 20 years to at least 
50 years the profit value of the enterprise, under consideration of substantially 
lower traffic volume, could be increased to avoid insolvency. 
Nevertheless, incipient negotiations with the city of Rostock could not be 
concluded up to the end of this year. However, at the same time the banks 
and the shareholders accepted the finance of the project under reserve of 
the extension of the concession. 
These developments led to substantial discussion among lobbyists of different 
positions. They discuss if the extension approved by the citizen council of 
Rostock was consistent with German law and therefore legal. The project 
company persist on the viewpoint that the extension applies to the contract 
with the city of Rostock only and that the Federal Government is not involved 
in this decision. 
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In the meantime, the concession contract has been extended to 50 years. 
This leaves political parties and lobbyists in the opinion that the decision for 
the extension has been premature and not deliberate and the citizens of 
Rostock in the certainty that they will have to pay toll fees for 20 more years. 
4.5  Lessons  Learned  
Germany is a latecomer with respect to realising Public Private Partnerships 
even though there is much demand for private solutions on German High-
ways. Due to budget constraints the roads are literality left to wear and tear. 
Private commitment could help to improve the situation. Still there is a lack of 
experience to be found with all stakeholders. This lack leaves room for wrong 
decisions and inappropriate measures and counts for the reasons why the first 
projects under the so called German F-Model could not be realized success-
fully. When the first PPP projects in the road sector were launched the legal 
framework conditions were insufficient and inappropriate and partly bound 
by European law. The existing legislation on PPP in the road sector is still un-
dergoing changes. In 2005 the PPP Acceleration Act changed the Act of 
1994. Another change on the legal bases for private participation is expected 
at the end of 2007 when the PPP Simplification Bill has passed. From interna-
tional experience, however, an upfront well defined legal framework only can 
provide conditions for successful private solutions. Both partners need to rely 
on the legal basis and on calculable risk allocation. Moreover, it is of high im-
portance that the contractual relationship is understood as partnership even 
though every participant has its own interests in the project. 
Particular attention should be given to traffic forecasting and therefore reve-
nues to be expected. Traditionally, the German road sector has been budget 
financed. Therefore, road users in Germany are not used to be confronted 
with costs that arise through usage. Most of them prefer to make a detour in-
stead of being charged. In the traffic forecasts this phenomenon was not 
considered to a realistic amount. As the tunnel Warnowquerung represents a 
new route which had not existed before the amount of users choosing the 
tolled way were overestimated to an amount that now endangers the pro-
jects success seriously. As for future projects the concessionaire should make 
every effort to provide realistic traffic forecasts. The viability of the whole pro-
ject depends on reliable figure. 
The intention of realizing the project Warnowquerung was to release the city 
of Rostock from heavy traffic congestion, to unburden the public budget and 
 99
to represent as a pioneer in the infrastructure project under the F-Model. The 
city of Rostock as concessioning authority finds itself in a difficult situation: The 
euphoria of having realized the first German PPP project in the road sector 
has vanished for a long time. On the one hand the extension of the conces-
sion contract was necessary since due the high level of debt the city could 
not afford to take over the project from an insolvent project company. On 
the other hand by approving the extension it was clear that the citizens of 
Rostock would have to pay for 20 more years. 
However, beside the inappropriate legal framework and the psychological 
aspect of avoiding tolled roads other aspects that had not been taken into 
considerations turned out to be problematic. Currently, Rostock has to face a 
dramatic migration wave. The number of population is declining. A recent 
study shows that the population development for Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania expects the population of Rostock to reduce by up to 15% until 
2020. Reasons for the population drift can be found in a high unemployment 
rate. This development endangers the whole economic situation of Rostock 
and will also effect the tunnel project under the river Warnow to an extent 
that is yet unknown. 
Such socioeconomic data and requirements have a strong influence and 
play an important role for traffic forecasts and a project’s economic viability. 
It is doubtful if this development had been considered at all in the feasibility 
studies respectively if the situation has been assessed to the full extend. A 
strong deficit existed on both sides, the public as well as the private, with re-
gard to inadequate experience with respect to producing applicable traffic 
forecasts. It is still to be evaluated which methods were used for the predic-
tion and which problems aroused in information interfaces between public 
and private partner. 
A new tariff structure has been submitted by the project company to the Min-
istry and is currently being scrutinised. The tariff should come into force at the 
beginning of the year 2007. In addition, the concession time of 30 years was 
extended to 50 years. It is intended to increase the volume of busses and 
heavy vehicle traffic where acceptance had been very low so far. It is 
planned to reduce toll rates for these types of vehicles up to 40 %. However, 
the base rate for passenger car of two Euros will be kept. During holiday sea-
son the tariffs will become more expensive as this time of year clearly repre-
sents the high season for the project company as well. While this increase of 
toll represents a vital chance for the economic success of the project the fi-
nancial burden for the users will increase.  
Whether the new tariffs in combination with improved legal framework condi-
tions will influence the traffic volume positively and the measures for eco-
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nomic adaptation can help to increase the project’s economic performance 
will be the targets of future studies. They are urgently needed in order to 
achieve more success and acceptance of the German F-Model. 
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5 CASE  STUDY IV  -  LA IB IN  B  POWER PROJECT  –  THE  F IRST  STATE-
APPROVED BOT PROJECT IN  CHINA 
by Prof. Dr. ShouQing Wang and Yongjian Ke,  
Dept of Construction Management, Tsinghua University 
5.1  P ro jec t  Background 
The tremendous economic growth in China had resulted in an immense de-
mand for basic infrastructure like roads, ports and power generation facilities 
in 1990s. The World Bank estimated that investment in infrastructure in China 
would rank top among all East Asian countries and account for US$750 billion 
over the period of 1995 to 2004 (Lianhe Zaobao, 1996). Road and power 
projects commanded top priority. To meet the development needs, the Chi-
nese government had been enthusiastic in granting favorable concessions to 
attract foreign investment. Some regulations for foreign investment were 
promulgated one after the other. Meanwhile, several state-approved pilot 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects have been awarded since late 1996 in 
order to introduce BOT on a larger scale, such as the Laibin B power project, 
Dachang water project and Changsha power project. 
In fact, several power plants and roads have already been built on a BOT ba-
sis in China before Laibin B (Tiong 1990; Tam 1995). They were not however 
recognized by the central government as official BOT projects though many 
companies outside China have regarded them as model projects. In addi-
tion, although there are three major modes of investments, i.e. sole proprietor-
ship, joint venture, and construction cooperation, which can be practiced in 
China, most of the BOT projects implemented in China before Laibin B were 
based on joint venture path (Shen et al. 1996). 
5.2  P ro jec t  Descr ip t ion  
As the first state-approved BOT project, Laibin B is the second phase project 
for Laibin Power Plant. It involves the investment, financing, design, construc-
tion, procurement, operation and maintenance and transfer of a 2x360 MW 
coal-fired power plant with an estimated cost of US$600 million to be located 
at Laibin County in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, a Chinese 
backwater southern province where most foreign investors might not venture 
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willingly (Figure 1). The concession terms require a very tight completion sche-
dule (See the section of “Development Process” for detailed information) and 
appear to offer a relatively low rate of return. But the prospect of joining the 
first consortium to test the new BOT framework was incentive enough for a 
number of developers to submit tenders. The Electricite de France (EDF) and 
GEC Alstom consortium, which tendered under the name of the Consortium, 
finally won the concession from five other short listed competitive tenderers 
with a very aggressive tender and the backing of France’s export-credit 
agency, COFACE. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Location of Laibin B Power Plant Project 
5.3  P ro jec t  Par tners  
A map of the relationships between the entities that participated in the 
project in the form of an organizational chart along with the contractual 
agreements is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – Contractual Structure of Laibin B Power Plant Project 
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5.3 .1  Cent ra l  Government  
The central government has provided its strong support to Laibin B given its 
status as the first official pilot BOT project which will set the benchmark, not 
least in terms of risk allocations, for other future BOT infrastructure projects. The 
project has been approved at the State Council level, and State Planning 
Commission (SPC) and Ministry of Power Industry (MOP) have directly partici-
pated throughout the project development, tendering, bid evaluation and 
award process. They together with State Administration for Exchange Control 
(SAEC) have each issued a support letter in relation to the project. The three 
support letters effectively support and underpin Guangxi Government’s ability 
to perform and demonstrate the central government’s commitment to ensure 
the success of the project. More detail of the central government’s support 
will be illustrated in the “Government Initiatives” section. 
5.3 .2  P rov inc ia l  Government  
For Laibin B, many of the uncertainties were thus cleared because Guangxi 
Government made some guarantees and incentives. Laibin B is underpinned 
by three main contracts namely, the Concession Agreement (CA), Power 
Purchase Agreement (PPA) and Fuel Supply & Transportation Agreement 
(FSTA) with CA as the overriding contract which summarizes all the major 
rights and obligations of the project company (the Consortium) and Guangxi 
Government in relation to the concession given for the investment, financing, 
design, construction, procurement, operation and maintenance of the pro-
ject. The Guangxi Government is the counterparty to the Consortium under 
the CA, and provides some guarantees of PPA, FSTA and Dispatch Agree-
ments. 
5.3 .3  Sponsor  
In Laibin B project, Electricite de France International (EDFI) and GEC Alstom 
are the sponsors. EDFI is a wholly owned subsidiary of EDF which is 100% 
owned by the French government and much experienced in international in-
vestment and power plant operation. GEC Alstom is a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of GEC Alstom N.V. which is jointly owned by The General Electric Com-
pany, PLC of the United Kingdom and Alcatel Alstom of France. 
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5.3 .4  P ro jec t  Company  
French Investment Guangxi Power Company LTD., the project company of 
Laibin B, under the shareholder agreement of 60% held by EDFI while the 
other 40% owned by GEC Alstom, is a wholly foreign-owned enterprise incor-
porated in China. As the project company, it was responsible for the financ-
ing, design, construction, operation and maintenance over the concession 
period; at the end of concession, the power plant returns to Guangxi Gov-
ernment without charge. 
5.3 .5  Lender  
The debt/equity ratio of Laibin B is about 3, and the project company has lim-
ited-recourse debt of US$0.462 billion and shareholder’s equity of US$0.154 bil-
lion. The bank consortium headed by Credit Agricole Indosuez (French), HSBC 
Investment Bank (UK) and Barclays Capital (UK) is the lender of the project. In 
addition, France’s export-credit agency COFACE provides export credit in-
surance for about US$0.312 billion of the debt. 
5.3 .6  Customer  
In accordance with the PPA Guangxi Government’s subsidiary department 
Guangxi Power Industry Bureau (GPIB) is required to purchase the minimum 
net electrical output of 3,500 million kWh (approximately 63% of plant load 
factor) each operating year from Laibin B.  
5.3 .7  Supp l ie r  
The government’s subsidiary Guangxi Construction and Fuel Corp. Ltd. 
(GCFC) is liable to supply the fuel (coal and/or oil) required and paid for by 
the Consortium. The Consortium has the right to reject fuel that is not in con-
formity with the fuel specifications described in the FSTA. 
5.3 .8  Cont rac tor  
The Construction Services Contractor is a special purpose joint venture com-
prising Alstom Export and Compagnie Financiere de Valorisation pour 
L’Ingenierie (COFIVA). The Equipment Supplier/ Contractor is a consortium 
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comprising GEC Alstom Centrales Energetiques SA and EDF, acting through its 
division CNET. 
5.3 .9  Opera tor  
Guangxi Laibin Synergie Operating Maintenance for Generation Co. Ltd. is a 
joint venture, which is owned by EDFI with 85% of share, GPIB and Guangxi 
Development and Investment Co. Ltd. (GIDC) for another 7.5% of share each. 
5.4  Deve lopment  P rocess  
5 .4 .1  In i t i a l  P lann ing  
 In February 1995, the Guangxi Government officially entrusted Bridge of 
Trust with the task of inviting foreign investors to implement Laibin B on a 
BOT basis. 
 From February to March 1995, after preparing the preliminary feasibility 
study for Laibin B in accordance with international practice and in 
compliance with the actual requirements in China, Bridge of Trust sub-
mitted an executive proposal and financial feasibility study report for 
constructing Laibin B on a BOT basis. It then assisted the Guangxi Gov-
ernment in seeking approval from the central government. 
 On May 10th, 1995, the SPC officially approved Laibin B as the pilot BOT 
project in China 
5.4 .2  P requa l i f i ca t ion  
 In August 1995, Bridge of Trust completed the prequalification docu-
ments for Laibin B in China and issued an invitation for prequalification 
in the People’s Daily and China Daily, publicly inviting potential inves-
tors from abroad to participate in the prequalification for China’s pilot 
BOT project. 
 By September 30, 1995, a total of 31 applicants had submitted their ap-
plications for prequalification; 23 were individual companies, while 
eight others were consortia, including some of the best-known power 
utilities in the world. 
 By early October 1995, Bridge of Trust and its advisors had reviewed the 
prequalification proposals submitted by each tenderer. The Evaluation 
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Committee then reached a unanimous agreement to list the applicants 
into two groups: A and B. Group A, with 12 applicants, was made up of 
companies that were allowed to tender either individually or as a 
member of a consortium as they were considered to be candidates 
with strong experience in developing power projects. They were also 
seen as those with adequate financial strength and other relevant ex-
periences. Meanwhile, another 19 applicants, listed as group B, were al-
lowed to tender only in a consortium jointly with one or several of the 
group A applicants. On October 28, 1995, Bridge of Trust issued the invi-
tation to tender on behalf of Guangxi Government. 
5.4 .3  Tender ing  
On December 8th, 1995, Bridge of Trust completed the tender documents 
and formally released them to the prequalified applicants. All 12 of the appli-
cants in group A purchased the tender documents at a cost of US$12,000 per 
set. 
From December 1995 to January 1996, Bridge of Trust organized on-site in-
spections of the Laibin B site for each potential tenderer. 
On January 28th, 1996, Bridge of Trust conducted the pre-tender meeting for 
Laibin B, during which concerns related to legal and financial issues were cla-
rified. On February 12, 1996, Bridge of Trust issued the Memorandum for Pre-
Tender Meeting for Guangxi Laibin B. 
By 4:00 p.m. on May 7th, 1996, a total of six tenderers had submitted their pro-
posals. They were: 
 
a) China Energy Investment Co. Ltd. - Siemens consortium 
b) International Generating (HK) Co. Ltd. 
c) Tomen Corporation - Singapore Power International (Pte) Ltd. - Union 
Energy Co. Ltd. - Toshiba Corporation consortium 
d) The Consortium, comprising the Electricite de France and GEC Alstom 
e) National Power PLC (UK) - Mitsui & Co., Ltd. consortium 
f) New World Infrastructure Limited (UK) - AEP Resources International - 
ABB Energy Ventures consortium 
 On May 8th, 1996, Bridge of Trust conducted the tender opening 
for Laibin B. 
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5.4 .4  Tender  Eva lua t ion  
 From May to July 1996, the Evaluation Committee clarified and ana-
lyzed the tender proposals from legal, financial, and technical angles. 
Bridge of Trust assisted the Evaluation Committee in evaluating the ten-
ders. 
 By June 18th, 1996, the Evaluation Committee had ranked the tender-
ers and selected the three most competitive tenderers in accordance 
with the evaluation criteria in the tender documents. They were: 
 
a)  The Consortium 
b)  New World Infrastructure Limited (UK) - AEP Resources International - 
ABB Energy Ventures consortium 
c)  International Generating (HK) Co. Ltd. 
 
 From July 8th, 1996 to early November 1996, Bridge of Trust held 
negotiations on the three main contracts with the Consortium. 
 On November 11, 1996, the Guangxi Government and the Con-
sortium signed the concession agreement in Beijing. 
 108
5.4 .5  Eva lua t ion  Cr i te r i a  
The following evaluation criteria were used by the evaluation committee: 
 
 Electricity tariff (60% weight in evaluation). The most significant criterion 
is the unsubsidized tariff rate, which represents a sharp break from past 
practices. The Evaluation Committee compared the tenders on a leve-
lized tariff basis to evaluate the annual electricity tariff proposed for the 
entire concession period. It considered the annual changes of such ta-
riff, the proportions of foreign exchange and the local currency, RMB, in 
such tariff; and the tariff of additional net electricity output. 
 Financing proposal, technical proposal and operation, maintenance, 
and transferal (OMT) proposal (40% weight in evaluation). The Guangxi 
Government considered the feasibility of the tenderer’s financing pro-
posal, including financing schedule, financing cost, ability to finance, 
and extent of equity committed by the tenderer; the reliability and 
quality of the technical proposal; and the feasibility and viability of 
OMT, including administration, personnel training, and power plant 
transferal plan in respect to the interests of the Guangxi Government.  
 
Of the 40% total weight in evaluation, the financing proposal accounts for 
60%, while the technical proposal and OMT proposal account for only 20% 
each. The Guangxi Government adopted a lower weighting for the technical 
proposal is because (1) The tender document already specified that interna-
tional technical specifications and standards will be used for Laibin B; and (2) 
lenders are surely more concerned with the technical feasibility of Laibin B 
and will certainly examine more carefully the tenderer’s technical proposal. 
Hence, the financing proposal is more important than the technical proposal 
and OMT proposal. 
5.4 .6  Cr i t i ca l  Success  Fac tors  
In light of the above, critical success factors in the development of Laibin B 
project could be concluded and presented in Table 1. As mentioned before, 
12 ones among 31 applicants submitted their applications for pre-
qualification were qualified to bid either individually or jointly. Finally, the 
France Consortium won the concession. 
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Table 1- Influence of the CSFs in Tendering Laibin B Project 
 
Development Phases of Laibin B Critical Success Factors Influence 
Preliminary qualification evaluation 
phase 
 
Appropriate project identification + 
Stable political and economic situation + 
Favorable legislation and regulations - 
Capability of project promoter - 
Experience with BOT project by promoter - 
Lack of funds for infrastructure projects - 
Tendering phase 
 
Competitive tendering system + 
Attractive financial package + 
Acceptable tariff levels + 
Technical solution advantage - 
Select suitable project agencies - 
Concession award phase Concrete and precise concession agreement + 
Reasonable risk allocation + 
Special guarantees by the government + 
Multilateral investment guarantee agency insur-
ance 
NA 
Note:     
 
“+” means the CSF had strong influence on the project; 
“-” means the CSF had little influence on the project;  
“NA” means not available 
 
As mentioned above, one of the most important reasons why the Consortium 
won the concession is that it provided the lowest electricity tariff (much lower 
than the second competitor, less than US$0.05/kWh), which is close to or 
equivalent to the current tariff in large Chinese cities. This offer would yield a 
return of 17.5% estimated by the Consortium, lower than the company’s av-
erage of 18%. The key advantage was the acquisition of turbines from the 
Chinese manufacturer, which was welcomed by the Chinese government 
and kept the project cost down so that it could provide the lowest electricity 
tariff while maintaining reasonable profitability. 
5.5  Leg is la t ion  Dr i v ing  the  P ro jec t  
In March 1994, the MOP promulgated Interim Regulations for the Use of For-
eign Investment for Power Project Construction (the “MOP Guidelines”), which 
set out guidelines applicable to all types of foreign investment by foreign or-
ganizations and individuals in electric power projects in China. Foreign inves-
tors may invest directly in the form of equity or cooperative joint venture with 
a Chinese partner. They may invest in construction and operation of new 
power plants, in expansion and technical upgrading of existing power plants 
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or purchase equity in existing power plants, where the foreign equity interest 
should not exceed 30% usually. The foreign investors may now apply to the 
SPC for approval to establish wholly foreign-owned and operated power 
plants. In addition, the MOP Guidelines stated that the term of cooperation 
shall be limited to 20 years for thermal power plants and 30 years for hydroe-
lectric power plants, excluding the construction period, although the national 
joint venture legislation set no limit on the term of joint venture establishment. 
For key power projects involving unit capacity of over 300 MW and total ca-
pacity of over 600 MW, the Chinese parties should maintain a controlling 
stake. All these indicated that China intended to retain control over its power 
industry, while foreign investment was encouraged in the construction and 
modernization of plants ((B&M) 1996). 
Since late 1996, China has been preparing for the introduction of BOT on a 
larger scale. The central government selected a batch of road, bridge, water 
and power projects for the implementation of BOT on a trial basis to bring 
more foreign capital into infrastructure projects. In its effort to encourage Chi-
na’s move to BOT schemes, the Asian Development Bank gave a US$2.6 mil-
lion grant to the MOP to accelerate the implementation of BOO and BOT 
projects (PFI 1996). China began its experimental scheme with Laibin B, the pi-
lot BOT project approved by the SPC to test full foreign ownership and peg ta-
riffs to the market place. The developer will only be awarded the concession 
after a competitive tendering process, and the successful tenderer will have 
to finance its project from a revenue stream based on a letter of comfort from 
the provincial government supporting off-take agreements instead of the 
guaranteed returns that have characterized many projects in China. The Chi-
nese government is moving towards adopting international contractual and 
practices and works out a risk-sharing scheme under which it will bear some 
risks, while the concessionaire bears the rest. 
These innovations are also the main principles of the later promulgated Regu-
lations for Foreign Investment Concession Project by the SPC (He 1996). As for 
the governmental evaluation and approval of foreign investment projects, 
China has also regulated and simplified the procedure, presented in Figure 3. 
A full introduction to governmental evaluation and approval procedure 
would not be appropriate here and the reader is referred to Wang et al. 
(1998) for clear, simple understanding to the procedure described. 
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Figure 3 – Approval Procedure for Foreign-Invested Project in China 
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5.6  Bas i c  Dea l  S t ruc ture  
5 .6 .1  Concess ion  Agreement  (CA)  
An international survey to evaluate the adequacy of key contract clauses in 
Laibin B’s CA was conducted from December 1997 to March 1998. More re-
search findings have been reported in the authors’ other papers (Wang et al. 
1999a; Wang et al. 2000a; Wang et al. 2000b; Wang et al. 2000c). Based on 
the survey, all except one of the related contract clauses used for the Finan-
cial Closing risk are regarded as adequate for the mean scores of respon-
dents’ rating for the adequacy of the clauses are all close to the score 3 
(adequate) and the overall rating is 2.99 as shown in Table 2. The exception is 
the clauses for Financial Closing risk which is regarded as only fairly adequate 
as its rating is only 2.12. 
 
Table 2 – Adequacy of Related Contract Clauses of Laibin B’s CA 
 
Contract Clause For Risk 
Adequacy of Contract Clause Criticality of Risk 
Mean Score Ranking Ranking 
Tariff Adjustment 3.31 1 1 
Expropriation 3.31 1 9 
Exchange Rate & Convertibility 3.26 3 5 
Force Majeure 3.21 4 6 
Delay in Approval 3.01 5 8 
Corruption 2.97 6 10 
Dispatch Constraint 2.92 7 3 
Change in Law 2.77 8 4 
Financial Closing 2.12 9 7 
Chinese Entities’ Reliability Not available 2 
Overall 041 - - 
 
Among them, the contract clauses for Tariff Adjustment, Expropriation and 
Exchange Rate & Convertibility risks are the three most adequate while for Fi-
nancial Closing, Change in Law and Dispatch Constraint risks are the three 
least adequate. The mean score of the adequacy of the contract clauses for 
Financial Closing risk is especially low at 2.12, i.e. fairly adequate. Therefore, 
there are possible improvements to these contract clauses. In addition, by 
comparing the contract clauses’ adequacy rankings in column 4 with the 
risks’ criticality rankings which are also shown in column 5, the general impres-
sion of which clauses need more improvements could also be gauged. 
The general comments of some respondents who gave low ratings on the 
adequacy are that although the contract clauses are all drafted according 
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to international customs and practices they are still not very suitable in the 
context of China. A more exact non-legal wording should be used, detached 
from a particular legal system. To the extent practically possible, terms like 
“material”, “substantially adversely” etc. should be quantified and more de-
tails would have to be introduced to make the clauses more specific. For de-
tails of possible improvement to each clause, please refer to the author’s oth-
er papers (Wang et al. 1999a; Wang et al. 2000a). 
5.6 .2  Power  Purchase  Agreement  ( PPA)  
According to the PPA, GPIB guarantees to purchase the minimum net elec-
trical output of 3,500 million kWh each operating year from Laibin B. The de-
tails of the payment scheme cover the project from testing to commence-
ment of commercial operations of the 2 units of generators: 
 
 During testing and commissioning of Unit 1 and Unit 2, Guangxi Gov-
ernment through GPIB shall pay to the project company the fuel 
charge for all net electrical output generated and delivered to the de-
livery points; 
 For each month or part thereof after the commissioning of Unit 1 and 
before the commencement of commercial operations, Guangxi Gov-
ernment or GPIB shall pay: (1) the operating charge calculated on the 
basis of the part of the operating tariff for the minimum net electrical 
output for that month denominated in RMB; plus (2) the fuel charge for 
all net electrical output actually delivered in accordance with the dis-
patch instructions for such month; plus (3) any supplemental tariff; 
 For each month or part thereof after the commencement of commer-
cial operations and until the end of the concession period, Guangxi 
Government through GPIB shall pay: (1) the operating charge for the 
minimum net electrical output for that month, plus (2) the fuel charge 
for all net electrical output actually transmitted according to the dis-
patch instruction for that month; plus (3) any supplemental tariff; 
 After the commencement of commercial operations, at the end of 
each operating year, Guangxi Government or GPIB shall pay: (1) the 
operating charges for the additional net electrical output calculated 
on the basis of operating tariff for the additional net electrical output; 
plus (2) any additional charge. 
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The operating charge in the tariff structure is designed to cover all costs, ex-
cluding fuel cost, while the actual fuel price is passed through in the form of 
the fuel charge. 
In addition, during the concession period, Guangxi Government permitted 
the project company to make reasonable adjustments to the electricity tariff 
according to the following principles: (a) Exceptionally, the electricity tariff 
may be adjusted upon the occurrence of any uninsurable Force Majeure 
event including any change in laws or any other exceptional events recog-
nized by Guangxi Government as being of such gravity or importance, which 
cause difficulties in the repayment of the principal and interest to the lenders 
by the project company; (b) The US$ portion of the operating tariff shall be 
adjusted from time to time to take account of variations in the US$ - RMB ex-
change rate beyond a certain threshold (5%) as provided under the PPA; (c) 
The fuel tariff will be adjusted as and when the base fuel price under the FSTA 
is adjusted. 
Guangxi Government would also pay the electricity purchase charge to the 
project company on each calendar month during the concession period and 
payments shall be made in RMB only. This off-take guarantee greatly miti-
gates the market and revenue risks of the project company. 
The Government also guaranteed to supply the fuel (coal and/or oil) required 
and paid for by the project company in accordance with the FSTA signed by 
both sides. More about FSTA is presented in “Government Initiatives” section. 
5.7  F inanc ia l  Ana lys i s  
Total investment in the project amounted to US$0.616 billion, 25% of which 
was directly invested by shareholders of the project company (60% by EDFI, 
and 40% by GEC Alstom); The remaining 75% came from the bank consortium 
including 19 commercial banks headed by Credit Agricole Indosuez (French), 
HSBC Investment Bank (UK) and Barclays Capital (UK). In addition, France’s 
export-credit agency COFACE provides export credit insurance for about 
$0.312 billion of the debt. Figure 4 summarizes the investment of Laibin B 
project. 
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Equi t y( 25%) Debt ( 75%)
EDF( 60%)
GEC Al st hom
( 40%)
COFACE
( $0 312 bi l l i on)
 
Figure 4–  Laibin B Power Project Investment Structure 
 
Under the financial investment structure shown in Figure 4, the concession pe-
riod is 18 years, an estimated construction period of 33 month and 15 years 
operating period. The electricity tariff that the Consortium provided is less than 
US$0.05 per KWh (before tax), and according to the PPA, GPIB is liable to pur-
chase the minimum net electrical output of 3,500 million kWh each operating 
year from Laibin B. As estimated by the Consortium, the project would yield a 
return of 17.5%. 
Before Laibin B project’s implement, there were three versions of feasibility 
study reports. In these reports, the electricity tariffs are about US$0.077, 0.077 
and 0.080 per KWh respectively, and the IRRs are 19.01%, 19.63% and 18.88% 
(Fang and Luo, 1999). Compared with these financial models, it seems unbe-
lievable and attractive that the project would still yield a return of 17.5% with 
the tariff less than US$0.05. Since the detailed financial statements of the 
project company are unavailable, the reason might be the acquisition of tur-
bines from the Chinese manufacturer, which reduces the cost a lot. 
5.8  Government  In i t i a t i ves  
With the prospect of joining the first consortium to test the new BOT frame-
work, the central government and Guangxi Government have provided their 
strong support to Laibin B giving to the project company some guarantees 
and incentives. The following part discusses briefly the government’s major 
guarantees and incentives. More information in detail can be acquired in 
(Wang and Tiong 2000). 
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5.8 .1  Exc lus ive  Concess ion  Gran ted  
The Consortium was granted the exclusive right to design, construct, test, op-
erate and maintain Laibin B, to use the land provided by Guangxi Govern-
ment, to sell the net electrical output and the generating capacity of Laibin B 
to Guangxi Government during the concession period. The concession period 
started on the date Guangxi Government and the Consortium signing the 
project documents on the financial close date, i.e. Sept. 3, 1997. It would last 
for 18 years including the construction period unless otherwise modified in ac-
cordance with the CA. The operating period is approximately 15 years follow-
ing the commissioning of the plant based on an estimated construction pe-
riod of 33 month. At the end of the concession period, the Consortium will 
transfer the project to Guangxi Government in good order, at no cost and 
free of any borrowings. 
In addition, during the concession period the Consortium is given the right to 
own and operate all assets, equipment and facilities constituting Laibin B. At 
the same time, the Consortium is allowed to mortgage or transfer the right to 
operate, all assets, facilities and equipment of the project for purpose of fi-
nancing provided that such mortgage or transfer shall be agreed in writing by 
Guangxi Government and have no adverse effect on the rights or interests of 
Guangxi Government. 
 
5.8 .2  Power  Purchase  Guarantee  
In accordance with the PPA signed by the Consortium and GPIB, Guangxi 
Government guarantees to purchase, through its subsidiary department GPIB, 
the minimum net electrical output of 3,500 million kWh each operating year 
from Laibin B. The GPIB has primary responsibility for carrying out its obligations 
to the Consortium under the PPA while Guangxi Government gave the assur-
ance on proper and timely fulfilment of the obligation of GPIB under the PPA. 
So long as the Consortium is not in default of its obligations under the CA, and 
subject to the provisions pertaining to any such default or the occurrence of 
an event of Force Majeure during the concession period, Guangxi Govern-
ment through GPIB agreed to pay the electricity purchase charge for the net 
electrical output transmitted to the delivery points in accordance with the 
PPA. 
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5.8 .3  Fue l  Supp ly  Guaran tee  
The Government guarantees to supply, through its subsidiary GCFC, the fuel 
(coal and/or oil) required and paid for by the Consortium in accordance with 
the FSTA signed by both sides. The Consortium has the right to reject fuel that is 
not in conformity with the fuel specifications described in the FSTA. The Gov-
ernment would ensure the proper and timely fulfilment of the obligations of 
GCFC under the FSTA and shall support all financial consequences resulting 
from any breach of GCFC under the FSTA. 
5.8 .4  Force  Ma jeure  Guarantee  
Under this guarantee, either party shall be entitled to suspend performance of its 
obligations under the CA to the extent that such performance is impeded by 
Force Majeure, i.e. circumstances beyond its control such as natural disasters, 
war, hostilities, embargo, import or export restrictions and change in law. 
In the event of a termination of the CA following Force Majeure arising out of the 
circumstances, Guangxi Government shall pay the Consortium the compensa-
tion amount. Upon payment of such compensation amount, the Consortium 
shall transfer Laibin B to Guangxi Government. 
Should changes in Chinese laws, regulations and decrees or in any material 
conditions associated with any of the approvals applicable to the project take 
place after the date of the CA which substantially adversely affect the rights or 
obligations of the Consortium, the Consortium may request adjustment to the 
terms of the CA so as to place the Consortium in substantially the same eco-
nomic position it was in prior to such changes. 
Should changes in Chinese Laws, regulations and decrees take place after the 
date of the CA which financially substantially benefit the Consortium, Guangxi 
Government may by written notice request adjustments to the terms of the CA 
so that the Consortium would remain in substantially the same economic posi-
tion as it was prior to such change. 
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5.8 .5  Fore ign  Exchange  Guarantee  
The foreign exchange and convertibility are also guaranteed as Guangxi 
Government promises to assist with the conversion and remittance of RMB-
denominated profits. 
For the debt service requirements of the Consortium, Guangxi Government 
agreed to pay to the Consortium, on each calendar month during the con-
cession period, taking into account the US$ element of the electricity tariff, an 
amount in RMB which shall take into account variations in the US$ - RMB ex-
change rate as published by the People’s Bank of China. In addition, Guangxi 
Government would ensure that the Consortium, the Construction Contractor 
and the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Contractor receive consent, if 
required, for the opening and operation of, and retention of earnings in, US$ 
bank accounts inside China. The Government also ensured that the Consor-
tium shall have permission to transfer the funds from its accounts in China to its 
accounts outside China that are necessary to implement and carry out the 
project in accordance with the CA. The Consortium was also given the right 
to convert income from the project from RMB to US$ in order to pay for the 
project expenses, debt service, and, return on equity during the concession 
period. The Government would ensure that US$ are available from time to 
time for such conversion. 
5.8 .6  Compensat ion  under  Government ’s  Defau l t  and  
Po l i t i ca l  R i sks  
If completion of the construction work is delayed or the cost of construction or 
financing is increased due to an act or omission of Guangxi Government in 
contravention of its obligations, Guangxi Government might, at its sole discre-
tion, either agree to extend the concession period appropriately or shall 
compensate the Consortium by adjusting the electricity tariff so that all addi-
tional costs of construction and/or any additional amount that may become 
payable under the financing documents after the completion date of the 
power plant, as a result of such delay shall be reimbursed to the Consortium in 
equal amounts in the monthly payments of Electricity purchase charge paid. 
In the event the Consortium terminates the CA as a result of Guangxi Gov-
ernment event of default, the Consortium shall transfer Laibin B to Guangxi 
Government or its designee and, upon such transfer, Guangxi Government or 
its designee shall pay the Consortium the compensation amount set forth. 
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5.8 .7  Tax  Incen t i ves  
Guangxi Government also promised to use its best efforts to ensure that the 
Consortium would be entitled to enjoy tax incentives according to the laws 
and regulations of China.  
The detailed tax incentives for the Consortium include: (a) The Consortium is 
exempt from 3% of the local income tax; (b) Starting from the first profit mak-
ing year, the Consortium will benefit from a two year complete exemption 
from national income tax. Thereafter, after this two year period, from the third 
year to the fifth year, the Consortium will benefit from a 50% exemption from 
national income tax (and will consequently be liable for income tax at a rate 
of 15%). From the sixth year, the Consortium will pay the income tax in accor-
dance with the full tax rate of 30%; (c) In addition, the foreign investors will be 
exempted from withholding tax on dividend distributed by the Consortium. 
5.8 .8  Guaran tee  o f  Lenders ’  R igh t  
From and after financial closing and for so long as the financing documents 
remain in effect, Guangxi Government agreed not to terminate the CA with-
out first providing the lenders with an opportunity to cure the event of default 
of the Consortium and affording the lenders the other rights provided in the 
CA. The lenders or lender’s nominee may make any payment or perform any 
act required to be made or performed by the Consortium with the same ef-
fect as if made or performed by the Consortium. 
5.8 .9  Land and  Ut i l i t i es  and  Other  Suppor t  Measures  
For acquisition of the site and access to it and performing preliminary con-
tract works, Guangxi Government gave its support and would maintain the 
site free from all liens and encumbrances, so that the Consortium has the right 
to the free and exclusive use thereof for the concession period. 
The Government also gave the assurance that all utilities necessary for the 
construction, O&M of Laibin B are made available to the Consortium in a 
timely manner and at fair rates on terms no less favourable to the Consortium 
than those generally available to commercial customers receiving service 
substantially equivalent to that being provided to the Consortium. 
During the construction period, Guangxi Government would be responsible 
for: (a) the delivery of the site and completion of the preliminary contract 
works and the access road; (b) coordinating and facilitating all dealings with 
the appropriate Government Authorities during the construction period; (c) 
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obtaining, in a timely manner, and thereafter maintaining, the approvals re-
quired for construction which can only be obtained by Guangxi Government; 
(d) providing the Consortium with the transmission line and providing start-up 
electricity and steam and all fuel for testing. 
The Consortium, the Construction Contractor and the O&M Contractor are 
also given the assurance that they may import into China all items and 
equipment required for the construction, O&M of Laibin B. 
During construction, archaeological, geological and historical objects could 
be found. In such cases, all costs arising from the protective measures for 
these objects shall be borne by Guangxi Government. Any delaying effects 
on the project Schedule caused by such measures shall be compensated by 
an appropriate extension of the construction period or the concession period 
or both. 
5.9  R isk  Management  
5 .9 .1  Tar i f f  Ad jus tment  
The requirement in China that all tariff increases must be approved by the 
pricing bureau annually has created an element of uncertainty with regard to 
the adjustment of tariff and hence the project economics. This has been ad-
dressed as follows: (a) The PPA (and the tariff structure within it) has been ap-
proved by the SPC and the SPC’s support letter clearly states that the princi-
ples of the tariff structure, payment mechanism and tariff adjustment have 
been approved by the SPC (who controls the central price bureau) and that 
Guangxi Government (who controls the provincial price bureau) will comply 
with the principles set forth in the CA and PPA. (b) Specific provisions have 
been incorporated in the CA stating that the pricing bureau will simply verify 
the correct application of the pricing formula contained within the PPA. (c) 
Additional comfort is provided by stipulating that the obligation to pay the 
tariff is a commercial obligation of GPIB. By these measures, the tariff adjust-
ment risk is minimized. 
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5.9 .2  Ch inese  Par t i es ’  Re l i ab i l i t y  &  Cred i twor th iness  
Laibin B aims to alleviate the significant power shortage in Guangxi Province 
which is an impediment to sustained economic growth. As such, Guangxi Gov-
ernment is committed to see the project succeed. In addition, the strong support 
from the SPC and the MOP underpins the obligations of Guangxi Government 
under the project. The SPC’s support letter also states that the CA, PPA and FSTA 
comply with all current laws and regulations and that Guangxi Government has 
the capacity to commit itself and to sign the CA. It is such support that has en-
abled COFACE to provide strong cover for the COFACE Loan. Finally, if termina-
tion results from a Guangxi Government event of default, The Lenders will be re-
paid and Sponsors will be compensated for equity invested and loss of profit. 
5.9 .3  D ispatch  Const ra in t  
According to Laibin B’s PPA which sets new standard in China, with the ex-
ception of the occurrence of Force Majeure events which are specific and 
clearly defined, GPIB will be obliged to take-or-pay for a minimum net elec-
tricity output (MNEO) of 3.5 billion kWh (approximately 63% of plant load fac-
tor) per operating year from the Project Company. The electricity tariff has 
been set in a manner that, if GPIB only takes the MNEO from the power plant, 
the Project Company will be able to cover all of its costs and provide the 
Sponsors with a commercial return on their investment over the life of Laibin B. 
In addition, GPIB undertakes not to discriminate against the power plant and 
to apply the principles of economic dispatch to the purchase of any addi-
tional output, i.e. over and above MNEO. 
5.9 .4  Change  in  Law 
The risk of change in law in Laibin B is well covered in the CA as follows: (a) if a 
significant change in law prevents the Project Company from fulfilling its obli-
gations, the Project Company is entitled to received MNEO payments irre-
spective of its inability to supply electricity; (b) the CA also includes provisions 
requiring the Project Company to be restored to the same economics posi-
tion if change in law results in additional costs to the Project Company over 
and above an agreed threshold; (c) the change in law provision applies to 
any change in law after Bid Submission Date (May 7, 1996) and includes any 
changes in tax regulations; (d) change in law provisions address also potential 
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increased costs needed to cover any tightening of environmental standards 
in the future. 
In addition, the BOT legislation is being drafted by the SPC and is expected to 
be largely based on the experience of Laibin B. As such, the new legislation is 
not expected to contradict the provisions and framework established for the 
project. 
5.9 .5  Exchange  Rate  &  Conver t ib i l i t y  
The exchange rate fluctuation risk is largely mitigated by the Project Com-
pany’s right to adjust the floating portion of the tariff (indexed to US$ but 
payable in RMB) on a monthly basis to reflect RMB/US dollar exchange rate 
changes. There is a one-off exposure with regard to the first 5% movement 
from the base exchange rate under the PPA. The risk of significant exchange 
rate depreciation thus lies with GPIB and Guangxi Government. 
As for the convertibility risk, SAEC’s approval means that the project’s foreign 
exchange requirements have already been incorporated into the National 
Foreign Exchange Balancing Plan of China. The SAEC support letter also con-
firms that the project’s right to foreign exchange conversion and remittance 
of foreign exchange offshore will not be adversely affected by any future 
changes in laws and regulations. The Project Company also enters into a 
Conversion Agreement with a China bank which will undertake to use its best 
efforts to convert the Project Company’s RMB receipt into US$. While the un-
dertaking is not a guarantee of US$ availability, it does provide additional 
moral comfort to the Lenders and Sponsors. 
5.9 .6  Force  Ma jeure  
In Laibin B, comfort is derived from the comprehensive and well structured 
Force Majeure provisions in the project contract (CA, PPA and FSTA) and the 
appropriate insurance programme which, collectively, ensure that Spon-
sors/Lenders are protected. In the project contracts, Force Majeure is divided 
into insurable, uninsurable and political Force Majeure and is accorded dif-
ferent treatment and compensation. Upon the occurrence of an event of 
Force Majeure, the Project Company’s obligations under the project con-
tracts will be suspended and it will receive day for day extension to Milestone 
Dates including the Target Completion Date and the Concession Period. 
There is appropriate risk sharing with the off-taker with regard to political and 
uninsurable events of Force Majeure. 
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If termination results from Force Majeure, Lenders will be repaid and Sponsors 
will receive compensation corresponding to their equity investment. If termi-
nation results from a Company event of default, the Sponsors are not entitled 
to any compensation. However, the Lenders have extensive step-in rights and 
cure periods which afford the Lenders the opportunity to cure the Company 
event of default, including proposing a substitute company to replace the 
Project Company. 
5.9 .7  F inanc ia l  C los ing  
In Laibin B’s CA, the original schedule for financial closing is sixty days. That is 
apparently too tight because financial closing depends on many other fac-
tors which are out of developer’s control. Financial closing usually needs at 
least 3 months and subjects also to the adequacy of the CA. This is why the 
respondents rated this clause as the lowest adequate one with mean score of 
only 2.12. 
In fact, the financing close period was extended to 180 days in the final CA of 
Laibin B after the Consortium’s negotiation with Guangxi Government. Never-
theless, the financing of Laibin B was actually closed 270 days after the con-
cession was awarded, a delay of three months from the official schedule. This 
is a risk the Consortium bears. 
5.9 .8  De lay  in  Approva l  
In Laibin B, the “sponsorship” of the SPC as well as the explicit approval of 
MOP and SAEC confirmed in the letters of support offered helped to ensure 
that the other necessary approvals are forthcoming. The approval of Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation for the terms of the JV for Laibin 
is also significant. Although the Project Company is responsible for obtaining 
the necessary approvals, according to the CA, arbitrary denial or withdrawal 
of an approval is however treated as political Force Majeure. The risk of failure 
to obtain key approvals is therefore minimized. 
5.9 .9  Expropr ia t ion  
According to Laibin B’s CA, this risk is treated as political Force Majeure; 
hence it is mitigated. 
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5.9 .10  Cor rupt ion  
This risk is already addressed in the CA in the form of warranties by the Gov-
ernment (and also the Project Company). However, as corruption never takes 
place out in the open and is a fact of life so it is difficult to preclude it by using 
contract language. In addition, even if the clauses are useful, the enforce-
ment of the clauses is the issue and that cannot be legislated. Therefore, 
there is still corruption risk that the Project Company should bear. 
5.9 .11  R isk  A l loca t ion  
The end result achieves a fair allocation of risk for all parties as shown in Table 3. 
The political and legal risks are mainly borne by Guangxi Government, the con-
struction, operating, technical and finance risks are mainly borne by the Consor-
tium, while the Force Majeure risks are shared by Guangxi Government and the 
Consortium. As the first state-approved BOT project, Laibin B has set the bench-
mark in terms of risk allocation for future project financing in China, and to extend 
more information, a risk management framework based on Laibin B project is 
proposed in (Wang et al. 1999b) to guide project promoters planning to invest in 
future BOT power project in China. 
 
Table 3 – The Risk Allocation of Laibin B Power Plant Project 
 
 
Risk 
Guangxi 
Government 
The Consortium 
(as Sponsor,  
Contractor and 
O&M Contractor) 
 
Lender 
 
Insurer 
Bond 
Bank or 
Insurer 
1. Political Risks      
revoke, expropriation, sequestration X     
exclusivity, i.e. not second facility  X    
changes in law X     
development approvals X X    
adverse Government action or  
inaction 
X X    
provision of utilities X X    
increase in taxes (general) X X    
increase in taxes (specific) X     
political force majeure events X     
termination of concession by  
Government 
X     
payment failure by Government X X    
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2. Construction Completion Risks      
land acquisition and compensation X     
restriction on import  
equipment/materials 
X     
cost overruns  X X  X 
increases in financing costs  X X   
time and quality risk  X   X 
Contractor default  X   X 
default by Concession Company X X   X 
time, cost and scope of identified but 
related work and variations 
     
environmental damage - subsisting X   X  
environmental damage - ongoing  X    
protection of geological & historical ob-
ject 
X     
force majeure X X  X X 
      
3. Operating Risks      
Government Department default X     
Concession Company default  X    
Operator inability  X    
termination of concession by  
Concession Company 
X X X  X 
environmental damage - ongoing  X    
force majeure event X X  X  
labor risk X X    
technology risk  X    
prolonged downtime during  
operation 
 X  X  
condition of facility (maintenance)  X  X  
      
4. Market and Revenue Risks      
insufficient fare income X X    
fluctuating demand of power  
generated 
X     
transmission failure X     
problem in bill collection X     
insufficient other income  X X   
power theft X     
fluctuate of cost & availability of 
fuel/coal 
X X    
Government restriction on profit & tariff X X X   
      
5. Finance Risks      
inflation risk X X X   
interest rate  X X   
foreign currency exchange rate X X    
foreign currency convertibility X     
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6. Legal Risks      
title/lease property X X    
ownership assets  X    
security structure   X   
insolvency of Concession  
Company 
 X X   
breach of financing documents  X X   
enforceability of security   X   
documentation/contractual risk (conflict 
& arbitration, applied laws) 
X X X   
      
7. Competition risk (before bid 
award) 
 X    
      
 
5.10  Summary  
Laibin B demonstrates the commitment of the China authorities to the BOT 
process. The project contracts are of a much higher standard than is usually 
the case in China. It has become a model for future BOT project in China. As 
an evidence of this, the second official BOT power plant project at Changsha 
and the first official BOT water treatment plant project at Chengdu both 
adopt a very similar contractual structure. So it is meaningful and important to 
study Laibin B in details and to draw lessons from it, and the experience 
gained from Laibin B will be used effectively in the following BOT projects in 
China. In light of the full introduction above, some main experiences are listed 
in the following. 
 
 International competitive bidding to select investors 
Laibin B is the first project to use international competitive bidding in 
power sector in China, and the developer will only be awarded the 
concession after a competitive tendering process. The successful ex-
perience of Laibin B indicates that international competitive bidding is 
efficient, economical and fair. In addition, the efficient and fair bidding 
process not only promotes foreign investment in Laibin B project, but 
also makes a favourable impression for Guangxi Government. 
 Letters of comfort instead of guaranteed returns 
As known, financial returns of an investor should represent how much 
risk he bears and how much return and profit the project can generate. 
If the government guarantee the returns, the project company would 
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lose the enthusiasm and drive to reduce costs and improve efficiency. 
Laibin B introduced competition mechanism in the tendering process, 
and the government did not need to bargain with investors. The suc-
cessful tenderer would have to finance its project from a revenue 
stream based on a letter of comfort from the government supporting 
off-take agreements instead of the guaranteed returns that have char-
acterized many projects in China. 
 A wide range of initiatives from government 
Government support is significant in any public infrastructure BOT 
project, especially in China where there is little history of or legal frame-
work for BOT projects. Under the current regulations for foreign invest-
ment in the power sector, the attitude of the government and its sup-
port for a BOT project is crucial to the viability and outcome of the 
project. The central government and Guangxi Government has pro-
vided their strong support to Laibin B given its status as the first official pi-
lot BOT project and given the project company some guarantees and 
incentives, such as power purchase guarantee, fuel supply guarantee, 
etc. All these show that the Chinese government is moving towards 
adopting international contractual and practices. 
 A reasonable risk-sharing scheme 
The risk-sharing scheme will directly influence the partners’ view of the 
success of the project and is probably the most critical success factor for 
BOT projects. Generally speaking, risk should be allocated to the partner 
who is most capable of controlling and influencing it, and meanwhile 
expected returns should match the risk borne. According to these princi-
ples, the construction, operating, technical and finance risks are mainly 
borne by the Consortium, the political and legal risks are mainly borne by 
Guangxi Government, while the Force Majeure risks are shared by 
Guangxi Government and the Consortium as shown in Table 3. 
 Much higher standard contracts 
The project contracts are of a much higher standard than is usually the 
case in China, since it is regarded as a state-approved BOT project. As 
mentioned before, Laibin B is underpinned by three main contracts, the 
Concession Agreement, Power Purchase Agreement and Fuel Supply & 
Transportation Agreement. These documents absorb the experience of 
BOT contracts from other countries, and take into account the current 
situation in China at the same time. 
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 Questions for Readers to Answer 
 
1. Will Laibin B project be more attractive if the central government 
provides guaranteed return instead of letter of comfort? Why did 
the government decide to adopt the later? 
2. Whether the risk sharing is fair and reasonable based on the risk al-
location matrix in Laibin B project? 
3. How does the international competitive bidding affect the success 
and effectiveness of Laibin B project? 
4. What is the difference between results of guaranteed return and 
power purchase guarantee? 
5. What lessons can be drawn from the Laibin B project? 
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6 CASE STUDY VI  -  THE NATIONAL STADIUM BOT PROJECT 
FOR BE I J ING 2008 OLYMPIC GAMES 
by YuWen Liu, GuoFu Zhao and Prof. Dr. ShouQing Wang 
6.1  In t roduct ion  
In order to meet its obligations in the Host City Contract for the 29th Olympic 
Games signed with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Beijing 
People’s Municipal Government (BMG) decided to build the National Sta-
dium (the Project), which will be a landmark building inside Beijing Olympic 
Green Park as well as the largest multi-functional stadium of international 
standard in Beijing. The Project will become a legacy of the Olympic Move-
ment and a new bright spot of infrastructure in Beijing. 
This paper introduces first the Project’s brief, development, partners and site, 
followed by relevant legislation, structure and financing. At last, three major is-
sues of the Project are discussed, i.e. the disputes arisen, impacts of canceling 
the retractable roof of the Stadium and key risks involved in the Project. 
The Project is developed in the form of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP), or 
more exactly Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). The Beijing State-owned Assets 
Management Corporation authorized by the BMG as one of the shareholders 
in the Project Company undertakes 58% of the total investment while the re-
maining 42% is financed by the private sector which is the CITIC Consortium. 
The public and private sectors set up jointly the Project Company responsible 
for the financing, building, operating, maintaining and transferring the Project 
for 30 years. 
As the "Green Olympics", "Hi-tech Olympics" and "People's Olympics" are set 
by the Government as the three main themes of the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games (the Game), the Project should also reflect these themes and con-
cept for sustainable development. Advanced, practicable and world-class 
cut-edge technologies in the field of ecology and environmental protection 
as well as advanced, reliable and high-new technologies are adopted in the 
design and construction as well as the utilization of the National Stadium dur-
ing and after the Games (Figure 1). The aim is to develop the Project as a 
model of environment protection and a window through which the hi-tech 
achievements and the innovative strength of China will be presented, and a 
brand new image of a prosperous and civilized Beijing and the high spirits of 
its citizens will be promoted to the world. The National Stadium is to be an 
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everlasting building capable of meeting various high functional requirements 
within 50 years. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The National Stadium for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games,  
Photo resource: http://www.beijing2008.com/olympic 2006-12-6 
6.2  P ro jec t  Ob jec t i ves   
The objectives of the Project can be described at two levels: the state and 
project levels. 
6.2 .1  S ta te  Leve l  
The Olympic spirit is to be spread and popularized most extensively with the 
active participation of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. While drawing on the 
experience of the host cities of previous Olympic Games, creativity is to be 
emphasized in organization, management and marketing of the Games so as 
to maximize the economic and social benefits. The National Stadium is to be 
developed as a landmark building and milestone project, which is of great 
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help to promote the modernization of Beijing as well as the rest of the country. 
It is also hoped that the Project can help maximize the positive impacts of the 
Olympic Games on national economic development and accelerating the 
modernization drive of the country and will bring a breakthrough in the capi-
tal in terms of economic development, urban construction, social progress 
and people's living standard. 
In the process, high-quality personnel are also expected to be trained and 
employed and advanced management concepts and expertise from other 
countries learned. As for the government, it is expected to help adhere to the 
principles of openness, fairness, efficiency and honesty. In the preparation for 
and operation of the Games, it is hoped that it will be more practical and ef-
fective in an endeavor to set a good example of being innovative in system, 
mechanism and management. It is therefore to be of help to create a new 
image of Beijing and China. 
6.2 .2  P ro jec t  Leve l   
The objective at project level is to obtain maximum profit in addition to meet-
ing all demands of holding the Games. The design, financing, construction, 
operation, maintenance and transfer of the Project must be carried out in 
accordance to this objective. The National Stadium should meet all technical 
requirements and standards for the Games and be developed with state-of-
art technology. Competitions will be well organized and excellent services will 
be provided to all athletes participating in the Games. During the Olympic 
Games period, the National Stadium will be capable of seating 100,000 spec-
tators, including 20,000 temporary seats (to be dismantled after the Games), 
and will be used for the opening/closing ceremonies, track and field events 
and the football final of the Games. 
After the Games, the National Stadium will be able to seat 80,000 spectators 
for special competition events (such as the World Track and Field Champion-
ships, World Cup Football Games etc), various regular sports competitions 
(such as the Asian Games, Asian Track and Field Championship, Interconti-
nental Integrated Competitions, National Games, National Football League 
Matches etc) as well as non-competitive events (such as art performances, 
group activities and commercial exhibitions etc). 
As a BOT project, the Project Company has to bear on its own the loss and 
profit of the Project. The BOT arrangement, as well known, has great impact 
on the design, financing, construction and operation of the Project. The de-
sign and construction of the Stadium has to consider their potential impacts 
on the operation, and during the construction stage, the Project Company 
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has to negotiate with potential enterprises interested in the operation of the 
National Stadium after the Games. For example, it is said that after Games 
the National Stadium will be the arena of Beijing GuoAn Football Club. If this is 
true, it will be a great guarantee for the Project Company’s cash-in flow. 
6.3  Deve lopment  P rocess  
The Beijing Development Planning Commission (BDPC), entrusted by the BMG, 
requested in Oct 2002 all interested parties to apply for pre-qualification of fi-
nancing, design, construction and operation of the Project. The key steps of 
the tendering process are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Tendering Process of the National Stadium for 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
Step Date Participators Activities Remarks 
Invitation to bid-
ders 
October 28 
2002 
BDPC Inviting bidders to apply 
for pre-qualification and 
submit bids  
7 apply for pre-
qualification, of which 5 
are qualified 
Field inspection 
and pre-bid meet-
ing 
April 30, 2003  BDPC and poten-
tial bidders 
Q&A after bidders have 
finished field inspection 
and review on the Bid-
ding Documents 
 
Bidding Deadline on 
June 30, 2003 
The CITIC,  
CSCEC and  
BCEG Consortia 
Submitting response to 
the Bidding Documents 
and competitive bids 
1 bidder quits due to 
failure of responding to 
the Bidding Documents 
substantially 
Bid opening June 30, 2003 Supervisory per-
sonnel of 
BOCOG, repre-
sentatives of bid-
ders, Tendering 
Agent 
Opening bids and An-
nouncing the successful 
bidder 
Top two successful bid-
ders, i.e. the BCEG 
Consortium and the 
CITIC Consortium 
Initialing of Con-
cession Agree-
ment and Nation-
al Stadium 
Agreement 
Before July 5 
2003 
BDPC and the 
BCEG Consor-
tium, the CITIC 
Consortium 
The bid being given to 
the CITIC Consortium 
The BCEG Consortium 
being dropped out due 
to failure of reaching 
Consortium Agreement 
Signing of the 
Concession 
Agreement and 
the National Sta-
dium Agreement 
August 9 2003 The CITIC Con-
sortium with BMG 
and BOCOG 
Signing agreements and 
preparing for the regis-
tration of the Project 
Company 
In accordance with Chi-
nese Laws, the CITIC 
Consortium has to form 
the Project Company 
with BSAMC 
Establishment of 
the Project Com-
pany 
September 
2003 
The CITIC Con-
sortium, BSAMC, 
GSHGC and 
BUCGC 
Registration of Project 
Company  
Site acquisition before 
the Registration 
 
Note:   BDPC—Beijing Development Planning Commission 
  CITIC— China International Trust and Investment Corporation  
  BUCGC—Beijing Urban Construction Group Corporation  
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  GSHGC— Golden State Holding Group Corporation 
  BSAMC—Beijing State-owned Assets Management Corporation 
  BOCOG—Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of XXIX Olympiad  
  BCEG—Beijing Construction Engineering Group 
  CSCEC—China State Construction Engineering Corporation 
6.4  P ro jec t  Par tners  
The Tendering Administrative Authority for the Project is the BMG which en-
trusts Beijing Development and Planning Commission (the BDPC) to be re-
sponsible for the tendering process of the Project’s Concession. The Guoxin 
Tendering Corporation is appointed as the Tendering Agent for preparing the 
Invitation to Bidders (ITB) and has been entrusted by the Tendering Administra-
tive Authority to implement ITB activities. 
The Project Company set up for the Project comprises mainly of two parties: 
the public partner and the private partners. 
6.4 .1  The  Pub l i c  Pa r tner  
The Beijing State-owned Assets Management Corporation (BSAMC) is nomi-
nated as the representative of the public (mainly the BMG), contributing 58% 
of the total investment, forming one partner of the Project Company with the 
private partners. The BSAMC, a very unique company with its management 
and staff having a deep understanding of China and the city of Beijing as 
well as rich experience in public and private finance, asset management and 
capital operations, was founded in April 2001 with registered assets of Ren-
minbi (RMB)1 1.5 billion.  
6.4 .2  The  P r i va te  Par tner  
The private partner is a consortium composed by three companies with rich 
experiences in financing and construction of large construction projects, i.e. 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), Beijing Urban 
Construction Group Corporation (BUCEC) and the Golden State Holding 
Group Cooperation (GSHGC), with equity proportion in the Consortium of 
65%, 30% and 5% respectively. 
                                             
1  The exchange rate of RMB vs US$ was 1 US$=8.2765 RMB (before August, 2005) and 1 
US$=7.6965 RMB (after August, 2005 when Chinese Government depreciated RMB). 
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6.4 .2 .1  Ch ina  In te rnat iona l  T rus t  and  Inves tment  Corpo-
ra t ion  
CITIC, with the initiation and approval by Mr. Deng Xiaoping, chief architect 
of China's reform and opening-up, was established on Oct. 4, 1979 by Mr. 
Rong Yiren, former Vice President of the People’s Republic of China. As a 
window of China's opening to the outside world, CITIC has grown into a large 
trans-national conglomerate. It now owns 44 subsidiaries (banks) including 
those in Hong Kong, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
The company has also set up representative office in Tokyo, New York and 
Frankfurt. CITIC's core business ranges from financial industry, industrial invest-
ment to service industries. CITIC, elected by the private partners as the leader 
and representative of the CITIC Consortium, is in charge of coordination of 
the bid preparation, and submit jointly the bidding document and material 
with the other two private partners. In the meantime of being the representa-
tive of the consortium and representative for negotiation with BSAMC, CITIC 
also undertakes the role of legal person of the Consortium of the Project. 
6.4 .2 .2  Be i j ing  Urban  Const ruc t ion  Group  
Corpora t ion  
Beijing Urban Construction Group Corporation (BUCGC) is a large compre-
hensive group which carries out construction of industrial and civil buildings, 
municipal works, metros, expressways and airports as its main business and it 
also undertakes real estate development and urban infrastructure projects. 
BUCGC is the largest construction group in Beijing and has the necessary lo-
cal know-how and expertise that will be helpful to the Consortium. 
Selected by the State Council of China as one of the “120 Companies of 
State-owned Large Enterprises for Pilot Reform”, BUCGC also ranks 70 in the 
“Top 500 Enterprises of China”. As the largest construction enterprise in Beijing, 
BUCGC has strong technology strength and liable management team with 
full of youthful spirit. It equips with the most modernized equipments that can 
work above and/or under the earth automatically. It also accumulates many 
experiences in steel structure construction over 40 years. Its construction 
scope covers airports, sports stadiums, bridges, civil buildings and so on.  
6.4 .2 .3  Go lden  S ta te  Ho ld ing  Group Coopera t ion   
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The Golden State Holding Group Corporation is an international group com-
pany specialized in municipal infrastructure construction, environmental pro-
tection and renewable energy development, etc. with its offices and subsidi-
aries in the United States, France, Spain, Canada and China.  
6.4 .3  P ro jec t  Management  Adv isors  
There are two project management advisors to the Project Company: Vinci 
Construction Grands Projects (VCGP) and Bouygues Batiment (BYB). VCGP is 
part of the French Vinci Group, the largest group for construction and asso-
ciated services in the world, active in civil and building construction and re-
lated services (toll roads, airports, car parks, bridges and stadiums) while BYB is 
part of the Bouygues Group, a major French conglomerate with activities in 
construction, services, telecomm and media. 
Vinci Group and Bouygues Group are also the shareholders of the Consortium 
Stade de France (CSDF), first of its kind, Public-Private Partnership for a sport 
facility. The expertise and know-how of VCGP and BYB in the design, financ-
ing, construction of a sport and cultural venue and that of CSDF for man-
agement and operation of such facility brings value and competitiveness to 
the Project Company. 
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6.4 .4  P ro jec t  S t ruc ture  
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6.5  P ro jec t  Scope  and  Loca t ion  
6 .5 .1  P ro jec t  Scope  
As mentioned in the Project Objectives section, during the Olympic Games, 
the National Stadium will be capable of seating 100,000 spectators, including 
20,000 temporary seats, and will be used for holding the opening and closing 
ceremonies, track and field competition events and football final. After the 
Games, the National Stadium will be able to seat 80,000 spectators for special 
competition events such as World Track, various regular sports competitions 
such as the Asian Games, as well as non-competitive events such as art per-
formances. The detailed information of the project scope is given Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Some Indicators of the National Stadium’s Scope 
 
Planning Control Indicators Conditions and Requirements 
Planning of  
underground 
space 
 United with the planning of the public parking area 
on the west side, enable convenient communication, 
and include ground greening and local planting in the 
thickness of mantle rock 
Surroundings East side Dragon-shaped water system, Kaidike Hotel, and 
land use for development of commercial facilities 
West side Central Axis Square, National Swimming Center 
South side Green space, North Fourth Ring Road 
North side Green space 
External traffic  
requirement 
Subway  On the northwest side, about 500 m from Olympic 
Green Subway Station 
Bus  About 600 m from the bus stop on the west side 
About 300 m from the bus station on the southeast 
side 
Round urban roads Close to a urban branch road on the west side (35 
m) and a trunk road on the north side (56 m) 
Internal traffic  
requirement 
Main entry 
of vehicle 
ground East side  
Under-
ground 
North side 
Main entry of people West, east and north sides 
Entry of underground 
garage 
Arrange underground garage exits/entries, as 
planned, in addition to the underground vehicle ex-
it/entry on the north side 
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Landscape  
requirement 
Trend of style Consist the sports architecture style and pattern with 
squares and water elements  
External space  
requirement 
Pay attention to the leading role of the architecture 
pattern, and develop the Stadium into the land  
Linkage  Emphasize the integrity of different pats and the 
harmony of landscapes 
Public utility Heat station 3 stations with a total surface area of 210 m2, on 
basement 1 
Communications facility One interface, 350 m2, on baseline 1 
CATV facility One terminal machine room, 50 m2, no baseline 1 
transformer One substation, 500 m2, on baseline 1 
Sanitary facility Solid waste management 200 m2, on baseline 1 
Fire & security Fire parking apron 
Gas facility 2 underground pressure regulating boxes arranged 
outdoors at a clear distance of 6 m from any impor-
tant public building 
 
6.5 .2  Loca t ion   
The Stadium is located in Area B of Beijing Olympic Green, approximately 
20.29 hectares with the exact area dependent on the land redline map. The 
detailed information on land use and a map are given in Table 3 and Figure 1 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Location of the National Stadium 
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Table 3 – Land Use Indexes for the National Stadium 
 
Mandatory Index Control Index 
Series number of plot 
area 
 12 
Nature of land use  Sports  
Plot area(ha)  20.29 
Project scale  80,000 permanent seats
 
 
Setback of the building 
line (m) 
East side North of Chengfu 
road 
20 
South of Chengfu 
road 
60 
West side 5 
South side 10 
North side 10 
Underpass section of 
Chengfu road 
South side 5 
North side 5 
Green coverage ratio  30% (including field of 
playground) 
Minimum parking area 
required 
 1000 cars 
Parking area available Ground  Temporarily arranged 
Underground  1000 cars  
 Total  1000 cars 
 
6.6  Government ’s  Suppor ts  and  Incent i ves  
Pursuant to the Host City Contract, the IOC granted to the City of Beijing the 
right to host the Games. BOCOG has been appointed as the official organiz-
ing committee for the Games. In order to fulfill its obligations to the IOC to 
plan, organize and stage the Games in accordance with the Olympic Char-
ter and the Host City Contract, BMG will deliver the major Olympic facilities 
including the Stadium at Beijing Olympic Green Area B. 
As there is no BOT/PPP law in China, a series of government polices are 
enacted by Chinese central government and the BMG so as to meet its obli-
gations for or provide incentives to the National Stadium. For example, the 
Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation and the General Ad-
ministration of Customs jointly issued on Jan 23, 2003 the “Notices on Taxation 
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relevant to the 29th Olympic Games” in which a lot of tax incentives are pro-
vided including that all imported equipment for the Stadium are free of cus-
tom and value added tax, and most of sales relevant to the Stadium are 
waived, etc. Besides, the BMG also enacts some other policies and requires 
coordination of its departments for the project. For example, the “Tendering 
Regulations for Concession of Urban Infrastructure Projects in Beijing” and the 
“Concession Regulations for Urban Infrastructure Projects in Beijing” imple-
mented by BMG on Sept 1, 2006 and March 1, 2006 (trail version on Oct 1, 
2003) respectively; the “Some Suggestions (36 clauses) on Developing Private 
Economy” issued by the State Council on Feb 24, 2005 encouraging private 
investment in infrastructure using project finance. 
BMG granted the Project Company the rights to invest in, finance, design, 
construct, operate, maintain and repair the Stadium on the terms and condi-
tions of the Concession Agreement. The Concession Agreement provides that 
the Project Company, BMG and BOCOG shall enter into the Stadium Agree-
ment pursuant to which the Stadium will be made available to BOCOG dur-
ing the Games Period for the holding of the Test Competitions and Test Events, 
the Olympic Games and Paralympics Games. Accordingly, the Project Com-
pany, BMG and BOCOG have entered into this Agreement in order to specify 
each party’s rights and obligations in connection with the use of the Stadium 
by BOCOG and the provision of certain services to BOCOG by the Project 
Company. 
According to the Agreement, CITIC partners (bidder) should obey relevant 
rules of IOC and BOCOG during the bidding process and the investment, 
construction (design and construction), operation and transfer of the Project. 
These rules include but are not limited to the rules contained in the following 
document in the next paragraph. If there is any discrepancy in the require-
ments for the relevant matters between the International Federations and the 
Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games with regard to relevant mat-
ters, IOC will be requested to make the final decision: relevant rules shall not 
restrict the Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games from proposing 
supplementary clauses or imposing higher requirements. 
The followings are some important relevant regulations and con-
tracts/agreements: the Olympic Charter, Host City Contract for the 29th 
Olympic Games, Rules on Protection of the Olympic Marks, the Market Devel-
opment Agreement for the 29th Olympic Games, Guidelines for design of the 
National Stadium Olympic Project, Cooperative Joint Venture Contract and 
the Concession, Cooperative Joint Venture Contract, the National Stadium 
Agreement and Concession Agreement. According to these documents, 
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some government supports and incentives have been provided to facilitate 
the implementation of the Stadium in BOT mode, as briefed below: 
 
 BMG provides land at very low cost (1040 RMB per square meter for 
gross land development). This is really a quite low price compared to 
the 10,000 RMB per squire meter for other land nearby. 
 BMG contributes 1.8154 billion RMB, 58% of total investment (3.13 billion 
RMB) but will not get any dividend. 
 BMG provides necessary infrastructure (water, electric and road etc) 
connection to the site and all other help and convenience for the con-
struction and operation of the Stadium. For example, for easy shipping 
on road large steel structure components for the Stadium, the BMG has 
issued a special passport to the Project Company. 
 During the Test Competitions/Events and the Olympic Games, BOCOG 
will pay fees to the Project Company. BMG will also undertake all ex-
pense of special equipments used for the opening and closing cere-
monies as these equipments cannot be used for daily operation after 
the Game. 
 During the concession period, BMG will not permit to develop new 
competitive stadium or to expand any existing competitive stadium in 
northern area of Beijing. 
6.7  Bas i c  Dea l  S t ruc ture  
The Concession Agreement is signed between the BMG and the Project 
Company.  
6.7 .1  The  BMG’s  Ob l iga t ions  
BMG grants the Project Company the rights to invest, finance, design and 
construct the Stadium and thereafter, to operate, maintain and repair it dur-
ing the concession period on the terms and conditions set in the Concession 
Agreement.  
The Land Administrative Authority of BMG gratuitously offers the Project Com-
pany the allocated land use rights of the Project Facilities Site (collectively, 
the "Land Use Rights"), for which the Project Company is not required to pay 
the land premium or supporting infrastructure construction fee, provided that 
 143
the Project Company shall bear the first level land development expenses 
(RMB 1,040 per square meter) of the Project Facilities Site. 
6.7 .2  The  P ro jec t  Company ’s  Ob l iga t ions  
The Project Company will invest, finance, design and construct the Stadium 
and thereafter, to operate, maintain and repair it in the term. And the Project 
Company will make available the Stadium to BOCOG for the holding of Test 
Competitions and Test Events and the Olympic Games. During the period, the 
BOCOG have to pay for the Project Company. The amount is determined as 
follows: the actual operation fee minus the daily operation fee. The daily op-
eration fee is the project’s operation fee when it doesn’t hold any games. At 
the expiration of the concession period, the Project Company will transfer the 
Stadium at no cost to BMG or its nominated transferee. The concession period 
is commencing from the Completion Date, December 31, 2006, and, subject 
to earlier termination, ending on December 31, 2038. 
6.7 .3  The  P ro jec t  Company ’s  Revenues  
The Project Company can get all revenues from the Project in the ways be-
low: 
 
 Revenue from television, radio and other media; 
 Sponsorship; 
 Advertisement (main); 
 Franchise; 
 Commercial space rent e.g. offices, boxes, parking lots, restaurants, su-
permarkets and hotels etc (main); 
 Gate and ticket sale;  
 Sport and performance etc events; and 
 Selling the naming right (brand) after the Olympic Games (main). 
 
The Project Company will get all revenues during the concession period ex-
cept the Olympic Games Period. During the Olympic Games Period the 
Project Company will only get rent fee paid by the BOCOG. 
Because the project is still under construction, a detailed revenues structure is 
not available at the moment. But the Project Company is starting to make 
some plans. For example, there are about 80,000 square meters of building 
area for commercial use and 1000 parking lots, 110 corporate boxes, 4 restau-
rants (2 Chinese and 2 western), a membership hotel on the 4th and 5th floor 
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(about 70 rooms) and 40000 square meters for supermarket (the Project 
Company is negotiating now with the Wal-Mart company). 
6.7 .4  The  Compet i t i ve  S tad iums 
As mentioned in Section 6, the Project Company will just compete with the ex-
isting stadium. As many of the existing stadiums are obsolete and not as big as 
the National Stadium, there will be only little competition from other large sta-
diums during the concession period. If a new stadium is very necessary to be 
built, the BMG will negotiate with the Project Company, and in accordance 
with the concession agreement, the Project Company will get enough com-
pensation. 
6.8  Sources  o f  F inance  
6 .8 .1  The  Shareho lders  o f  the  P ro jec t  
The BMG authorizes Beijing Development Planning Commission, a functional 
authority of BMG, duly established and existing in accordance with Law, to 
sign the Agreement on BMG’s behalf. And the Consortium is formed by three 
parties, the CITIC, BUCGC, GSHGC (collectively the “Bidders”). After the Con-
sortium won the tender, they set up a Project Company (the “Project Com-
pany”) jointly with Beijing State Owned Assets Management Corporation 
(BSAMC) that is the representative of the BMG. 
The original and current proportions of the shareholder’s equity are com-
pared in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Comparison of Original and Current Proportions of Equity 
 
 Original Now 
Shareholders Proportion 
in 
Consortium 
Proportion 
in Project 
Company 
Equity 
Amount 
(RMB 103) 
Proportion 
in 
Consortium
Proportion 
in Project 
Company 
Equity 
Amount 
(RMB 103) 
BSAMC  65.980% 762,100  58% 605,133 
CITIC 65% 22.113% 255,410 65% 27.3% 284,830 
BUCGC 30% 10.206% 117,880 30% 12.6% 131,460 
GSHGC 5% 1.701% 19,650 5% 2.1% 21,910 
Total 100% 100% 1,155,040 100% 100% 1,043,333 
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6.8 .2  The  F inanc ia l  Ar rangements  o f  the  P ro jec t  
The non-equity financing of the Project is mainly loan from banks. The Project 
Company thinks domestic commercial banks that have also shown strong in-
terest in the Project have good financing capacity in both domestic and for-
eign currencies. The Project Company therefore is confident in raising the re-
quired RMB 785.89 million from domestic commercial banks. 
Table 5 is a comparison of the original and current proportions of various kinds 
of fund. During the biding period, the CITIC Consortium used the original pro-
portions of Fund. The government thought the proportion for government is 
too high and therefore chose the BCEG Consortium. But after the BCEG Con-
sortium was dropped out due to failure of reaching Consortium Agreement 
among shareholders, the government could only negotiate with the CITIC 
Consortium. Finally, they agreed on the current proportions of Fund. 
 
 
Table 5 – Comparison of Original and Current Sources of Fund 
 
 Original Current 
Source of Fund Proportion in total 
investment 
Amount  
(RMB million) 
Proportion in total 
investment 
Amount  
(RMB million) 
Government Contri-
bution 
65.98% 2,286.29 58% 1, 815.40 
Equity Capital from 
Consortium 
11.34% 392.94 12.6% 394.38 
Bank Loan 22.68% 785.89 29.4% 920.22 
Total 100% 3, 1300.00 100% 3, 130.00 
 
The bank loan is senior debt with tenor of 16 years (including 6 years of grace 
period). The details of the loan are as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Details of Bank Loan 
 
Borrower The Project Company 
Lenders Domestic Commercial Banks 
Class of Debt Senior Debt 
Facility Amount  RMB 920.22 million 
Tenor 16 years (including 6 years of grace period) 
Currency RMB 
Interest 5.184% (10% discount on the base rate issued by the People’s Bank of 
China) 
Drawdown Period 4 years 
Grace Period 6 years (including drawdown period) 
Repayment Principal will be repaid in equal installments on quarterly basis from 2010, 
and interest will be paid on quarterly basis from first drawdown 
Prepayment Prepayment is allowed 
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The Project Company has got the letter of commitment from three banks be-
fore the tendering, i.e. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, China CITIC Bank (The original name was CITIC Industrial 
Bank when it gave the letter of commitment.). But all banks are doubted 
about the Project’s financial viability. After they heard that the Project may 
be cost overrun and the retractable roof is cancelled, they are more doubted 
the Project’s financial viability. And therefore, the banks and the BMG now 
ask the shareholders (CITIC, BUCGC and GSHGC) of the Consortium to re-
place the Project Company to be the borrower of the money. The Consor-
tium is reluctant to be the borrower, so it’s still negotiating with the BMG now. 
6.9  Ins ights  in to  Ma jor  I ssues  
Three major issues of this project are discussed below. They are the disputes in 
the project, the canceling of the retractable roof and the risks involved in the 
project.  
6.9 .1  The  D ispu tes  in  the  P ro jec t  
6 .9 .1 .1  D isputes  among the  P ro jec t   
Company ’s  Pa r tners  
There are some disputes arisen among the Project Company’s partners. First, 
all partners want to get the profit of construction and the construction work of 
the project is divided into three parts to the CITIC, the BUCGC and the 
GSHGC as the proportion of the three companies’ equity in the Project Com-
pany, resulting that the Project Company has not good control on construc-
tion. Second, due to the Project’s structural characteristics and the detail de-
sign not ready, the contractor could only sign a Unit Price Contract with the 
Project Company. The BUCGC, as the general contractor, considers more its 
own profit, time and safety than the overall ones. This leads to construction 
cost overrun and the most conflict thing - the BUCGC asks for technical 
measures fee to accelerated construction schedule delayed mainly by the 
design changes due to cancellation of the retractable roof.  
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6.9 .1 .2  D isputes  be tween  the  P ro jec t  Company  and  The  
BMG 
First, the original design of parking sparking spaces is 2000. But the BMG asks the 
Project Company to cut 1000 parking spaces because the BMG want to con-
struct a large parking lot for the whole Olympic area. So the parking spaces for 
the Stadium will not be enough. Many people will have to park their car in the 
BMG’s parking lot and walk to the Stadium. Second, the BMG asks the Project 
Company to cut more commercial area in the Stadium. Third, the BMG asks the 
Project Company to cancel the retractable roof. All these reduce the Project 
Company’s sources of revenue. Fourth, the BMG set a tight deadline requiring 
the Completion Date to be before December 31, 2006 while changing the de-
sign. There’s not enough time for an economic construction. Considering the re-
quirement of the tight deadline, the Financial Closing Date was set on Decem-
ber 15, 2003. But the actual date delayed for about 2 months, and just after the 
concession agreement was signed, BUCGC have to go into the site to com-
mence construction. 
6.9 .1 .3  D i spute  be tween  the  P ro jec t  Company  and  the  
Des ign  Consor t ium 
With regard to the design, there is a big problem for the Project Company. 
The BMG has not got the copyright of the National Stadium’s design, but 
asked the Project Company to follow the design. This leads to the Project 
Company’s weak status when negotiating with the design consortium result-
ing that the design may not be good enough for proper commercial use. 
Usually, a project company is the owner of a facility and the design consor-
tium should satisfy the Project Company’s requirement. In addition, as the 
Stadium is used for 2008 Olympic Games, the BMG has played a more impor-
tant role in deciding the blue print. This constrains the Project Company in 
maximizing the commercial and efficient use of the Stadium. 
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6.9 .2  The  Impac ts  o f  Cance l l ing  the  Ret rac tab le  Roof  
The BMG thinks the cancellation of the retractable roof can save much mon-
ey and make a symbol of “Host the Olympic Games Frugally”. In addition, the 
cancellation will also improve the safety condition during its construction and 
operation as it reduces weight of the roof and complexity of its installation 
and operation. But actually, there are pros and cons for this decision. 
6.9 .2 .1  P ros  o f  Cance l l ing  the  Re t rac tab le  Roof  
 Reduce the Material (mainly Steel) Used 
The cancellation of the retractable roof reduces the load of the steel 
structure and therefore saves at least 2000 tons of steel material used 
for the supporting structure and about 1700 tons of steel used for the re-
tractable roof. In addition, after the re-design, many other parts can be 
saved. In a word, the cancellation of the retractable roof can save 
many materials which are worth of 200,000,000 RMB. Considering other 
saving in cost such as the easier installation of steel structure, it was es-
timated that the cancellation of the roof could save roughly 
400,000,000 RMB in total but, although there is not detailed information 
released, it seems this estimation is a little optimistic according to actual 
progress.  
 Reduce the Difficulty of Installing the Steel Structure 
The steel structure is very complex, and as one feature of the Stadium 
project, the unique wide span retractable roof is very hard to install. The 
retractable roof with its steel space truss rigid unit composed of two 
parts (about 80x80m, 8m high), spans the entire open space of the Sta-
dium structure. It moves along the fixed rail on the permanent roof to 
get opened and closed. The fixed slide rail is underpinned by the rigid 
member at the front edge of the permanent roof, which is the steel 
edge beam of the permanent roof. The sliding distance is about 85m. 
The contractor has searched many ways to install it, but all will cost too 
much and are not very safe. After canceling the retractable roof, the 
contractor will make the installation of steel structure more easily. 
 Reduce the Safety Risk 
The Stadium is the most fashionable design of the fourth era architec-
ture of the world. But no actual Stadium of this kind has been built till 
now. The retractable roof is as big as a football ground, and weights 
1700 ton. The structure to support the retractable roof also weighs 1700 
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ton. Because of the large weight and size, there may be some malfunc-
tions when opening and closing the roof. So, the canceling of the re-
tractable roof reduces the risks of the Stadium’s safety. 
6.9 .2 .2  Cons  o f  Cance l l ing  the  Ret rac tab le  Roof  
 Incur Design Consortium’s Claim 
Because the cancellation of the retractable roof is a great change to 
the design, many parts need to be redesigned, especially the steel 
structure and the film system. Almost all steel structure design needs to 
be renewed. So the design consortium claimed 40,000,000 RMB for re-
design the project. That’s almost one third of the primary design fee 
(120,000,000 RMB). 
 Delay the Schedule and Cause the Cost Overrun 
Because there are many disputes about the cancellation of the re-
tractable roof, the BMG invited many experts to discuss and evalua-
tion it. After the discussion and the negotiation with the Project Com-
pany, the design consortium began to redesign it. But the redesign of 
the architecture and the structure need time, so at last, the contrac-
tor sometimes have to stop construction and waits for new construc-
tion drawings. In all, this change delayed the construction schedule 
for about half a year.  
As the Stadium must be completed in time for the 2008 Olympic 
Games to be hold in August 2008, the contractor has to work quickly 
to complete the first part of the project (the main structure) by De-
cember 31, 2006, and adopts many technical measures to speed 
construction. This leads to a huge cost overrun and the main con-
tractor BUCGC therefore claims compensation fees for these addi-
tional technical measures. But the Project Company thinks this is 
caused by the BMG and the BMG should bear these additional costs. 
The disputes are still under negotiation now. 
 Influence the Operation 
The influence of canceling the retractable roof on the operation of 
the project after 2008 Olympic Games includes three aspects. 
First, it reduces the operation fee. Opening and closing the retracta-
ble roof need operation fee. After canceling the retractable roof, this 
part of operation fee will be zero. But the Project Company thinks this 
part is not very big because there will be no more than 10 times of 
opening and closing the retractable roof in a year. Maintaining the 
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retractable roof also need money. After canceling it, this part of 
maintenance fee is also saved. 
Second, it reduces the revenue of holding large performances and 
other events. In the original operation plan, the Project Company 
wants to develop five markets: the sports market, the sports exhibition 
market, the sports activities market, the cultural performances market 
and the tourism market. But the canceling of the retractable roof 
makes the Stadium from an all-weather stadium to an open air sta-
dium. The weather will influence many activities held in the Stadium. 
So the Project Company will lose many contracts of renting the Sta-
dium. The loss can’t be predicated now. 
Third, it reduces the Stadium’s brand value. The Stadium was consi-
dered to be the only large stadium with a retractable roof in China. So 
the Project Company thinks it will be the most famous stadium in China 
and will attract many big companies to buy the name right of this 
project. After canceling the retractable, the Stadium will have no ob-
vious unique characteristic to other large stadiums. The Project Com-
pany now is worrying about the brand value of the project. 
6.9 .3  R i sks  in  the  P ro jec t  
The Institute of International Engineering Project Management of Tsinghua 
University has carried a study on risk assessment of sport venues for 2008 
Olympic Games and has identified key risks associated with the Stadium 
project especially the four main mostly critical ones. 
 
 Irrational Construction Schedule 
The construction must be finished on December 31, 2006 as requested 
by the BMG while the signing of the Concession Agreement was on 
August 9, 2003, there were only about 3 years left for construction. 
However, as the Stadium’s technology standard is very high and the 
function is very complex, it took the contractor a lot of time in construc-
tion planning. What’s more, the canceling of the retractable roof 
caused construction delay for about half a year as the design drawings 
can’t be provided in time. The remaining construction schedule is very 
pressing.  
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 Cost Overrun 
The 3D steel frame system of the Stadium is very complex and there is 
no similar project in China especially that many parts must be incised 
and weld for two or three times. The inflated ETFE cushions installed to 
the proposed scale is quite innovative as building materials with few 
past experiences. Together with the nest-like steel structure, these 
caused potential fabrication, installation and maintenance problems. 
All these lead to a huge cost overrun which deteriorated the project 
balance sheet. And the risk can’t be solved now. 
 Small Market 
The concepts and themes for the National Stadium’s design and con-
struction will make it the most pre-eminent large-scale sport and per-
formance facility in China. As such, it has integrated the most world-
advanced high technology features as well as environment friendly 
operation processes. However, the biggest competitor of the National 
Stadium, i.e. the Workers’ Stadium, will continue to enjoy certain advan-
tages including lower operation costs and charges due to its investment 
having already been amortized. The National Stadium must create its 
own image and brand identity to capture the interest of future costu-
mers and establish customer loyalty. To this end, it must create its own 
cultural and humane atmosphere and attract the best domestic and 
international sports events and performing arts agencies. Excellent ser-
vices and advanced management techniques will be essential in at-
tracting those agencies and the public. 
Nevertheless, the National Stadium’s market is still small scale. Only non-
commercial government-run large-scale events and private enterprises 
large-scale events will take place in the National Stadium. In order to 
build the image of the National Stadium nationwide and worldwide, 
these events must be widely broadcasted. There will be only 16 big 
events per year as forecast. So, if the market is smaller than forecast, 
there will be a large budget deficits for the Project Company. 
 Lack of Operation Experience 
The performances held in the National Stadium will make the venue a 
new window of China to the rest of the world. The performances will in-
clude large-scale shows displaying Chinese culture as well as solo and 
group concerts by performers both from home and abroad. As to its fu-
ture clients, the Project Company will establish relationships with sports 
federations, whether national, regional or international. Specific atten-
tion will also be given to establishing relationships with relevant govern-
ment agencies such as the State Sports Administration, the Ministry of 
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Culture, and broadcasting agencies under the authority of the Ministry 
of Communication and foreign news agencies. The economic viability 
of large sport venues is also very much dependent upon the patronage 
of corporate clients. To this end the Project Company will develop rela-
tionships with all major domestic and foreign enterprises so as to ensure 
that National Stadium services and products meet the requirements of 
those organizations.  
However the Project Company has never operated a Stadium, so they 
don’t know how to operate it. They have signed a strategic operational 
agreement with Stade de France® seeking for consultation for the effi-
cient operation of the National Stadium and a smooth transfer of know-
how from Stade de France® to the Project Company. But the agree-
ment may be terminated because of the high consultation fee. The 
Project Company is preparing to solve these problems all by themselves 
now. For example, the park outside the Stadium is so hard to manage 
for the Project Company, so it may be sublet to an advertisement 
company. The latter can have advertisements in the park at a proper 
location, and generate revenue from it. 
6.10  Summary  
As the National Stadium will be the main stadium for the 29th Olympic Games 
where the opening and closing ceremonies, the track and field competitions 
and the football final game will be held during the Games, it is therefore a 
must to have the project finished in time. But as known, most stadiums in the 
world can’t get enough revenue from their own operation. To make the Na-
tional Stadium viable for BOT application, the BMG has provided a lot of sup-
ports and incentives including contributing 58% of the total investment but 
asking no return. The public and private sectors, as authorized by the BMG, 
then set up jointly a Project Company, responsible for the financing, construc-
tion, operation, maintenance of the Stadium and will transfer it back to the 
BMG after 30 years of concession period. However, there are some disputes 
appeared up to now and these disputes especially the cancellation of the re-
tractable roof have resulted or will result in problems which require both the 
Public and Public to solve clearly as no single party wants or can bear the 
negative impact alone. As both the CITIC and the BUCGC are state-
controlled or owned large enterprises in China, they have to carry out the 
project in time by all means and re-negotiation between the Public and the 
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Public and among the partners may be one of the good ways in finding solu-
tions.  
From the project, the following lessons could be learnt: 
 
 Government’s supports & commitments is important especially for 
projects of this kind; 
 Project scope should be well defined before signing agree-
ments/contracts and a project company’s shareholder agreement and 
design/construction contracts should be well formulated so as to avoid 
disputes in future; 
 All parties should have common project objectives pursuing overall ef-
ficiency and cost reduction etc during the whole project life cycle; 
 Proper risk management is critical, especially that it should align the Pri-
vate’s interests with the Public, have clear/strong contractual arrange-
ments and enforcement; 
 When disputes appeared, sometimes re-negotiation among partners es-
pecially with government is more efficient and effective than media-
tion/arbitration/lawsuit. 
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 Questions for Readers to Answer 
1. Is the National Stadium suitable for adopting PPP given its unique 
and special characteristics? 
2. How to ensure a state-owned enterprise in the Project Company to 
act as an independent legal entity? 
3. Is the decision of cancellation of the retractable roof right or not? 
4. What adjustments to the concession agreement should be made in 
response to the cancellation of the retractable roof of the National 
Stadium? 
5. How to solve the disputes arisen in the National Stadium project? 
6. How to improve the risk management of the National Stadium 
project? 
7. According to your prediction, what will be the future of the Project 
Company and its partners? 
